The session is divided in 5 main parts:
a. Task 1;
b. Participation decision in relation to Task 1;
c. Task 2;
d. Participation decision in relation to Task 2;
e. Task 3 according to the decision taken in part b and d.
We randomize within each village the groups for which we will record the audio throughout the experimental session.
DECISION MAKING WITH BARGAINING
During Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3, 42 participants are divided in groups of three and have to complete a group task. Groups are pre-formed, and are different for each task. For part b and d of the experimental session, we pre-select one person per group (groups as in Task 3).
Players complete each part of the experimental session using tokens. Before Task 1, Task 2 and Task 3 we assign to each participant an initial individual endowment. Within each community, we randomly pre-assign players to the equality/inequality treatment:
Equality: before each task, participants receive an initial endowment of 10 tokens.
Inequality: before each task, participants in each group randomly receive initial endowments of 15, 10 token or 5 tokens.
During Task 1 and Task 2, groups have to complete two group face-to-face decision-making exercises, the ``Contribution game'' and the ``Redistribution game''. The face-to-face design allows to mimic a real-life collective decision-making process, where people from the same village know each other before and will meet each other after the bargaining process.
During the ``Redistribution game'', after receiving their individual endowment, participants negotiate on how to redistribute among themselves a group endowment of 30 tokens.
In the ``Contribution game'', participants decide how much of their initial endowment to contribute for the creation of a common pool of resources, equivalent to twice the sum of the contributions, and simultaneously negotiate on how to split it.
In both games we require group decisions to be taken by unanimous consensus: everyone in the group must agree on how to redistribute the group resources (and on the contribution array, in the ``Contribution game''). Groups have 20 minutes to reach an agreement. In case the group fail to agree, players are only entitled to keep their initial endowment. The maximum possible winning is be the same in the two games.
Participants play one training round of the ``Contribution game'' and the ``Redistribution game'', and one round with real money at stake.
We randomize across villages the order in which the ``Contribution game'' and the ``Redistribution game'' are played.
ELICITATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING
After Task 1(2), we conduct an elicitation procedure in order to measure willingness to pay for participatory-decision making. We conduct this part of the experimental session with only 1/3 of participants, one player per group (groups as in Task 3), assisted by one enumerator.
First we assign to these players their initial individual endowment for Task 3. We explain to these players that during Task 3 they might play again Task 1(2), with a new group. During part 2(4) of the experiment they can decide how they want that their group will take decisions. The first option is to take part again in the bargaining stage as in the previous round. The other option is to not participate in the decision and receive a given distribution of tokens. In this latter case we assign to the group the agreement taken by another randomly extracted group with the same equality/inequality treatment during Task 1(2). Each person in the group will receive the final number of tokens obtained by the person in the assigned group with the same initial individual endowment.
We measure individual willingness to pay for participatory decision-making adopting a progressive binding auction design. We start by presenting participants a hypothetical choice between ``participatory decision-making'' and ``assigned distribution'' with zero price. In case the first choice is ``participatory decision-making''(``assigned distribution''), we present the following scenarios with progressively increasing(decreasing) price until participants switch from ``participatory decision-making''(``assigned distribution'') to assigned ``assigned distribution''(``participatory decision-making''). We allow positive and negative prices attached to the participatory option ranging from -5 tokens to +5 tokens. We define individual WTP as the highest price attached to the participatory option at which the participant does not choose the ``assigned distribution'' option.
After eliciting the WTP for participatory decision-making for Task 1(2), we elicit players' beliefs on their expected outcomes under the two decision-rules relative to Task 1(2). We incentivize their choices by awarding a small prize if their guess under the ``assigned distribution'' option is correct. The beliefs elicitation is not incentivized for the ``participatory decision-making'' option, as it would distort group dynamics in the third round.
The decision rule for Task 3 is determined by extracting the game (``Contribution game'' or ``Redistribution game'') and one price between -5 tokens and +5 tokens. Players in part 2(4) with a WTP equal or higher than the extracted price complete Task 3 together with their assigned group peers, and pays/receives the extracted price. Players in part 2(4) with a WTP lower than the extracted price, as well as their assigned group peers, receive an ``assigned distribution'' by randomly extracting one group (excluding their own) within the same equality/inequality treatment.
ELICITATION OF INDIVIDUAL SOCIAL PREFERENCES ON REDISTRIBUTION
Three men and three women from different households will be recruited in each village to play the spectator game. They will be seating in groups together and will play the Tasks as the other players, so to understand the rules of the games. It will be made clear for them however that the final payment will not depend from the distribution of outcomes resulting from the game but from the decision of a third party (a spectator in the other group). Their level of contributions will however be taken into account for the final outcome. For this reason, they will play two trial rounds per each game, one under equality of initial endowments, one under inequality.
The players will then be seated all separately and will have to answer a series of questions. They will be told that only two scenarios among the following their decision are going to have consequences for the group, and that also in that case there is only a 1/3 chance that the group outcome will depend on their decision. They will not be told that the group they are deciding the outcome for is the other group of spectators.
COMPENSATION OF PARTICIPANTS
At the end of the experimental session, we reward participants with a fixed show-up fee of 30 Bangladeshi Takas (1 BDT = 0.013 USD) and a bonus equal to the sum of their outcomes from all rounds with real money at stake, including the small prize of 30 BDT for correct beliefs on outcomes under the ``assigned distribution'' option. We convert 1 token in 5 BDT. Participants can expect a total reward between 150 BDT and 400 BDT.