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Field
Abstract
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Before
This study tests whether providing local government officials with better information and non-financial recognition can improve the allocation of public drinking water wells in rural Bangladesh. Naturally occurring arsenic in groundwater affects tens of millions of people in Bangladesh and poses major health and economic risks. Each year, the government installs a limited number of deep wells to provide arsenic-safe water, but these wells are not always placed where they would benefit the most people.
In this randomized controlled trial, 142 Upazila Nirbahi Officers (UNOs)—subdistrict-level administrators—are randomly assigned to either receive access to a web-based planning tool or continue using their usual decision-making process, with minimal intervention from the government. The tool shows arsenic contamination levels across villages and allows UNOs to simulate the public health impact of different well allocations. In addition, high-performing UNOs will receive public recognition through an award.
The main outcome is how efficiently UNOs allocate wells, measured by how many arsenic-exposed households benefit from their allocations relative to the maximum possible impact given their budget. This study aims to inform policies on how to better motivate and equip public officials to improve environmental risk mitigation in low-resource settings.
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After
This study tests whether providing local government officials with better information and non-financial recognition can improve the allocation of public drinking water wells in rural Bangladesh. Naturally occurring arsenic in groundwater affects tens of millions of people in Bangladesh and poses major health and economic risks. Each year, the government installs a limited number of deep wells to provide arsenic-safe water, but these wells are not always placed where they would benefit the most people.
In this randomized controlled trial, 200 Union Chairpersons, who dictate the allocation of governmental wells within their jurisdiction, are cross-randomized into either receiving an access to a web-based planning tool and/or receiving an incentive to prioritize high-arsenic regions within their unions. The tool shows arsenic contamination levels across villages and allows UNOs to simulate the public health impact of different well allocations. The incentive provides non-pecuniary benefits (bonus wells) when the union chairperson prioritizes high-arsenic regions.
The main outcome is how efficiently the union chairperson allocate wells, measured by how many arsenic-exposed households benefit from their allocations relative to the maximum possible impact given their budget. This study aims to explore the frictions of achieving optimal allocation of governmental resources in low-resource settings.
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