Willingness to pay for carbon abatement: institutional vs. retail investors in various contexts

Last registered on January 12, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Willingness to pay for carbon abatement: institutional vs. retail investors in various contexts
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017176
Initial registration date
November 04, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 12, 2026, 8:02 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
MIT

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
MIT
PI Affiliation
MIT
PI Affiliation
MIT

Additional Trial Information

Status
Withdrawn
Start date
2025-11-04
End date
2026-05-13
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study how sustainability preferences differ between institutional asset owners, asset managers, and homeowners, focusing on their willingness to pay (WTP) for carbon abatement. While prior survey evidence on sustainable investing largely centers on retail investors’ stated motives, less is known about how professional investors and managers—who make sustainability decisions in practice—value carbon reductions when facing realistic trade-offs. Our game elicits WTP for a ton of carbon in two complementary ways: (1) through direct stated-preference questions and (2) through incentivized vignette choices that simulate realistically calibrated renovation decisions for representative US office or residential buildings. Comparing these elicitation methods allows us to measure how participants’ WTP to reduce carbon differs when it is explicitly presented as a carbon tax versus when it is implied through building renovation choices. We implement a between-subject design with four groups: (i) Asset managers, entities responsible for the day-to-day operations and asset management decisions, (ii) asset owners, institutional asset owner entities that own the asset but do not manage it directly (e.g., ABP, Norges), relying on third-party managers, (iii) asset owners and managers deciding on a residential renovation akin to their own home, and (iv) retail homeowners deciding on a renovation on their private property. This structure enables us to disentangle differences in the WTP gap across experience and expertise (institutional owner vs. asset managerial vs. homeowner), incentive settings (principal vs. agent), and socio-demographic characteristics. By combining elicitation modes with participant heterogeneity, our study sheds light on how professional experience and incentives shape the valuation of carbon reductions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Palacios, Juan et al. 2026. "Willingness to pay for carbon abatement: institutional vs. retail investors in various contexts." AEA RCT Registry. January 12. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17176-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

Sponsors

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
In this experiment, we aim to assess whether participants have a different willingness to pay to reduce a ton of carbon under a directly stated carbon tax than when they make sustainable renovation choices and experience the trade-offs. We also want to study heterogeneity in a potential gap in WTP across owners vs. managers of assets, experience, principal or agent incentives, and socioeconomic differences. To this end, we assign institutional asset owners, homeowners, and asset managers to a setting where they either own or do not own the asset, in our paper, to a home or office setting. We then ask key demographic questions and assess their priors regarding (sustainable) renovation knowledge, return expectations, impact beliefs, and sustainable investment preferences. Following this, we conduct a vignette study in which participants are assigned to a representative building (commercial or residential) and asked to select the sustainability renovations to pursue in that building. We conducted this vignette study for a home (residential) or office building (commercial), and participants were presented with the financial, environmental (i.e., CO2 emissions), and health consequences of each renovation immediately. We then calibrate their willingness to pay for emission reductions and health consequences from these choices.
Intervention Start Date
2025-11-04
Intervention End Date
2026-04-08

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Primary outcomes:
• Participants’ willingness to pay for reducing a ton of CO2 and removing health outcomes in the vignette study
• Participants’ willingness to pay for reducing a ton of CO2 in the carbon tax setting
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Primary outcomes:
• Participants’ willingness to pay for reducing a ton of CO2 and removing health outcomes in the vignette study
• Participants’ willingness to pay for reducing a ton of CO2 in the carbon tax setting

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Supplementary outcomes:
• Sustainable investing preferences, return expectations, and impact beliefs
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Supplementary outcomes:
• Sustainable investing preferences, return expectations, and impact beliefs

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In this experiment, we aim to assess whether participants have a different willingness to pay to reduce a ton of carbon under a directly stated carbon tax than when they make sustainable renovation choices and experience the trade-offs. We also want to study heterogeneity in a potential gap in WTP across owners vs. managers of assets, experience, principal or agent incentives, and socioeconomic differences. To this end, we assign institutional asset owners, homeowners, and asset managers to a setting where they either own or do not own the asset, in our paper, to a home or office setting. We then ask key demographic questions and assess their priors regarding (sustainable) renovation knowledge, return expectations, impact beliefs, and sustainable investment preferences. Following this, we conduct a vignette study in which participants are assigned to a representative building (commercial or residential) and asked to select the sustainability renovations to pursue in that building. We conducted this vignette study for a home (residential) or office building (commercial), and participants were presented with the financial, environmental (i.e., CO2 emissions), and health consequences of each renovation immediately. We then calibrate their willingness to pay for emission reductions and health consequences from these choices.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
Person
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Sample size: planned number of clusters: We plan to have 4 clusters of observations. 1 group of institutional asset owners who make an office decision, 1 group of asset managers who make an office decision, 1 group of institutional asset owners & asset managers who make a house decision, and 1 group of homeowners who make a house decision.
Sample size: planned number of observations
For the first cluster, we strive to attain 100 to 150 institutional asset owner responses in the office setting. We have set up a collaboration with the Global Real Estate Sustainability Board (GRESB) and the Pension Real Estate Association (PREA), two of the largest trade unions among real estate investors in the US. They will help us distribute our survey. Furthermore, we collected a large number of email addresses of institutional asset owners through LinkedIn, providing a secondary source of prospective participants. For the second cluster of asset managers answering the office choice set, we similarly strive to attain 100 to 150 responses. We do this in collaboration with GreenBuild and the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) trade associations. We similarly collected over 25,000 emails of REIT employees through LinkedIn that we will approach if our primary contacts do not deliver sufficient responses. For the third cluster, we will recruit approximately 300 participants via Prolific. There are randomly divided into the office and house setting with equal probability. We will sort on participants living in the United States, owning a home, working in the financial sector or real estate industry, with (if possible) a managerial role. For the last cluster, we aim to recruit 700 participants via Prolific. These participants should live in the United States, own a home, work in sectors other than the financial sector or real estate industry, and be as representative of the US average as possible.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
For the first cluster, we strive to attain 100 to 150 institutional asset owner responses in the office setting. We have set up a collaboration with the Global Real Estate Sustainability Board (GRESB) and the Pension Real Estate Association (PREA), two of the largest trade unions among real estate investors in the US. They will help us distribute our survey. Furthermore, we collected a large number of email addresses of institutional asset owners through LinkedIn, providing a secondary source of prospective participants.
For the second cluster of asset managers answering the office choice set, we similarly strive to attain 100 to 150 responses. We do this in collaboration with GreenBuild and the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) trade associations. We similarly collected over 25,000 emails of REIT employees through LinkedIn that we will approach if our primary contacts do not deliver sufficient responses.
For the third cluster, we will recruit approximately 300 participants via Prolific. There are randomly divided into the office and house setting with equal probability. We will sort on participants living in the United States, owning a home, working in the financial sector or real estate industry, with (if possible) a managerial role.
For the last cluster, we aim to recruit 700 participants via Prolific. These participants should live in the United States, own a home, work in sectors other than the financial sector or real estate industry, and be as representative of the US average as possible.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Minimum detectable effect size for primary outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering) For the first hypothesis, we are adopting a within-person design. With a within-person (paired) comparison with N = 1,200, two-sided α = 0.05, and 80% power, the minimum detectable effect in SD of the difference scores (Cohen’s d_z) is: 0.08 of a standard deviation. For the second hypothesis, where we compare observations across samples, we would be comparing the mean of participants' WTP gap for a ton of CO2 across the first and fourth, and second and fourth treatment arms. Assuming that we get 125 observations in the first two, each, and 700 in the latter, an alpha of 0.05, a power of 80%, and a two-sided test, we can detect effect sizes of 0.27 of a standard deviation. We will also perform a comparison using both institutional asset owner and asset manager samples combined, resulting in 250 and 700 observations and a minimum detectable effect size of 0.21 standard deviations. Since these minimum effect sizes are large, we might need to collect additional responses from institutional asset owners and firm management.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects
IRB Approval Date
2025-10-26
IRB Approval Number
E-7235 - Sustainable investment decisions at home and at the office
Analysis Plan

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