Enhancing Wage Subsidies: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial

Last registered on February 04, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Enhancing Wage Subsidies: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0017797
Initial registration date
February 01, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 04, 2026, 10:09 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Central European University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
World Bank
PI Affiliation
World Bank

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-02-02
End date
2028-11-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Wage subsidies are a central active labor market policy tool, yet international evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. We evaluate whether two service add-ons within Hungary’s Youth Guarantee wage-subsidy program improve outcomes for subsidized youth. Using a clustered randomized 2×2 factorial design, we estimate the separate and joint effects of (i) mentoring and (ii) an employer–youth information package. Both add-ons are intended to strengthen job retention and human-capital accumulation during subsidized employment by improving workplace adjustment and the structure of the employment relationship. Eligible participants are young job seekers entering subsidized employment and their hiring employers. Randomization occurs at job match and into four arms (mentoring only, information package only, both, or business-as-usual). We measure impacts on job retention, employment, and earnings, and intermediate outcomes on skills development and workplace integration using surveys and administrative data. Results will inform how public employment services can increase job stability and skill accumulation for young adults through scalable enhancements to wage subsidy programs.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Khan, Nausheen, Pascale Schnitzer and Zsuzsanna Vadle. 2026. "Enhancing Wage Subsidies: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial." AEA RCT Registry. February 04. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.17797-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We evaluate two new services delivered alongside Hungary’s youth wage-subsidy program.

(1) The employer-youth information package, or Performance and Skills Information Package (PSIP) is a structured goal-setting and feedback program, intended to clarify expectations and document progress during the subsidized job. It includes a jointly developed performance plan, a mid-term check-in and final employer evaluation, an automatically generated skills certificate summarizing competencies gained, and an anonymous youth satisfaction survey.

(2) Mentoring is a light-touch mentoring support package to facilitate workplace integration during the subsidy period. It includes two small-group sessions (around five youths) near the start and end of the subsidy, individual follow-up calls for all participants, and a Mentor Helpdesk providing on-demand support to youth and employers.

Intervention Start Date
2026-02-02
Intervention End Date
2026-11-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcomes capture job retention and post-program labor-market status and earnings. We will estimate impacts on completion of the wage-subsidy spell, employment status, and number of employed days, unemployment (registered jobseeker), inactivity, and monthly labor income.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Wage-subsidy completion is a binary indicator for completing the full 4- or 6-month subsidy period versus exiting earlier, measured at program exit at the youth level. Employment, number of employment spell days, unemployment, inactivity, and monthly labor income are measured at exit and at 3, 6, 12, and 24 months after exit, at the youth level.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary outcomes capture additional dimensions of job quality and workplace experience for participants and employer perceptions. Because we test multiple outcomes, we organize outcomes into three pre-specified families:

(1) Skills and soft skills: self-esteem, motivation, perceived technical skills, perceived soft skills.

(2) Job quality and work experience: contract type, perceived employer support, employer perceived employer support, perceived job quality and reservation wages.

(3) Employer-perceived youth-level outcomes: perceived technical skills, perceived workplace integration, employer stereotypes.

Details of the exact measurement will be made available at the end of the trial period.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
(1) Skills and soft skills outcome family:
(a) Self-esteem: measured at exit, 4-item scale constructed as the mean of items, 5-point Likert scale, standardized mean
(b) Motivation: measured at exit, 1-item question, 5-point Likert scale; we will also construct a binary indicator Agree = 1 if response is 4–5, 0 otherwise
(c) Perceived technical skills: measured at exit, 1-item question, 5-point Likert scale; we will also construct a binary indicator Agree = 1 if response is 4–5, 0 otherwise
(d) Work self-efficacy: measured at exit, 3-item scale constructed as the mean of items, 5-point Likert scale
(e) Reservation wages

(2) Job quality and work experience outcome family:
(a) Contract type: measured at exit, at 3, 6, 12, and 24 months
(b) Perceived employer support: measured at exit, 4-item scale constructed as the mean of items, 5-point Likert scale
(c) Perceived job quality: measured at exit, 3-item scale constructed as the mean of items, 5-point Likert scale

(3) Employer-perceived youth-level outcome family:
(a) Perceived youth technical skills: measured at exit, 1-item question, 5-point Likert scale; we will also construct a binary indicator Agree = 1 if response is 4–5, 0 otherwise
(b) Perceived youth workplace integration: measured at exit, 1-item question5-point Likert scale; we will also construct a binary indicator Agree = 1 if response is 4–5, 0 otherwise
(c) Employer support: measured at exit, 6-item scale constructed as the mean of items, response scale 0–3 (0 = Never; 1 = Once a month; 2 = Twice a month; 3 = Once a week or more often.)
(d) Employer stereotypes: measured at exit, 6-item scale constructed as the mean of items, 5-point Likert

Details of the exact questions will be made available at the end of the trial period.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will run a cluster-randomized controlled trial in Hungary. Clusters are firms: all eligible youths hired by the same firm receive the same assignment. Randomization is implemented strictly after a PES caseworker matches a youth to a firm and is carried out continuously as matches occur. Firms are assigned to one of four arms in a 2×2 factorial design: Control, PSIP only, Mentoring only, and both PSIP and Mentoring.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Assignment to the 2×2 factorial treatment arms is implemented in the Public Employment Service IT system and is conducted automatically when an employer–youth match is finalized. Randomization occurs at the employer level within PES office strata using a unique employer identifier, so that each employer is assigned to one of the four study arms and retains that assignment for any subsequent eligible matches during the pilot period (i.e., employers are not re-randomized).
Randomization Unit
Randomization clusters are firms.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1900 employers
Sample size: planned number of observations
3000 workers
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
475 firms control, 475 firms mentoring only, 475 firms PSIP only, 475 firms both treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Power calculations are based on a clustered 2×2 factorial design with randomization at the firm level and outcomes measured at the youth level. We assume 3,000 youths in 1,900 firms (1–2 youths per firm), equal allocation across the four arms, 80% power, two-sided α = 0.05, and ICC = 0.10–0.30. Calculations use historical administrative data for wage-subsidy completion, employment, unemployment, inactivity, and monthly labor income. Main effects (PSIP and Mentoring) - Wage-subsidy completion (baseline 0.86, variance = 0.12): 3.5–3.8 pp - Employment at 6-month follow-up (baseline 0.36, variance = 0.23): 5.1–5.4 pp - Unemployment (baseline 0.16 among labor force, variance = 0.13): 3.6–3.8 pp - Inactivity (baseline 0.055 among labor force, variance = 0.05): 2.7–2.8 pp - Monthly labor income (mean HUF 233,265; SD = HUF 151,796): 0.10–0.11 SD (≈ HUF 15,800–16,800, EUR 41–43) Interaction effect (PSIP × Mentoring) With equal allocation, the interaction contrast is less precisely estimated than main effects. The study is powered to detect interaction effects of approximately: - Completion: 7–8 pp - Employment: 10–11 pp - Unemployment: 7–8 pp - Inactivity: 5–6 pp - Income: ~0.20 SD (≈ HUF 32,000–34,000, EUR 83–88)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
CEU Ethical Research Committee
IRB Approval Date
2026-01-28
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

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