Fair (P)redistribution

In the experiment, participants in the role of ``spectators'' determine the incomes of participants in the role of ``workers,'' who earned these incomes from a real-effort task. We focus on two important dimensions that vary between predistribution and redistribution: the timing of the spectator's decision relative to the accrual of worker earnings---before incomes are accrued (ex-ante) vs. after (ex-post)---and the context of changing earnings relative to changing a base payment to both workers.

2025-10-29

2025-11-08

The level of inequality implemented by spectators in our three treatments.

Preferred timing between ex-ante and ex-post, and support for government predistribution and redistribution policies.

We compare spectator choices for three treatments:
(1) Redistribution: Spectator decision made ex post.
(2) Predistribution: Spectator decision made ex ante.
(3) Predistribution + Context: Spectator decision made ex ante with different framing.

The spectators make incentivized choices that have real consequences for two workers, but not for themselves. They also answer a set of attitude questions and a standard set of background questions. We now explain each part in detail.
Our main goal is to elicit spectators' fairness perceptions regarding predistribution and redistribution. Each spectator is randomly assigned to one of the three treatments that vary the timing of the spectators' decisions and the context across spectators.

Treatment: Redistribution
In the benchmark condition, each worker is given a baseline payment of 2 USD. After they have completed the assignment, the workers will be informed that the more productive worker earned an additional 6 USD payment for the assignment, while the other worker did not earn any additional payment, but that a third person could redistribute the additional earnings. The spectators will choose, after the workers have completed the task, whether they want to keep this payment plan or change their payments to any other payment plan from the set: $\mathbf{P} \equiv \{(6,0), (5,1), (4,2), (3,3)\}$. The spectators are explicitly informed that the workers will not be informed about the payment plan prior to completing the task.


Treatment: Predistribution
In the ``Predistribution'' treatment, the spectators will choose a payment plan before the workers complete the task. That is, the spectators will choose whether they want to keep the payment plan of an additional 6 USD for the most productive worker, or change their payments to any other payment plan from the set: $\mathbf{P} \equiv \{(6,0), (5,1), (4,2), (3,3)\}$. However, this decision is taken before the workers complete the task. As in the Redistribution treatment, spectators in the Predistribution treatment are told that the workers will not be informed about the payment plan prior to completing the task.

Treatment: Predistribution + Context
In the ``Pre + Context'' treatment, the spectators will choose a payment plan before the workers complete the task as in the Predistribution. However, the choice is framed as a choice of distributing earnings between a ``base payment'' and a ``top-up payment to the most productive worker.''

Randomization of spectators into treatments and randomized matching of spectators to workers done in office by a computer.

Individual

No

1,250 US spectators and 1,250 Swedish spectators (2,500 total).

2,500 total.

1,000 Redistribution
1,000 Predistribution
500 Predistribution + Context