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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
The experiment, run in the lab, focuses on strategic information disclosure between a Sender and a Receiver. We vary two dimensions of the communication interaction :
(1) whether Senders and Receivers belong or not to the same group. The groups are built within the lab before the communication starts.
(2) the probability with which the Sender is initially informed of the payoff-relevant state. This probability When this probability equals one, we are in the standard disclosure game. When the probability is lower than one, we are in the framework proposed by Dye in 1985.
The design is 2 by 2 and the four treatments are implemented between subjects.
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After
The experiment focuses on strategic information disclosure between a Sender and a Receiver.
We vary two dimensions of the communication interaction :
(1) whether Senders and Receivers belong or not to the same group. The groups are built within the experiment before the communication phase starts.
(2) the probability with which the Sender is initially informed of the payoff-relevant state. This probability When this probability equals one, we are in the standard disclosure game. When the probability is lower than one, we are in the framework proposed by Dye in 1985.
The design is 2 by 2 and the four treatments are implemented between subjects.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The experiment has two main parts: first, participants engage in a collective word game designed to create group identities; second, they play a series of Sender-Receiver communication games.
- In Part 1, participants are randomly assigned in two teams of four people. They play four rounds of a word game with their team members. Precisely, each team member receives two letters per round, and teams must collectively form the longest possible word through intra-team discussion in a chat. Payments for Part 1 ensure that subjects try to find valid words, and also words that are longer than the ones found by the other team.
- Part 2 consists of six rounds of a Sender-Receiver communication game in which players, assigned permanently as either Senders or Receivers, are matched in pairs according to treatment: either with partners from the same team (InGroup) or from the other team (OutGroup).
Each round of communication game goes as follows: (1) a card color is randomly drawn, red or green; (2) the Sender is informed or uninformed of the color according to a probability that depends on the treatment; (3) the Sender sends either a precise color message or an empty message to the Receiver; (4) the Receiver observes this message and reports the probability that the card is green.
In the communication game, payoffs are standard: Senders earn payoffs increasing in the Receiver’s belief that the card is green. Receivers are paid according to a binarized scoring rule that rewards truthful reporting of their beliefs about the probability that the card is green.
More details about the design are given in the attached pre-analysis plan.
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After
The experiment has two main parts: first, participants engage in a collective word game designed to create group identities; second, they play a series of Sender-Receiver communication games.
- In Part 1, participants are randomly assigned to two teams. They play four rounds of a word game with their teammates. Precisely, in every round, each team member receives a set of letters, and teams must collectively form the longest possible word through intra-team discussion in a chat. Payments for Part 1 ensure that subjects try to find valid words, and also words that are longer than the ones found by the other team.
- Part 2 consists of several rounds of a Sender-Receiver communication game in which players, assigned permanently as either Senders or Receivers, are matched in pairs according to treatment: either with partners from the same team (InGroup) or from the other team (OutGroup).
Each round of communication game goes as follows: (1) a card color is randomly drawn, red or green; (2) the Sender is informed or uninformed of the color according to a probability that depends on the treatment; (3) the Sender sends either a precise color message or an empty message to the Receiver; (4) the Receiver observes this message and reports the probability that the card is green.
In the communication game, payoffs are standard: Senders earn payoffs increasing in the Receiver’s belief that the card is green. Receivers are paid according to a binarized scoring rule that rewards truthful reporting of their beliefs about the probability that the card is green.
More details about the design are given in the attached pre-analysis plan.
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