Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments

Last registered on March 23, 2026

Pre-Trial

General Information

Title

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0018142

Initial registration date

March 23, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

March 23, 2026, 8:08 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Gerrit von Jorck

Affiliation

HWR Berlin

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Tobias Börger

PI Affiliation

HWR Berlin

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Jürgen Meyerhoff

PI Affiliation

HWR Berlin

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2026-03-25

End date

2026-09-30

Keywords

Labor

Additional Keywords

Exit and voice, wage–amenity trade-offs, institutional framing, collective bargaining, strike willingness, labour market behaviour, discrete choice experiment, factorial survey experiment, job attributes, behavioural responses

JEL code(s)

C93, D91, J31, J51, J63

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

This study pursues both empirical and methodological objectives. On the empirical side, it builds on Hirschman’s (1970) exit–voice framework to examine how employed individuals evaluate core employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into two distinct responses to dissatisfaction: exit, defined as willingness to change positions, and voice, defined as willingness to participate in industrial action. The design allows the analysis to move beyond preference measurement by linking workers’ evaluations of job attributes to behavioural intentions across different institutional contexts.
On the methodological side, the study contributes to the labour-economics literature on wage–amenity trade-offs and institutional framing in stated-preference experiments, where most preference-elicitation experiments frame employment decisions as choices between job advertisements. The present design contrasts this conventional job-search framing with an alternative collective bargaining framing that presents employment conditions as negotiated tariff outcomes, while holding all employment attributes constant. This comparison allows us to assess whether institutional framing systematically affects estimated preferences and the interpretation of wage–amenity trade-offs.
Across both treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees. Attribute levels are expressed as deviations from respondents’ current employment situation and reflect magnitudes commonly observed in job changes and collective bargaining agreements. Using a common attribute framework ensures comparability across all experimental modules.
Analytically, the study consists of three complementary experiments with distinct objectives. Experiment 1 employs a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) to identify framing effects on preferences by comparing income-equivalent valuations of employment attributes across the job-search and tariff treatment. Rather than directly contrasting raw coefficient estimates, the analysis focuses on marginal rates of substitution between non-wage attributes and income, derived under a linear income specification, thereby allowing meaningful comparison of wage–amenity trade-offs across institutional contexts. Experiment 2 uses a factorial survey experiment (FSE) in the tariff treatment to analyse the determinants of strike willingness, focusing on behavioural responses within a collective bargaining context. Experiment 3 compares exit and voice responses within individuals in the job treatment by combining a job-acceptance FSE with a strike-propensity FSE, allowing for an assessment of whether exit and voice function as substitute behavioural strategies.
The target sample size is approximately 900 respondents per treatment (around 1,800 in total). DCE data will be analysed using multinomial logit models, while FSE outcomes will be estimated using linear mixed-effects models and respondent fixed-effects specifications, depending on the experimental module and research question.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Börger, Tobias, Jürgen Meyerhoff and Gerrit von Jorck. 2026. "Exit and Voice under Different Institutional Frames: Evidence from Job-Search and Collective Bargaining Survey Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. March 23. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18142-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

This study examines how institutional framing affects the evaluation of employment conditions and behavioural responses in the labour market. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames that describe identical employment conditions in different ways. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers that workers encounter when searching for a new job. In the collective bargaining framing, the same employment conditions are presented as outcomes of negotiated tariff agreements between employers and unions.

Across both frames, employment packages vary along four core attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment conditions in order to make the scenarios realistic and comparable to common labour market changes.

Participants complete several survey-based experimental tasks. In a discrete choice experiment, respondents repeatedly choose between hypothetical employment packages that differ in their attribute levels. In additional factorial survey experiments, respondents evaluate hypothetical scenarios describing employment conditions and report behavioural intentions such as willingness to participate in a strike or likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer.

The experimental variation of employment attributes allows the study to estimate how workers value different job characteristics and how these valuations translate into behavioural responses such as job exit or participation in collective action.

Intervention Start Date

2026-03-25

Intervention End Date

2026-04-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

The primary outcomes correspond to respondents’ choices and behavioural intentions across the three experimental modules.

In Experiment 1 (Discrete Choice Experiment), the primary outcome is the choice between alternative employment packages that differ in income, working hours, vacation days, and employment guarantees. These employment packages are presented either under a job-search framing, where they represent individual job offers, or under a collective bargaining framing, where they represent negotiated tariff outcomes. The outcome variable records which employment package respondents choose in each decision task.

In Experiment 2 (Tariff Factorial Survey Experiment), the primary outcome is strike willingness. Respondents evaluate hypothetical tariff agreements that differ in employment conditions and report their willingness to support collective action such as participating in a strike.

In Experiment 3 (Exit–Voice Factorial Survey Experiments), the primary outcomes are exit and voice behavioural intentions. Exit is measured as the stated likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer under different employment conditions. Voice is measured as the stated willingness to participate in collective action in response to changes in employment conditions.

Together, these outcomes capture how workers evaluate employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into behavioural responses across different institutional contexts.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

The primary outcome variables are measured using respondents’ choices and behavioural ratings in the experimental tasks.

In Experiment 1 (Discrete Choice Experiment), the outcome variable records which employment package respondents select in each choice task. Each task presents two hypothetical employment packages that differ in income, working hours, vacation days, and employment guarantees. The dependent variable is coded as a binary indicator identifying the selected alternative. The experimental design allows estimation of how variation in these attributes affects choice probabilities under different institutional frames.

In Experiment 2 (Tariff Factorial Survey Experiment), the primary outcome is strike willingness. Respondents evaluate hypothetical tariff agreements that differ in employment conditions and report their willingness to support collective action. Strike willingness is measured using a rating scale capturing respondents’ support for participating in industrial action under the described conditions.

In Experiment 3 (Exit–Voice Factorial Survey Experiments), two behavioural outcomes are measured. Exit corresponds to the stated likelihood of accepting an alternative job offer under the described employment conditions. Voice corresponds to the stated willingness to participate in collective action, such as a strike, in response to changes in employment conditions. Both outcomes are measured using rating scales that capture respondents’ behavioural intentions under each vignette.

Across the factorial survey experiments, respondents evaluate multiple scenarios, allowing behavioural responses to be analysed as a function of experimentally varied employment attributes.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

The study also collects several secondary outcomes that capture respondents’ perceptions of the experimental tasks and their interpretation of the decision context.

These secondary outcomes include:

Perceived realism of the experimental tasks, measuring whether respondents considered the presented scenarios realistic and comparable to real-life employment decisions.

Collective orientation in decision-making, capturing whether respondents interpreted the decision context primarily as an individual employment decision or as part of a collective labour relations context.

These outcomes are measured using post-experimental survey items administered after the experimental tasks.

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

The secondary outcomes are constructed from post-experimental survey items that measure respondents’ perceptions of the experimental tasks and their interpretation of the decision context.

The Perceived Realism Index captures whether respondents considered the experimental scenarios realistic and behaviourally meaningful. It is constructed as the standardized mean of three Likert-scale items asking respondents whether (i) the scenarios appeared realistic, (ii) the described employment conditions seemed plausible, and (iii) they approached the decisions in a way similar to real-life employment decisions. Higher values indicate greater perceived realism.

The Collective Orientation Index measures whether respondents interpreted the decision context as individual or collective in nature. The index is constructed as the standardized mean of three items that capture whether respondents considered collective outcomes, collective bargaining logic, or individual job decisions when evaluating the scenarios. One item is reverse-coded so that higher values consistently indicate a stronger collective interpretation of the decision context.

Both indices are standardized to facilitate interpretation and comparison across respondents.

Experimental Design

The study consists of three survey-based experiments designed to examine how workers evaluate employment conditions and how these evaluations translate into behavioural responses in the labour market.

Participants are randomly assigned to one of two institutional frames. In the job-search framing, employment conditions are presented as individual job offers encountered during job search. In the collective bargaining framing, identical employment conditions are described as negotiated outcomes of collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions. The framing treatment allows the study to examine whether institutional context affects how workers evaluate employment conditions.

Across treatments, employment packages vary along four attributes: monthly gross income, weekly working hours, vacation days per year, and employment guarantees against dismissal. Attribute levels are expressed relative to respondents’ current employment situation. These attributes are experimentally varied across tasks.

The experimental design consists of three modules. Experiment 1 is a discrete choice experiment in which respondents repeatedly choose between alternative employment packages. Experiment 2 is a factorial survey experiment in the collective bargaining framing that measures respondents’ willingness to support collective action, such as participating in a strike, under different tariff agreements. Experiment 3 consists of factorial survey experiments in the job-search framing that measure respondents’ behavioural intentions along the exit and voice margins, including the likelihood of accepting alternative job offers and the willingness to participate in collective action.

Because employment attributes are experimentally varied across decision tasks, the design allows causal estimation of how economic conditions and institutional framing affect both preference formation and behavioural responses.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Randomization is implemented by the survey software using computer-generated random assignment. Respondents are randomly assigned to either the job-search framing or the collective bargaining framing with equal probability. The assignment occurs automatically when respondents enter the experimental module of the survey.

Randomization Unit

Randomization occurs at the individual respondent level. Each respondent is assigned to one of the two institutional framing conditions.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

Approximately 1,800 individual respondents.

Sample size: planned number of observations

Approximately 1,800 respondents completing the experimental survey.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

Approximately 900 respondents in the job-search framing and 900 respondents in the collective bargaining framing.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

A formal ex-ante power calculation is not conducted because the experimental design combines multiple survey experiments with repeated observations per respondent, which substantially increases statistical power relative to simple between-subject designs. The target sample size of approximately 1,800 respondents (around 900 per treatment condition) is chosen to ensure sufficient statistical power to detect moderate treatment effects across the experimental modules.

Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name

IRB Approval Date

IRB Approval Number

Analysis Plan

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