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Field
Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
completed
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Abstract
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Before
Collective decisions in the real world rarely occur in isolation but within systems where authority shapes norms, expectations, and outcomes. While extensive research has examined leadership in cooperative behavior, the distinct influence of authority, in particular how its legitimacy affects compliance remains underexplored. This gap is especially critical in environmental dilemmas where technical solutions require deeper understanding of human behavioral responses to different sources of power.
This study investigates how different sources of authority influence rule compliance in a public bad game, and how the authorities themselves perceive the sources of power. Authorities are randomly assigned to one of four sources of power (Consensus, Merit, Random, or Win-the-Struggle) and set a rule r ∈ {0,1,…,10}. Group members make conditional compliance choices using the strategy method and are paid according to the rule actually chosen by their Authority. Since the rule is payoff-neutral, any systematic variation in compliance identifies non-monetary motives.
Experimental setup
Our experimental design consists of two distinct experiments conducted in the following order:
(i) the Authority Side (Part_one), where a series of tasks are performed and rules are collected; and (ii) the Group Member Side (Part_two), where participants play a Public Bad Game (PBG) in groups of five using the strategy method. More specifically, we run treatments that vary the source of power associated with each Authority.
We study how different sources of power affect rule compliance. The treatments are defined as follows:
T1. Random Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority randomly selected.
T2. Consensus Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority elected by majority rule.
T3. Merit Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority who won a selection based on a combination of an IQ test and an effort task.
T4. Win-the-Struggle Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority who won an all-pay auction.
Hypotheses:
H_1: The distribution of rule choices in Part_one is identical across all sources of power (Random, Consensus, Merit, Win-the-Struggle).
Test: We will compare the distribution of rules chosen by Authorities across treatments using an appropriate non-parametric test.
H_2: The group members’ absolute deviations in Part_two are distributed in the same way across all sources of power.
Test: We will compare the distribution of deviations ( D_i=| x_i − r | ) across the four power sources using an appropriate non-parametric test.
H_3: The behavioural types in Part_two are distributed in the same way across all sources of power.
Test: We will classify subjects into behavioural types according to the shape of their conditional compliance function (investment decisions as function of rule levels). Then, we will compare the distribution of these behavioural types across treatments using an appropriate non-parametric test.
Auxiliary hypotheses:
AH_4: We test whether lower deviations are associated with higher (unconditional) intrinsic respect for rule, as measured by compliance in the Y Task used in Bicchieri, C., Gächter, S., Molleman, L., & Nosenzo, D. (2025).
AH_5: We test whether lower deviations are associated with higher descriptive and normative beliefs.
AH_6. Conditional on the rule level r, investment decisions in the Public Bad Game do not differ across sources of power.
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After
Collective decisions in the real world rarely occur in isolation but within systems where authority shapes norms, expectations, and outcomes. While extensive research has examined leadership in cooperative behavior, the distinct influence of authority, in particular how its legitimacy affects compliance remains underexplored. This gap is especially critical in environmental dilemmas where technical solutions require deeper understanding of human behavioral responses to different sources of power.
This study investigates how different sources of authority influence rule compliance in a public bad game, and how the authorities themselves perceive the sources of power. In addition, we examine whether the mere presence of an Authority affects investment decisions by comparing behavior under Authority with behavior in a standard Public Bad Game without Authority. Authorities are randomly assigned to one of four sources of power (Consensus, Merit, Random, or Win-the-Struggle) and set a rule r ∈ {0,1,…,10}. Group members make conditional compliance choices using the strategy method and are paid according to the rule actually chosen by their Authority. Since the rule is payoff-neutral, any systematic variation in compliance identifies non-monetary motives.
Experimental setup
Our experimental design consists of two distinct experiments conducted in the following order:
(i) the Authority Side (Part_one), where a series of tasks are performed and rules are collected; and (ii) the Group Member Side (Part_two), where participants play a Public Bad Game (PBG) in groups of five using the strategy method. More specifically, we run treatments that vary the source of power associated with each Authority.
We study how different sources of power affect rule compliance. The treatments are defined as follows:
T1. Random Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority randomly selected.
T2. Consensus Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority elected by majority rule.
T3. Merit Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority who won a selection based on a combination of an IQ test and an effort task.
T4. Win-the-Struggle Selection: Group members receive rules from an Authority who won an all-pay auction.
Hypotheses:
H_1: The presence of an Authority affects investment decisions in the Public Bad Game.
Test: We will compare investment decisions in the Public Bad Game between participants exposed to an Authority and participants playing the Public Bad Game without Authority (PBG without Authority). We will test whether the distribution of investment decisions differs between the Authority and No-Authority conditions using an appropriate non-parametric test.
H_2: The distribution of rule choices in Part_one is identical across all sources of power (Random, Consensus, Merit, Win-the-Struggle).
Test: We will compare the distribution of rules chosen by Authorities across treatments using an appropriate non-parametric test.
H_3: The group members’ absolute deviations in Part_two are distributed in the same way across all sources of power.
Test: We will compare the distribution of deviations ( D_i=| x_i − r | ) across the four power sources using an appropriate non-parametric test.
H_4: The behavioural types in Part_two are distributed in the same way across all sources of power.
Test: We will classify subjects into behavioural types according to the shape of their conditional compliance function (investment decisions as function of rule levels). Then, we will compare the distribution of these behavioural types across treatments using an appropriate non-parametric test.
Auxiliary hypotheses:
AH_5: We test whether lower deviations are associated with higher (unconditional) intrinsic respect for rule, as measured by compliance in the Y Task used in Bicchieri, C., Gächter, S., Molleman, L., & Nosenzo, D. (2025).
AH_6: We test whether lower deviations are associated with higher descriptive and normative beliefs.
AH_7. Conditional on the rule level r, investment decisions in the Public Bad Game do not differ across sources of power.
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Last Published
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Before
January 09, 2026 09:01 AM
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After
July 10, 2026 05:26 AM
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Part One:
The main variables from the first part of the experiment are:
(i) the rule chosen by the Authority (r∈{0,…,10}).
Part Two:
The main variables from the second part of the experiment are:
(i) the Absolute Deviation of each participant from the rule (D_i= | x_i − r | );
(ii) the behavioural type for each participant based on their conditional investment decisions;
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After
Part One:
The main variables from the first part of the experiment are:
(i) the rule chosen by the Authority (r∈{0,…,10}).
Part Two:
The main variables from the second part of the experiment are:
(i) Investment decisions in the Public Bad Game;
(ii) the Absolute Deviation of each participant from the rule (D_i= | x_i − r | );
(iii) the behavioural type for each participant based on their conditional investment decisions;
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
In our setting, compliance is defined as the degree to which an individual’s decis align with the established rule r. For each possible rule r∈[0,10], participants indicate their intended investment x(r) using the strategy method. The individual deviation from the rule is measured as representing the absolute distance between the prescribed behavior and the actual decision.
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After
In our setting, compliance is defined as the degree to which an individual's decisions align with the established rule r. For each possible rule r∈[0,10], participants indicate their intended investment x(r) using the strategy method. The individual deviation from the rule is measured as representing the absolute distance between the prescribed behavior and the actual decision.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The experiment consists of two sequential parts: an Authority side (Part_one) and a Group Member side (Part_two), conducted with separate samples of participants.
In the Authority part, participants are randomly assigned to one of four sources of power — Random, Consensus, Merit, and Win-the-Struggle. Each participant acts as an Authority responsible for setting a rule. Authorities are informed that their decision will later be used with a different group of participants (the Group Members), but will have no direct payoff consequences for themselves or others in this stage.
Each Authority is asked to (i) choose a rule r∈{0,1,…,10} indicating the recommended investment level for group members who will play a Public Bad Game; (ii) report their own preferred investment level; (iii) state beliefs about average investment decisions of others (beliefs about compliance); and (iv) state beliefs about the rule choices of other Authorities exposed to the same source of power. These additional measures capture the Authority’s expectations and preferences beyond the chosen rule.
In the Group Member part, a separate sample of participants—who never interact directly with the Authorities—are randomly matched in groups of five and assigned to one of the same four power-source conditions. Participants at the beginning complete the Y task and later make conditional investment decisions for each possible rule between 0 and 10 (strategy method). The actual rule is implemented for payment. After the Public Bad Game, Group Members report beliefs about others’ deviations and beliefs about what others think one should do.
Final payoffs consist of a fixed participation fee plus a variable bonus determined by the realized rule and the participant’s actual decision in the Public Bad Game.
In addition, another group of participants plays the Public Bad Game under the same parameters but without Authority and any rules (no treatment- Standard PBG). Decisions are one-shot and unconditional, and all other procedures are identical to Part Two.
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After
The experiment consists of two sequential parts: an Authority side (Part_one) and a Group Member side (Part_two), conducted with separate samples of participants.
In the Authority part, participants are randomly assigned to one of four sources of power — Random, Consensus, Merit, and Win-the-Struggle. Each participant acts as an Authority responsible for setting a rule. Authorities are informed that their decision will later be used with a different group of participants (the Group Members), but will have no direct payoff consequences for themselves or others in this stage.
Each Authority is asked to (i) choose a rule r∈{0,1,…,10} indicating the recommended investment level for group members who will play a Public Bad Game; (ii) report their own preferred investment level; (iii) state beliefs about average investment decisions of others (beliefs about compliance); and (iv) state beliefs about the rule choices of other Authorities exposed to the same source of power. These additional measures capture the Authority’s expectations and preferences beyond the chosen rule.
In the Group Member part, a separate sample of participants—who never interact directly with the Authorities—are randomly matched in groups of five and assigned to one of the same four power-source conditions. Participants at the beginning complete the Y task and later make conditional investment decisions for each possible rule between 0 and 10 (strategy method). The actual rule is implemented for payment. After the Public Bad Game, Group Members report beliefs about others’ deviations and beliefs about what others think one should do.
Final payoffs consist of a fixed participation fee plus a variable bonus determined by the realized rule and the participant’s actual decision in the Public Bad Game.
In addition, another group of participants plays the Public Bad Game under the same parameters but without an Authority or any rule (PBG without Authority).
Decisions are one-shot and unconditional, and all other procedures are identical to Part Two.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
Part One: 90 groups of 2 participants for treatment,
Part Two: 90 groups of 5 participants for treatment plus 10 groups of participants for Standard PBG.
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After
Part One: 90 groups of 2 participants for treatment,
Part Two: 90 groups of 5 participants for treatment, plus 90 groups of 5 participants for PBG without Authority.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
Part One: 720 participants in total.
Part Two: 1850 participants in total.
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After
Part One: 720 participants in total.
Part Two: 1850 participants in total plus 450 participants in total for PBG without Authority.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
Part One: 180 participants for treatment.
Part Two: 450 participants for treatment plus 50 participants for Standard PBG.
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After
Part One: 180 participants for treatment.
Part Two: 450 participants for treatment plus 450 participants for PBG without Authority.
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