Economic Integration, Sanctions, and Preventive War: An Experimental Investigation

Last registered on March 12, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Economic Integration, Sanctions, and Preventive War: An Experimental Investigation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018051
Initial registration date
March 05, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 12, 2026, 4:20 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

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Primary Investigator

Name
Lingbo Huang
Affiliation
Shandong University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Lu Dong
PI Affiliation
SUSTech
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-03-13
End date
2026-04-17
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study investigates how economic integration and the threat of sanctions influence the likelihood of preventive war. We develop a two-stage bargaining model where a declining power (DP) faces a rising power (RP). Integration increases the total economic surplus but also accelerates the power shift towards the RP. The DP can use economic sanctions to mitigate this power shift. We test the model's predictions using a laboratory experiment with four treatments varying the level of integration (Low, Medium, High) and the availability of sanctions. We hypothesize that medium integration leads to preventive war due to a large power shift and weak sanctions, while high integration fosters peace because the credible threat of severe sanctions disciplines the RP. We also test whether subjects endogenously choose high integration to access this sanction mechanism.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Dong, Lu and Lingbo Huang. 2026. "Economic Integration, Sanctions, and Preventive War: An Experimental Investigation." AEA RCT Registry. March 12. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18051-1.0
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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The lab experiment implements a two-stage bargaining game between two players. The treatments are parameterized versions of the game. There are six between-subjects treatments in total (EXO-Low, EXO-Med, EXO-Med-NS, EXO-High, EXO-High-NS, ENDO). EXO-Low could be viewed as the control treatment. Recruited subjects are randomized assigned to one of the treatments depending on the experimental session they register. All details are provided in PAP.
Intervention Start Date
2026-03-13
Intervention End Date
2026-04-17

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Conflict Frequency; Take Action Frequency; Player A Payoff; Player B Payoff; Integration Choice
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Stage 1 Offer; Efficiency
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Efficiency: Realized total surplus (Player A payoff + Player B payoff, excluding starting income) divided by the maximum possible surplus under full cooperation (no conflict, no sanctions) for the given integration level.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment implements a two-stage bargaining game between two players.
• Roles: Player A (the proposer) and Player B (the responder). Player A represents a “rising power” whose relative bargaining position strengthens over time, while Player B represents a “declining power” whose position weakens. In Stage 1, Player B holds a
battlefield advantage (60% winning probability); without sanctions, A’s odds improve substantially in Stage 2, reflecting B’s relative decline.
• Integration Level: Determines the size of the available surplus in each stage, as well as the magnitude of the power shift and the costs of conflict.
• “Take Action” Option: In most treatments, Player B can choose to “take action” in Stage 1. This costs B 2 points but improves B’s winning odds if conflict occurs in Stage 2. This option captures the idea of economic sanctions that weaken the opponent’s future
position.

Timeline:
1. Stage 1: A pot of points is available. Player A proposes how to divide it. Player B then chooses:
• Accept: Both players receive their allocated shares and proceed to Stage 2.
• Reject: A computerized lottery determines who wins the entire pot (combining both stages), and both players pay a conflict cost. The game ends.
• Take Action: Player B accepts the allocation but pays an additional 2-point cost. Both players proceed to Stage 2, but B’s winning odds in any Stage 2 conflict are now improved.
2. Stage 2: A second pot of points is available. Player A proposes how to divide it. Player B then chooses:
• Accept: Both players receive their allocated shares from both stages. The game ends peacefully.
• Reject: A lottery determines who wins the combined pot from both stages. Stage 1 allocations are voided. Both players pay a conflict cost. The game ends.

Experimental Treatments
Treatment & Take Action? & Stage 1 Pot & Stage 2 Pot & Conflict Cost & Predicted Outcome \\
\midrule
\textbf{EXO-Low} & Yes & 12 & 18 & 8 & Peace (Standard) \\
\textbf{EXO-Med} & Yes & 13 & 27 & 9 & Conflict \\
\textbf{EXO-Med-NS} & No & 13 & 27 & 9 & Conflict \\
\textbf{EXO-High} & Yes & 20 & 30 & 15 & Peace (Sanction-Disciplined) \\
\textbf{EXO-High-NS} & No & 20 & 30 & 15 & Peace (Standard) \\
\textbf{ENDO} & Yes & Choice & Choice & Choice & Choose High, then Peace (Sanction-Disciplined) \\
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
randomization by computer
Randomization Unit
Treatment randomization is employed at session level. Pairing is randomized in each round with roles fixed throughout the session.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Each treatment has 6 sessions of 10 subjects each. 36 sessions in total
Sample size: planned number of observations
36 sessions
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
60 participants per treatment. 360 in total.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Based on previous experiments, we expect to detect medium effect sizes (Cohen's d $\approx$ 0.5) with greater than 80% power.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
CER Lab of SDU
IRB Approval Date
2026-03-05
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Pre-Analysis Plan: Economic Integration, Sanctions, and Preventive War: An Experimental Investigation

MD5: 4ef49fcc0beb68ff3faf9ea6ed715048

SHA1: 4bb0d54965e9edf774e1c6259788a6e5361695b7

Uploaded At: March 05, 2026