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Field
Abstract
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Before
This randomised evaluation studies whether low-cost information interventions and financial incentives can increase voluntary adoption of privately beneficial, emissions-reducing motorcycle maintenance in a weak enforcement context. Air pollution disproportionately affects developing countries, where 91% of related deaths occur, with the urban poor — those most exposed to airborne particulate matter — facing the greatest health risks. Despite its urgency, little is known about how to effectively reduce pollution in weak enforcement contexts. In Viet Nam, motorcycles account for the vast majority of transport-related emissions, yet on-road emissions remain largely unregulated and uptake of emissions-reducing maintenance is low, despite potential private fuel cost savings.
The study is implemented in Hanoi, where motorcycles contribute substantially to local air pollution. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) information about their motorcycle's compliance with emissions standards (T1); (2) compliance information plus information on the social benefits of emissions reduction (T2); or (3) a control group receiving no information. Following the information intervention, we elicit willingness to choose maintenance over a cash alternative using a BDM mechanism, and randomly assign participants to receive either a partial (10%) or full (100%) subsidy, allowing us to separate informational frictions from financial constraints.
Primary outcomes include demand for maintenance and maintenance take-up, with fuel expenditure estimated via IV using voucher assignment as an instrument for take-up. Motorcycle emissions are measured post-maintenance as a validation of the environmental benefits of adoption. Driving behaviour is also tracked to assess potential rebound effects. By isolating the roles of information and subsidies, this study provides causal evidence on whether targeted, low-cost interventions can increase adoption of a privately beneficial, pollution-reducing technology in the absence of strict regulatory enforcement.
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After
This randomised evaluation studies whether low-cost information interventions and financial incentives can increase voluntary adoption of privately beneficial, emissions-reducing motorcycle maintenance in a weak enforcement context. Air pollution disproportionately affects developing countries, where 91% of related deaths occur, with the urban poor — those most exposed to airborne particulate matter — facing the greatest health risks. Despite its urgency, little is known about how to effectively reduce pollution in weak enforcement contexts. In Viet Nam, motorcycles account for the vast majority of transport-related emissions, yet on-road emissions remain largely unregulated and uptake of emissions-reducing maintenance is low, despite potential private fuel cost savings.
The study is implemented in Hanoi, where motorcycles contribute substantially to local air pollution. Ride-share drivers are randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) information about their motorcycle's compliance with emissions standards at baseline (T1); (2) compliance information plus information on the social benefits of emissions reduction (T2); or (3) a control group receiving no information. Following the information intervention, I elicit willingness to choose maintenance over a cash alternative using a BDM mechanism, and randomly assign participants to receive either a partial (10%) or full (100%) subsidy, allowing us to separate informational frictions from financial constraints.
Primary outcomes include demand for maintenance and maintenance take-up, with fuel expenditure estimated via IV using voucher assignment as an instrument for take-up. Motorcycle emissions are also measured post-maintenance to validate the environmental benefits of adoption. Driving behaviour is also tracked to assess potential rebound effects. By isolating the roles of information and subsidies, this study provides causal evidence on whether targeted, low-cost interventions can increase adoption of a privately beneficial, pollution-reducing technology in the absence of strict regulatory enforcement.
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