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Field
Abstract
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Before
Mediation is widely used because it is faster, cheaper, and more flexible than courts. Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that the informality of mediation can disproportionately disadvantage less powerful parties, particularly those marginalized by gender, race, or ethnicity. In response, demand for more structured and rigorous mediation practices, combined with recent technological advances, has spurred the growth of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems. In a standard ODR system, mediator is an algorithm defined by predetermined rules. Although these protocols are designed to deliver impartial outcomes, we know little about how gender visibility shapes behavior and outcomes in algorithmic mediation. We study this question in a controlled experiment using the algorithmic mediation mechanism proposed by \citet{kesten2025strategy}. We measure negotiation behavior, including participants’ demands, acceptance decisions, and beliefs about others’ behavior, and we collect detailed perceptions of fairness and the salience of gender in decision-making. We manipulate gender visibility across two experimental conditions to examine its effects on evaluation outcomes.
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After
Mediation is widely used because it is faster, cheaper, and more flexible than courts. Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that the informality of mediation can disproportionately disadvantage less powerful parties, particularly those marginalized by gender, race, or ethnicity. In response, demand for more structured and rigorous mediation practices, combined with recent technological advances, has spurred the growth of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems. In a standard ODR system, the mediator is an algorithm defined by predetermined rules. Although these protocols are designed to deliver impartial outcomes, we know little about how gender visibility shapes behavior and outcomes in algorithmic mediation. We study this question in a controlled experiment using the algorithmic mediation mechanism proposed by \citet{kesten2025strategy}. We measure negotiation behavior, including participants’ demands, acceptance decisions, and beliefs about others’ behavior, and we collect detailed perceptions of fairness and the salience of gender in decision-making. We manipulate gender visibility across two experimental conditions to examine its effects on evaluation outcomes. We further compare this algorithmic protocol against free-form (unstructured) bargaining, in which participants exchange offers directly without an algorithm. Crossing the two protocols with gender visibility allows us to test whether algorithmic mediation narrows or widens gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes relative to unstructured bargaining.
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Trial End Date
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Before
March 31, 2026
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After
March 31, 2027
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Last Published
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Before
February 19, 2026 07:17 AM
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After
September 07, 2026 10:31 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
The study investigates (i) individuals' negotiation behaviors and beliefs under the algorithmic mediation protocol, and (ii) whether these behaviors, beliefs, and preferences differ across gender visibility conditions. In the gender treatment, negotiators observe gender-revealing icons; in the baseline treatment, only neutral icons are used. Full details are provided in the pre-analysis plan.
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After
The study investigates individuals' negotiation behaviors and beliefs under the algorithmic mediation and free-form bargaining protocols.
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Intervention End Date
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Before
March 31, 2026
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After
March 31, 2027
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Participants' demand above their backup option (sincerity).
Successful resolution of negotiation (compatible demands and mutual acceptance).
Fairness of outcomes across matched pairs with swapped backup options.
Total welfare (sum of realized payoffs).
See the pre-analysis plan for operationalizations and measurement procedures.
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After
Participants' demand above their backup option (sincerity).
Successful resolution of negotiation (compatible demands and mutual acceptance).
Fairness of outcomes across matched pairs with swapped backup options.
Total welfare (sum of realized payoffs).
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
This is a three-part incentivized online study on decision-making and negotiation with computer assistance. Participants complete a series of short bargaining tasks for points that affect payment, followed by additional tasks measuring social preferences and beliefs about others’ decisions. In some sessions, participants see simple profile cues about their counterpart, while in others these cues are not shown. Full procedures and analysis plans are documented in the pre analysis plan.
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After
This is a three-part incentivized online study on decision-making and negotiation under different bargaining protocols. Participants complete a series of short bargaining tasks for points that affect their payment, followed by additional tasks measuring social preferences and beliefs about others' decisions. In some sessions, participants see simple profile cues about their counterpart; in others these cues are not shown.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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240 participants
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After
240 participants for the algorithmic mediation session
240 participants for the free-form bargaining session
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Planned Number of Observations
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240 participants. Each completes 10 rounds (2,400 participant-round records). Primary outcomes are analyzed at the participant level (averaged across rounds).
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After
480 participants. Each completes 10 rounds (4800 participant-round records). Primary outcomes are analyzed at the participant level (averaged across rounds).
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
120 participants in gender-visible treatment (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
120 participants in gender-blind control (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
(Total: 240 participants.)
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After
Algorithmic mechanism session:
120 participants in gender-visible treatment (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
120 participants in gender-blind control (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
(Total: 240 participants.)
Freeform bargaining session:
120 participants in gender-visible treatment (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
120 participants in gender-blind control (balanced: 60 women, 60 men).
(Total: 240 participants.)
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
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After
The study investigates (i) individuals' negotiation behaviors and beliefs under the algorithmic mediation and free-form bargaining protocols, and (ii) whether these behaviors, beliefs, and preferences differ across gender-visibility conditions. In the gender treatment, negotiators observe gender-revealing icons; in the baseline treatment, only neutral icons are used. Full details are provided in the pre-analysis plan.
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