Estimating the Human Costs of Debtor Prisons

Last registered on August 25, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Estimating the Human Costs of Debtor Prisons
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016609
Initial registration date
August 22, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 25, 2025, 8:40 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Adam Osman
Affiliation
University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Kareem Haggag
PI Affiliation
UCLA
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PI Name
Abdelrahman Nagy
PI Affiliation
Maastricht University
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PI Name
Ahmed Ahmed
PI Affiliation
Babson College
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-10-01
End date
2028-08-30
Keywords
Crime, Violence, & Conflict, Finance & Microfinance, Gender
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We aim to provide causal evidence on the social costs of debtor prisons and on the financial market consequences of its potential abolition in Egypt. To do so, we will conduct a set of randomized controlled trials. The first randomized experiments will be with an NGO that pays off the debts of prisoners (and those facing prison), thereby releasing them. This will provide a rigorous estimate of how debtor prisons affect the lives and debtors and their families. Second, we will run an experiment with a microfinance institution to estimate the extent of moral hazard in credit markets. Together we will be able to provide the first estimates on the benefits and potential costs of abolishing debtor prisons as an institution.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Ahmed, Ahmed et al. 2025. "Estimating the Human Costs of Debtor Prisons." AEA RCT Registry. August 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16609-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Experiment 1: Intervention 1: Debt repayment as a grant, Intervention 2: Debt repayment as a loan
Intervention Start Date
2025-10-15
Intervention End Date
2027-10-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Experiment 1: Employment, income, consumption, education of the children, and psycho-social well-being. We intend to collect this for the debtor and other members of the household. We are particularly interested in the outcomes for children in the household, who we suspect may be significantly impacted given their vulnerability.

Experiment 2: Application & Default Rates
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experiment 1: Treatment 1 will receive debt repayment as a grant, Treatment 2 will receive debt repayment as a loan. Control will receive it at a later date if funds permit.

Experiment 2: We will vary the way we will advertise to people about the opportunity to take out a new loan. For some individuals, a letter will note that for this loan the bank will not be reporting delinquent clients to the criminal authorities and instead will work with them to make sure they repay on time (group 1). Others will just receive a message about a normal loan (group 2).

We will then run a second level of randomization. Those that were told there would be no prosecution of delinquency will be split into a group that is only told that (group 1a) and another group that is told that as well as told about the reporting to a credit bureau (group 1b).

Those that were initially sent a generic letter will be split into three groups, a group informed about no prison-risk group (group 2a), and a group informed about no prison + credit reporting (group 2b), and a normal group who is not informed about the change in prison risk (group 2c). None of these clients will face prison-risk if they default, even if they are not initially informed of this.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Experiments 1 & 2: Randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization Unit
Experiments 1 & 2: Individual level randomization
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Experiment 1: 3000 debtors

Experiment 2: 2500 potential clients
Sample size: planned number of observations
Experiment 1: 3000 debtors Experiment 2: 2500 potential clients
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Experiment 1: 1500 treatment debtors, 1500 control debtors

Experiment 2: 500 potential clients in each treatment arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
UCLA
IRB Approval Date
2025-07-31
IRB Approval Number
IRB-23-0463-AM-001
IRB Name
AUC
IRB Approval Date
2025-08-05
IRB Approval Number
2024-2025-282
Analysis Plan