Political Collusion and Civic Resistance to Organized Crime

The intervention takes place in the context of an online questionnaire delivered by a professional panel provider. A randomly selected subset of respondents are provided with a prime about political collusion, while a second subset are given official information about the prevalence of collusion among Italian public officials. A third subset receives neither the priming nor the information.

The members of the Collusion Priming Group (T1) are primed about the existence of an official report about collusion episodes between politicians and public officials and OCGs. Specifically, they are asked whether they are aware of the existence of a recent report by the Italian Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) concerning collusion episodes between public officials and mafia groups.

The members of the Collusion Priming + Information Group (T2), after being primed about the report, are given two pieces of information drawn from the report, plus an additional information about the dissolution of Italian public administration for mafia infiltration. The information is delivered in a brief paragraph that reads as follows (translation in English by the PI, respondents are addressed in Italian): "The report shows how these episodes of collusion with mafia groups are very frequent and spread from North to South. Between 2016 and 2019, on average, the frequency was of one documented episode per week. Furthermore, the report points out that some politicians and public servants are corrupted by mafias with relatively small amounts of money, averaging between 2000 and 3000 euros. In the most serious instances, these collusion episodes have can led to the dissolution of the administration for mafia infiltration, as happened on 393 occasions".

Finally, the members of the Control Group (T0) do not get any priming or information on collusion.

2025-10-17

2025-11-15

1) Behavioral outcomes:

• Donation to public or private organizations (ISPRA vs. Libera/Legambiente) and to organizations devoted to fighting OCGs vs. protecting the environment (Libera vs. ISPRA/Legambiente).


2) Attitudinal outcomes:

• Trust in institutions.

• Concerns about selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion)

• Perceived efficacy of public officials in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion).

• Perceived efficacy of civil society organizations in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion).

• Voting intentions.

1) Behavioral outcomes:

• Donation to public or private organizations (ISPRA vs. Libera/Legambiente) and to organizations devoted to fighting OCGs vs. protecting the environment (Libera vs. ISPRA/Legambiente).


2) Attitudinal outcomes:

• Trust in institutions.

• Concerns about selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion)

• Perceived efficacy of public officials in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion).

• Perceived efficacy of civil society organizations in solving selected issues (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, tax evasion).

• Voting intentions.

The survey flow consists of the following:

- Informed consent to the participation and disclaimers in accordance with the GDPR regulations and requirements of the Research Ethics Committee of Bocconi University.

- Screening demographic questions ensuring representativity of the sample.

- Questions on social and political attitudes at baseline, ensuring representativity of the sample and to be used for heterogeneity and robustness checks.

- Experimental condition delivery. Each subject is randomized into one of three experimental conditions exposing them to (see above for details about what each treatment condition entails):
I. Collusion Priming (T1).
II. Collusion Priming + Information (T2).
III. Control (T0): Baseline condition providing no priming and no information.

- Behavioral outcome elicitation of revealed preference for support to governmental (ISPRA) or non-governmental (Legambiente and Libera) organizations in the form of donation of experimental (windfall) money.

- Outcome elicitation of trust in eight institutions (European Union, Italian government, Italian parliament, Italian President of the Republic, Italian judiciary, Italian law enforcement agencies, regional administrations and municipal administrations).

- Outcome elicitation of three most important issues, to be chosen from a list of six options (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, fiscal evasion).

- Outcome elicitation of public officials’ and civil society organizations’ perceived efficacy in addressing three issues (environmental pollution, mafias and economic inequality).

- Outcome elicitation of voting intentions in the next general election and in the next municipal election.

- Delivery of T2 treatment condition to check for immediate recall ability (T0 only).

- Question asking to recall the information provided from the ANAC report (T0 and T2 only).

The survey flow consists of the following:

- Informed consent to the participation and disclaimers in accordance with the GDPR regulations and requirements of the Research Ethics Committee of Bocconi University.

- Screening demographic questions ensuring representativity of the sample.

- Questions on social and political attitudes at baseline, ensuring representativity of the sample and to be used for heterogeneity and robustness checks.

- Experimental condition delivery. Each subject is randomized into one of three experimental conditions exposing them to (see above for details about what each treatment condition entails):
I. Collusion Priming (T1).
II. Collusion Priming + Information (T2).
III. Control (T0): Baseline condition providing no priming and no information.

- Behavioral outcome elicitation of revealed preference for support to governmental (ISPRA) or non-governmental (Legambiente and Libera) organizations in the form of donation of experimental (windfall) money.

- Outcome elicitation of trust in eight institutions (European Union, Italian government, Italian parliament, Italian President of the Republic, Italian judiciary, Italian law enforcement agencies, regional administrations and municipal administrations).

- Outcome elicitation of three most important issues, to be chosen from a list of six options (mafias, economic inequality, environmental pollution, irregular immigration, school dropout, fiscal evasion).

- Outcome elicitation of public officials’ and civil society organizations’ perceived efficacy in addressing three issues (environmental pollution, mafias and economic inequality).

- Outcome elicitation of voting intentions in the next general election and in the next municipal election.

- Delivery of T2 treatment condition to check for immediate recall ability (T0 only).

- Question asking to recall the information provided from the ANAC report (T0 and T2 only).

Randomization by computer carried out by the panel provider company at the beginning of the interview.

Individual. Each group has quotas to ensure representativeness of the Italian population by age, gender, and geographic location.

No

N.A.

8,000 respondents.

N.A.