Sustainability Scores as Labor Market Signals: Experimental Evidence on Employer Attractiveness and Wage Concessions

Last registered on March 12, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Sustainability Scores as Labor Market Signals: Experimental Evidence on Employer Attractiveness and Wage Concessions
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018071
Initial registration date
March 10, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
March 12, 2026, 4:32 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-04-01
End date
2026-04-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Amid rising CSRD compliance costs, firms seek strategic uses for mandatory ESG disclosures. This pre-registered study examines whether numerical sustainability scores in job postings causally enhance employer attractiveness and induce wage concessions among working-age adults. A forced-choice employer selection experiment is planned (N=3,000 German adults), which randomizes realistic job posting across control and treatment conditions. Expected outcomes include pay cut acceptance relative to salary expectations, pro-social moderation, and ESG sub-aspect preferences. Experiment launches April 2026. This study will provide first causal evidence linking accounting-reported ESG metrics to talent acquisition economics
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Dauerer, Andreas. 2026. "Sustainability Scores as Labor Market Signals: Experimental Evidence on Employer Attractiveness and Wage Concessions." AEA RCT Registry. March 12. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18071-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
This is a randomized online experiment with 3,000 working-age adults in Germany (quota sample via Qualtrics). It examines whether disclosing a quantified sustainability score in job postings affects employer attractiveness and applicants' wage trade-offs.

Two between-subjects conditions: control (no score disclosed) vs. treatment (sustainability score visible, e.g., 70/100). Each condition includes three forced-choice tasks where participants choose between two job postings (randomized position/salary ± 0 – 20% above individual minimum wage). Scores appear below the salary to test trade-offs.
Intervention Start Date
2026-04-01
Intervention End Date
2026-04-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
(I) The presence of a sustainability score in a job posting increases perceived employer attractiveness and the likelihood of employer choice, relative to job postings without such a score.
(II) Participants exposed to job postings with sustainability scores accept lower relative wages (as a percentage of their stated minimum salary expectation) than participants in the control condition.
(III) Among participants exposed to sustainability scores, willingness to accept a pay cut increases with score magnitude (high vs. low score).
(IV) The positive effects of sustainability scores on employer choice and wage concessions are moderated by pro-social attributes, such that the effects are stronger for individuals high in altruism, environmental concern, and societal values.
(V) A elasticity measuring how a 1 percentage point increase in the sustainability score lowers participants' salary demands by X%.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants first received general information about the study, including its stated purpose, procedure, expected duration, compensation, voluntary nature of participation, confidentiality, and data protection in accordance with applicable regulations. To reduce social desirability bias and avoid demand effects, the study was framed as an investigation of how the composition and wording of short job postings influence employer attractiveness. Participants then provided informed consent to participate and to the anonymous processing of their data.
Subsequently, the first part of the questionnaire collected demographic information, including gender, age, highest educational attainment, current employment status, years of professional experience, and country of residence. Participants who indicated that they were retired were excluded to ensure that the sample reflects individuals who are actively participating in the labour market.

Following the demographic questions, an attention check was administered. Participants were presented with the instruction: “To demonstrate that you are reading the questions carefully, please select ‘Agree’ for this item.” Four response options were provided. This attention check was implemented to identify and exclude inattentive respondents, thereby enhancing the quality and reliability of the collected data. Ensuring that participants carefully read and understood the questions helps to reduce noise and potential bias in the experimental results.

In the second part of the questionnaire, participants provided job- and salary-related reference information. Specifically, they reported their interest in changing jobs within the next 12 months, the type of position they would seek (entry-level, experienced professional, managerial, or other), their current job title, their minimum acceptable annual gross base salary excluding bonuses and variable compensation components, and the working hours associated with this salary expectation. These responses served as individualized benchmarks for generating the salary offers in the subsequent forced-choice tasks.
This section was followed by an attention check regarding the reported salary. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were in the accuracy and realism of the amount they had provided. The purpose of this check was to ensure that respondents did not enter arbitrary values, but instead carefully considered their actual minimum salary expectations. By confirming the validity of these self-reported benchmarks, we ensured that all salary information was perceived as meaningful and that subsequent decisions in the forced-choice tasks were not artificially influenced by offers falling below participants’ expected minimum salaries.

The experimental section consisted of two sequential parts. First, all participants completed the control condition forced-choice task, followed by the treatment condition forced-choice task. Each condition included three forced-choice tasks, which were presented in a randomized order to minimize order effects.

In each task, participants were simultaneously presented with two job postings and were required to select one of the two. The positioning of the advertisements (first or second) was randomized across tasks to control for potential positional bias. Each job posting included a brief narrative company description, comprising firm size, years of market presence, customer base, and general management orientation. Each element was described in a single sentence to ensure comparability across profiles while maintaining realism. For the experiment, three distinct company profiles were designed (A, B, and C), which generated three pairwise comparisons within the job postings: A & B, A & C, and B & C, which are illustrated within the appendices. Below the company description, participants were shown their previously indicated job title along with an annual gross base salary offer. The critical difference between conditions was that, in the treatment condition, each job posting additionally displayed a sustainability score below the salary, accompanied by a brief explanation of the score.

For each pair of job postings, salary levels were generated algorithmically relative to each participant’s stated minimum salary expectation. One offer was randomly set between 0% and 20% above the participant’s minimum salary, while the alternative offer was also within the 0% to 20% range but strictly lower. Thus, both offers exceeded the participant’s reservation wage, yet one was always financially superior. The assignment of which job posting received the higher or lower salary was randomized across tasks to control for potential positional biases.
To illustrate, consider a participant whose minimum acceptable salary was 50.000,00 €. In one task, job posting a offered 58.000 € (+ 16,00 %) with a sustainability score of 70, whereas job posting b offered €54,000 (+ 8,00 %) with a higher sustainability score of 90.

Following the experimental section, participants completed a structured sustainability preference elicitation. First, they allocated 100 points across the three broad sustainability dimensions, environmental, social, and governance, reflecting the relative importance of each dimension in their employer selection decisions. Second, they allocated 100 points within each dimension across six specific subdimensions. For the environmental dimension, these included climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, sustainable use of water resources, transition to a circular economy, pollution prevention, and protection of biodiversity and ecosystems. For the social dimension, the subdimensions comprised working conditions, equality and diversity, health and safety, human rights in the supply chain, training and development, and impact on local communities. For governance, the subdimensions included board independence, executive compensation policy, anti-corruption measures, transparency and disclosure, risk management, and compliance systems. The constant-sum format forced respondents to make explicit trade-offs, thereby reducing the likelihood of uniformly high importance ratings.

Following the treatment condition, an attention check was administered to ensure that participants had noticed and cognitively processed the sustainability information presented in the job postings. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they had perceived and considered the sustainability score when making their choices. This check served to confirm engagement with the treatment and to enhance the internal validity of the experimental results by identifying participants who may have ignored the sustainability information.

At the conclusion of the survey, all participants received a debriefing, which provided detailed information about the study’s purpose, the experimental manipulations, and the use of sustainability scores in the job postings. The debriefing ensured transparency, clarified any potential misconceptions, and reinforced ethical standards by informing participants about the nature of the trade-offs they had encountered during the experiment.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
By Qualtrix
Randomization Unit
The order of the forced-choice tasks and the presentation of the two job postings within each task are fully randomized for both the treatment and control conditions. This randomization applies separately to each part to minimize order effects and positional biases across all pairwise comparisons (A vs. B, A vs. C, B vs. C).
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
3.000 people
Sample size: planned number of observations
3.000 surveys
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
3.000 surveys
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
None, Experiment is exploratory.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Committee of the Catholic University of Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
IRB Approval Date
2025-12-10
IRB Approval Number
N/A