Framing Winners and Losers: Distributional Outcomes and Support for Carbon Pricing

Last registered on October 27, 2025

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Framing Winners and Losers: Distributional Outcomes and Support for Carbon Pricing
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016768
Initial registration date
October 02, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 06, 2025, 11:39 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
October 27, 2025, 12:41 PM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
RWI - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2025-10-13
End date
2025-11-14
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Climate policy is increasingly contested in the political arena, with opponents portraying it as costly, illegitimate, or a threat to personal freedom, thereby triggering public backlash that is reinforced by negative media coverage and amplified through social media. This project investigates the extent to which opposition to climate policy stems from biased political framing. We conduct an online survey experiment with German households, randomly exposing participants to messages that emphasize either the inequality-reducing benefits (positive frame) or the potential societal costs (negative frame) of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (EU ETS 2). In addition, we randomize the attribution of the negative frame to a political party to test whether partisan cues amplify or mitigate opposition through affective polarization. The study examines how framing winners and losers shapes public support for climate policy by focusing on perceptions of distributional justice.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Kaestner, Kathrin and Puja Singhal. 2025. "Framing Winners and Losers: Distributional Outcomes and Support for Carbon Pricing." AEA RCT Registry. October 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16768-2.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We conduct an online survey experiment with German households living in rental housing, randomly assigning participants to receive information about the upcoming EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (EU-ETS2), which will take effect in 2027, framed either to emphasize negative consequences (costs and burdens) or positive outcomes (fairness and improved living conditions) for disadvantaged households.
Intervention (Hidden)
In total, we generate four experimental groups:
(1) Control - Neutral, factual information about the policy without any distributional framing or political attribution. This message is seen by all experimental groups.
(2) Negative Frame, Anonymous - Quote by a politician that emphasizes costs or burdens of the policy (e.g., higher expenses, unfairness, social division).
(3) Negative Frame, with Politician Cue - Identical to the negative frame, but explicitly attributed to a named politician including party affiliation. This tests whether political source cues amplify or polarize reactions along partisan lines— i.e., evidence of affective polarization.
(4) Positive Frame - Factual message that emphasizes benefits of the policy (e.g., reducing inequality, fairness, or broader social gains).
Please refer to the Pre-Analysis Plan for further details.
Intervention Start Date
2025-10-13
Intervention End Date
2025-11-02

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The study focuses on three primary outcomes. We seek to measure the extent to which alternative framings of the upcoming EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (EU ETS2) shape (1) public attitudes toward the policy (e.g. general support, perceived social justice, perceived effectiveness, perceived cost burden), (2) political alignment, specifically voters’ willingness to support politicians/political party who endorse/oppose the policy, and (3) the role of affective polarization, specifically whether people’s attitudes toward the policy diverge depending on their partisan alignment.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Throughout our analysis, we elicit stated support and further attitudes towards the EU ETS 2 using a 5-point Likert scale. We will test whether the politician cue in the third treatment arm amplifies the negative frame along partisan lines. That is, we will capture whether partisan support moderates the effect of the cue, which is the essence of affective polarization.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The study investigates three secondary outcomes. First, how the framing influences tenants’ willingness to accept higher rents in exchange for lower energy costs. Second, the personal burden mechanisms through which framing may shape support for the EU ETS2, focusing on perceptions of relative economic position and whether respondents themselves live in an unrenovated dwelling. Third, whether respondents can identify the evaluative direction of the framing (i.e., whether the policy is presented in a more favorable or unfavorable light) using a 5-point Likert scale, and how more informed respondents (those with prior knowledge of the EU ETS29 are better able to recognize framing directions.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Please refer to the Pre-Analysis Plan for further details.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
All respondents first receive a neutral baseline message with factual information about the policy (EU ETS2). They are then randomly assigned to one of three framing conditions: a negative frame emphasizing costs and inquality using an anonymous quote, identical negative frame but with explicit attribution to a politician/party affiliation, or a positive frame highlighting benefits such as fairness and inequality reduction.
Experimental Design Details
The experiment begins with an introduction to the upcoming EU Emissions Trading Scheme 2 (ETS2), which from 2027 will place a price on CO₂ emissions from heating fuels and transport across Europe, replacing the existing German CO₂ price. Respondents are informed about the initial price, with future prices determined largely by supply and demand but subject to regulation, while Germany’s CO₂ cost-sharing law between tenants and landlords will remain in effect. Participants are also asked about their prior awareness of the ETS2, with response options ranging from full knowledge to never having heard of it.

They are then randomly assigned to one of three framing conditions:
(1) Negative frame: Message highlighting costs and burdens of the policy (e.g., higher expenses, unfairness, social division).
(2) Negative frame with politician cue: Identical to the negative frame, but explicitly attributed to a named politician to test the role of political source cues.
(3) Positive frame: Message emphasizing benefits of the policy, such as fairness, inequality reduction, and broader social gains.
Randomization Method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization unit is at the survey respondent level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
None
Sample size: planned number of observations
The experiment will involve approximately 5,700 tenants who are heads of their households across Germany.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Approximately 1400 household heads per treatment arm.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
German Association for Experimental Economic Research
IRB Approval Date
2025-10-02
IRB Approval Number
K87YBJPq
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials