Digital Technology, Meritocracy and Rent-seeking, Experiment in China

The advancement of digital technology enables governments to access vast amounts of data, raising concerns about centralization and privacy infringement. However, many local governments actively pursue digital governance initiatives, prompting a key question: What motivates local officials? One explanation is that digital technology creates rent-seeking opportunities. This paper conducts a randomized experiment involving more than 2,000 Chinese civil servants, introducing two information interventions: merit intervention and low-pay intervention. Participants choose between automated and manually managed projects. We find that when officials receive both merit-intervention and low-pay intervention, they exhibit a stronger preference for retaining human discretion in digital governance, favoring automated technologies over manually managed projects. Using a list experiment, we show that officials recognize the rent-seeking opportunities embedded in automated governance and, after treatment, display greater tolerance for corruption. We attribute this to the sharp contrast between the intense competition for public office and the relatively low salaries. We also rule out alternative explanations, including technocratic enthusiasm, distrust in technology, power-seeking motives, and prosocial behavior. Our findings provide new insights into the political economy of digital governance by shedding light on the motivations driving government officials to adopt digital technologies.