How Much Compensation Do Households Demand for Giving Up Price Stability? Risk Premia in Electricity Plan Choice

Last registered on December 26, 2025
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
How Much Compensation Do Households Demand for Giving Up Price Stability? Risk Premia in Electricity Plan Choice
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017459
Initial registration date
December 15, 2025

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 26, 2025, 2:26 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Eva Hümmecke
Affiliation
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Mark Andor
PI Affiliation
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
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PI Name
Lukas Tomberg
PI Affiliation
RWI – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research
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Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2025-12-15
End date
2030-12-31
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
Dynamic Electricity Tariffs, Price Volatility, Tail Risk, Risk Premia, Household Energy Choices, Electricity Consumption, Take-up Incentive
JEL code(s)
D12, D81, Q41, Q48
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
In this study, we investigate the decision to adopt a dynamic electricity tariff in a choice experiment that we run with 3,000 individuals in Germany. Respondents receive information about how dynamic tariffs work and about expected annual cost differences for a representative two-person household under three tariff types: a fixed tariff, a dynamic tariff with a price cap, and a dynamic tariff without a cap. We then randomly vary a take-up incentive for choosing an uncapped dynamic tariff and elicit stated electricity plan choices. This allows us to observe how households trade off tariff options as compensation for price risk increases.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Andor, Mark , Eva Hümmecke and Lukas Tomberg. 2025. "How Much Compensation Do Households Demand for Giving Up Price Stability? Risk Premia in Electricity Plan Choice." AEA RCT Registry. December 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17459-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2025-12-15
Intervention End Date
2026-01-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Electricity Plan Choice
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
All participants receive information about how dynamic electricity tariffs work and about expected annual cost differences across three different tariff options: (i) a fixed tariff, (ii) a dynamic tariff without a price cap, or (iii) a dynamic tariff with a price cap. They are then randomly assigned to experimental groups that vary in the size of a take-up incentive for choosing the uncapped dynamic tariff, including a control group in which no incentive is presented. Afterward, participants select one tariff from the three available options.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization by the survey institute commissioned to conduct the survey
Randomization Unit
Individuals (respondents)
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
3,000 respondents
Sample size: planned number of observations
3,000 respondents
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
428 respondents in control group, 2,572 respondents randomly assigend to six treatment groups (428 or 429 in each group)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V.
IRB Approval Date
2025-11-24
IRB Approval Number
CWEYXbec
Analysis Plan

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