Abstract
This study investigates whether gender differences in risk attitudes emerge only under conditions that trigger intuitive, heuristic-based thinking. Building on dual-process theory (Kahneman & Tversky), we propose that in the absence of framing cues, both men and women rely on analytic, system-2 reasoning and therefore demonstrate comparable levels of risk aversion. However, when even minimal but relevant framing is introduced, decision-makers shift toward system-1 processing, making intuitive judgments shaped by heuristics. Prior research suggests that heuristic tendencies may differ by gender, potentially leading to divergent choices under framed conditions. Drawing on literature examining gender-specific cognitive biases and heuristic use, we test whether framing moderates the relationship between gender and risk behavior. The findings contribute to understanding the cognitive mechanisms behind gendered decision-making, offering theoretical value for behavioral economics and practical implications for policy design, entrepreneurial decision contexts, and financial communication strategies.