Back to History Current Version

Delegation, Monitoring, and Incentives: A Field Experiment in Supply Chain Governance

Last registered on August 08, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
ESG Supply Chain Management
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016528
Initial registration date
August 07, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 08, 2025, 7:25 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
The University of Hong Kong

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
The University of Hong Kong

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2025-06-30
End date
2026-03-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines the systemic integration of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) practices in global supply chains, tackling the challenge of aligning smaller suppliers with the sustainability goals of large downstream firms. In collaboration with a major publicly listed company in China, we utilize comprehensive firm-level data to test innovative, cost-effective mechanisms for enhancing supplier ESG performance. Grounded in organizational economics, our experimental design draws on multitasking and delegation theories to examine the allocation of decision-making authority. Horizontally, we evaluate how data verification and incentive structures influence balanced ESG advancement among suppliers. Vertically, we compare the effects of mandated versus self-selected ESG improvement metrics on supplier engagement and efficiency. By rigorously assessing ESG and financial performance across experimental groups, this research delivers scalable, theory-driven insights to advance sustainable supply chain practices, offering valuable contributions to both academic scholarship and practical application.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
He, Guojun and Qinrui Xiahou. 2025. "ESG Supply Chain Management." AEA RCT Registry. August 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16528-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Targeted versus comprehensive ESG data verification, strong versus weak incentive structure, and mandated versus self-selected ESG improvement metrics in supply chain management
Intervention Start Date
2025-09-01
Intervention End Date
2026-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
ESG and financial performance of suppliers
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Control;
T1 (Vertical Intervention): T1A (Mandated ESG Improvement Metrics) versus T1B (Self-Selected ESG Improvement Metrics);
T2 (Horizontal Intervention): T2A (Comprehensive ESG Data Verification) versus T2B (Targeted ESG Data Verification), and T2C (Weak Incentive) versus T2D (Strong Incentive)
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Block Randomization
Randomization Unit
Firm (Supplier)
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
N/A
Sample size: planned number of observations
150 firms * 12 months
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
50 firms in control and 50 firms in each of the treatment arms (T1A-T2D)
* Note that our treatment arms are cross-cutting with each other to investigate the interaction between different combinations of management practices
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number