Inequality, Antisocial Sentiments, and the Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Last registered on October 22, 2025
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Inequality, Antisocial Sentiments, and the Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0016967
Initial registration date
October 07, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 22, 2025, 12:49 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Hong Kong
Region
Hong Kong

Primary Investigator

Name
Simon Fan
Affiliation
Lingnan University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2025-06-09
End date
2025-12-31
Keywords
Behavior, Governance, Lab, Post-conflict, Welfare
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This project aims to conduct a theoretical and empirical investigation into the impacts of inequality on antisocial sentiments and the voluntary contributions to public goods. It posits that inequality tens to foster antisocial sentiments, which discourages the contributions to public goods from the poor. There is voluminous literature on the voluntary contributions to public goods in experimental economics and other social sciences. However, most of this literature assumes that the inputs to obtain the public good are the same as the inputs to obtain the private good, which essentially downplays the role of the poor’s in the production of the public good. Our project differs from the literature mainly in that the public good (e.g. committing crimes, fighting in the battlefield against foreign invaders) has totally different inputs from that for private good, which suggests that the poor’s actions would matter greatly to everyone’s welfare.
We will conduct a randomized experiment in a laboratory setting at a university in China. University students will be recruited and randomly assigned to different experimental groups.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Fan, Simon. 2025. "Inequality, Antisocial Sentiments, and the Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. October 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.16967-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We will conduct a randomized experiment in a laboratory setting at a university in China. University students will be recruited and randomly assigned to different experimental groups.
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2025-10-01
Intervention End Date
2025-11-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The responses of the participants of the experiments.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Instruction of the experiments

Note: All experimental instructions are translated into English from their original versions in Chinese.

Experiment description: Setting N

Thank you for participating in our experimental study! Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please feel free to raise your hand and a staff member will come to address your question. Please note that you are not permitted to communicate with other participants during the experiment.

Beyond your show-up payment, which is RMB20, you will be additionally compensated for your participation if you complete the entire task. Your additional payment will be jointly determined by your decisions and the decisions of other members of your group, according to the instructions that follow.


Participant matching rules:

There are 10 rounds of the game you are about to play. At the beginning of each round, you and another randomly selected participant in this session will form a two-person group. In other words, in each round, participants in this session will be divided into several groups of 2 members each, to play the game together.

At the beginning of each round, the participants in each group will be determined randomly by the system. This means that the participants in your group will change in each round. The formation of groups is completely randomly and independently determined across rounds.

Game rules:

Content introduction:

You will be allocated two types of endowments: (1) health (2) wealth. You need both health and wealth to consume, and your payment will be determined by the your total amount of consumption, which will take place in two separate stages.
Each round of the game has five stages which will occur in sequence. Your INITIAL wealth, which differs from that of your teammate, is determined in Stage 1 as detailed later. Please be aware that you and your teammate will receive varying amounts of wealth. In Stage 1, you and your teammate will receive the same amount of health, which are 100 units. Health is a necessary input for consumption and the only input for combat.
Combat takes place in Stage 3, which will be elaborated more later. In this stage, imagine that you and your teammate are amidst a scenario where there is a foreign invasion, requiring both of you to unite in battle. If your team is defeated by the foreign invader, both you and your teammate will suffer a 60% loss of your wealth. Conversely, if your team emerges victorious, both you and your teammate will maintain your original wealth. You and your teammate need to devote “health” to fight against foreign invaders.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
We will conduct a randomized experiment in a laboratory setting at a university in China. University students will be recruited and randomly assigned to different experimental groups.
Randomization Unit
A laboratory in Wuhan University, China
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
400 students in Wuhan University
Sample size: planned number of observations
400
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
400
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Lingnan University
IRB Approval Date
2023-04-05
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials