Intervention(s)
This is a laboratory experiment implementing a three-stage election game. In each of 25 periods, two candidates simultaneously propose a fiscal platform. The platform consists of a budget or tax rate and an allocation of that budget between a public good that benefits all voters and a private good interpreted as political rents. Five voters then observe the platforms and vote for candidate A or candidate B. The electoral outcome determines political influence through a power-sharing rule.
The design includes seven treatments:
Treatment T1 (Baseline) implements the model with a proportional power-sharing rule, low partisan intensity, human voters, and partial fiscal transparency, where voters observe only the proposed tax and public good levels and must infer corruption from the budget constraint.
Treatment T2 (Automated Voters) is identical to the baseline, except that the five human voters are replaced by five automated agents programmed to vote sincerely for the party offering them the highest utility. Comparison between T1 and T2 tests Hypothesis 2.
Treatment T3 (Transparency) is identical to the baseline, except that voters are explicitly shown the level of rents proposed by each candidate. Comparison between T1 and T3 tests Hypothesis 3.
Treatment T4 (Disproportional Rule) is identical to the baseline, except that it implements a more disproportional power-sharing rule. The comparison between T1 and T4 provides a direct test of Hypothesis 1.
Treatments T5--T6 (Disproportionality--Partisanship Interaction) replicate the proportional and disproportional power-sharing rules under stronger partisan intensity. Together with T1 and T4, they form a two-by-two factorial design that varies the electoral rule and the strength of partisan bias, providing a direct test of Hypothesis 4.
Treatment T7 (Public-Good Gambit) is a scripted-candidate election treatment in which the candidates' platforms are pre-programmed by the computer. In each round, five human voters observe the two platforms under full transparency and cast their votes, so the electoral outcome continues to depend on aggregate voter support. The scripted platform pairs are organized around two benchmark environments: one in which the benchmark platform provides the socially efficient amount of the public good, and one in which the benchmark platform provides too little of the public good. In each environment, the opposing scripted platform combines a fixed increase in rents with different amounts of additional public-good provision.
The experiment uses a common theoretical calibration in which both private consumption and public-good benefits are valued with diminishing marginal returns, there is no office rent or valence advantage built into the candidates, income is fixed across participants, and partisan bias is introduced through an individual-specific predisposition toward one of the candidates. Some treatments use weaker partisan bias and others use stronger partisan bias.
Hypothesis 1 (H1):Greater power-sharing disproportionality is expected to promote stronger fiscal discipline. Under the disproportional rule treatment, relative to the proportional baseline, we predict that candidates will propose lower levels of corruption, greater provision of public goods, and, as a result, higher aggregate voter welfare.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Policy payoffs lead voters to electorally punish rent-seeking behavior and reward public-good provision. Under the assumption of voter rationality, we predict no significant differences between a treatment with automated utility-maximizing voters and a baseline with human voters.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Greater fiscal transparency does not necessarily improve voter accountability. Under the assumption of voter rationality, we predict that equilibrium policy will be similar in a treatment where political rent levels are explicitly disclosed to voters and in a baseline where corruption must be inferred from the budget constraint.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Greater disproportionality weakens the rent-increasing effect of stronger partisanship. When the electoral rule and partisan intensity are varied independently, we predict that the increase in corruption caused by stronger partisanship will be smaller under the disproportional rule than under the proportional baseline.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The electoral viability of the public-good gambit depends on whether public-good provision at the benchmark platform is already socially efficient. Comparing candidate vote shares across scripted platform pairs, we predict that combining higher rents with additional public goods should not improve electoral support when the benchmark platform already provides the efficient amount of the public good, but can improve support when the benchmark platform provides too little of the public good and the increase in public-good provision is large enough.