Vertical Control in a Supply Chain and the Bullwhip Effect: An Experimental Approach

Last registered on June 29, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Vertical Control in a Supply Chain and the Bullwhip Effect: An Experimental Approach
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017474
Initial registration date
June 25, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 29, 2026, 9:22 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Kiel University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Kiel University
PI Affiliation
Kiel University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-06-29
End date
2027-06-28
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how vertical control in supply chains affects the inci-dence and size of the bullwhip effect (BWE). The BWE refers to the phenomenon whereby small fluctuations in consumer demand translate into much larger swings in the quantities firms order from their suppliers. It can arise in decentralized supply chains comprised of separate, independently-owned firms, as well as in vertically integrated supply chains run by a singled firm. While vertical integration helps align pricing and inventory decisions, we hypothesize that it increases the incidence and the size of the BWE rather than reducing them.
In decentralized supply chains, upstream firms (manufacturers) and downstream firms (retailers) are independent decision-makers who must each form expectations about the others' choices before ob-serving them. This strategic uncertainty may lead participants to deviate from equilibrium behavior, amplifying order fluctuations beyond what demand shocks alone would predict. We therefore hy-pothesize that strategic uncertainty strengthens the BWE in decentralized supply chains.
To test these hypotheses in our experiment, participants take on the role of retailer and/or manufactur-er in a two-period supply chain game with random consumer demand. We vary the supply chain structure (decentralized versus vertically integrated) and the persistence of demand shocks. In some treatments we replace the human manufacturer with a computer to isolate the role played by strategic uncertainty.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Johnsen, Lennart, Horst Raff and Anna Veri. 2026. "Vertical Control in a Supply Chain and the Bullwhip Effect: An Experimental Approach." AEA RCT Registry. June 29. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17474-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-06-29
Intervention End Date
2027-06-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
participants' choices of sales quantities, order quantities, and wholesale prices
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment uses a two-period supply chain game in which participants make decisions about sales quantity, order quantity, and, depending on the treatment, wholesale price, with the help of a calculator that displays all decision-relevant information, such as profit. The experiment is imple-mented in multiple sessions at the laboratory at Kiel University.
The experiment consists of six treatments that vary along three dimensions: the supply chain structure (vertically integrated vs. decentralized), the persistence of the demand shock, and, in decentralized supply chains, whether the manufacturer is played by a human or a computer.
The supply chain structure is either decentralized or vertically integrated. In decentralized treatments, participants are randomly assigned to one of two roles, retailer or manufacturer, and matched with another participant for the duration of the experiment; here, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price, while the retailer chooses sales and order quantities. In vertically integrated treatments, a single participant makes all decisions for both stages of the supply chain, choosing sales and order quantities directly; no wholesale price exists in this setting.
The persistence of the demand shock takes a high or low value, determining how strongly a first-period demand shock carries over into the second period. Across all treatments, participants play 30 independent rounds, with the demand shock drawn randomly in each round.
In decentralized treatments, the manufacturer role is played either by a human participant or by a computer following a fixed rule; in the latter case, the human participant only takes the retailer role.
Of the 30 rounds, the first 10 are unpaid practice rounds, followed by 20 incentivized rounds. Pay-ments are based on cumulative profits earned in the incentivized rounds, converted to euros, plus a fixed participation fee. After the game, participants complete a questionnaire on their decision-making, a brief cognitive reflection test, and demographic questions.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
random assignment of computer terminal and role played in the experiment at each session (either manufacturer or retailer) via random draw of number
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
6 treatments (2 treatments with individuals representing either manufacturers or retailers, 2 treatments with individuals representing vertically integrated firms, 2 treatments with individuals representing retailers playing with a computer taking the role of the manufacturer).
Sample size: planned number of observations
240
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
30 individuals per role (retailer or manufacturer or vertically integrated firm) per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Zentrale Ethikkommission der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
IRB Approval Date
2024-09-19
IRB Approval Number
ZEK-29/24
Analysis Plan

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