Take up of grants for governments

Last registered on June 15, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Take up of grants for governments
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018152
Initial registration date
June 04, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 15, 2026, 9:51 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
ifo institute

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Leipzig University
PI Affiliation
Ifo Institute

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-06-08
End date
2026-09-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Municipalities frequently rely on upper-level government grants to finance local public investments, yet many eligible grants remain unused. This paper examines how administrative complexity in grant design affects grant application and investment decisions. Using a conjoint experiment with mayors, we exogenously vary key features of grant programs -- such as documentation requirements, discretion in fund use, and co-financing rates -- as well as investment characteristics. We analyze how administrative features reduce the likelihood of mayors' preference to support a public investment project, and investigate the underlying mechanisms by which complexity generates costs. We examine how urgency of a project and expected popularity of the project among the electorate influence the cost of complexity. Finally, we quantify the implicit cost of complexity by estimating willingness to forego grant resources in exchange for simpler procedures.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Blesse, Sebastian, Leon Högner and Sarah Necker. 2026. "Take up of grants for governments." AEA RCT Registry. June 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18152-1.0
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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Conjoint experiment using hypothetical scenarios
Intervention Start Date
2026-06-08
Intervention End Date
2026-09-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcome of our conjoint experiment is a question we repeatedly pose after each of six choice scenarios. Participants are asked: "Would you support that your municipality carries out this investment project?" Answer options are "Yes, absolutely", "rather yes", "rather no" and "No, absolutely not". These stated choices will be informative about the underlying preferences of the mayor. Scenarios are defined by seven different features, which randomly vary from scenario to scenario: 1) investment volume, 2) urgency of the investment, 3) expected support of the investment among general public, 4) pages of the grant application, 5) discretion how the funds might be used, 6) documentation requirements after project completion, 7) co-financing rate of overall investment.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

We are further interested in the interaction effect of administrative complexity of grants on project support (as measured by attributes 4-6) when the investment is more urgent as well as when the popular support of investment is high. Specifically, we assume that the effect of administrative complexity is less pronounced when the investment is more urgent. Moreover, we expect that the effect of administrative complexity is less pronounced when the investment is more popular.

We include also a follow-up conjoint experiment in which participants see a random selection of two of the six earlier shown scenarios and are asked, for each scenario, four questions. "What would be 1) the expected time and resource requirements, 2) the risk of not receiving the funds, 3) the level of mental burden associated with the process (e.g. aversion to the procedure, perceived stress), 4) the overall risk of problems related to the funding when receiving funding (e.g. subsequent objections or repayment claims)." The goal of these follow-up scenarios is to study the mechanisms by which different complexity features cause perceived costs to potential applicants of funds. We expect that administrative complexity attributes affect 1) resource/time costs, 2) hedonic costs, and 3) (cognitive) uncertainty.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We implement an online survey experiment with German mayors using a conjoint design to study decision-making regarding municipal public investments and the take-up of intergovernmental grants.

In the main task, respondents evaluate a series of hypothetical scenarios describing a public investment project and an associated grant program. Respondents are instructed to consider a typical investment in their municipality and to assume that (i) for each investment project a respective grant program would be available and that the best program for the respective municipality was identified, (ii) the project is not decided upon yet and competes with other municipal tasks and investments, such that financing would rely on additional revenue or limitations on other spending, (iii) funding will be approved conditional on compliance with the program requirements and once an application was filed, and (iv) the investment is generally sensible and technically feasible. Further, subjects need to assume that, such investment projects can generally happen in their own municipality and they need to consider, how well their municipality would be able to implement the project under actual limitations of adminstrative and fiscal capacities (v).

Each scenario is characterized by seven attributes that vary along two dimensions: (i) characteristics of the investment (investment volume, urgency of investment, and expected support in the population), and (ii) characteristics of the grant program (pages of the grant application, discretion how the funds might be used, documentation intensity after project completion as well as co-financing rate).

The possible values for each respective attribute are as follows:
Investment volume: €0.2 million; €1 million; €3 million

Urgency in the affected policy area: Very high urgency; High urgency; Moderate urgency

Expected public support: High support; Moderate support; Low support

Application form length (number of pages to be completed): 2 pages; 10 pages; 25 pages

Expected documentation requirements after project completion: Detailed documentation with receipts; Simplified documentation without receipts

Flexibility on use of funds: High (funds can be used largely at own discretion); Low (use of funds is largely pre-defined)

Co-financing rate: 50%; 60%; 70%; 80%; 90%

Each respondent evaluates six scenarios presented sequentially in a tabular format.
While the attributes are shown in fixed order for a given subject, their order is randomized between respondents. Similarly, we have attributes that are related to the investment project (investment volume, urgency in the affected policy area and expected public support) and the grant (application form length, flexibility in use of funds, co-financing). Each of these blocks also is shown in random order across subjects but is in fixed order across scenarios for a given subject. Attribute values are randomly assigned across scenarios and respondents. Randomization enables identification of the causal effects of grant and investment characteristics on stated policy support of surveyed politicians.

The design uses a single profile evaluation format. For each decision for an individual scenario, respondents indicate whether, in their role as mayor, they would support carrying out the investment. By identifying the respective treatment effects of investment- or grant-related attributes, we can differentiate the relevance for each attribute for public investment support of the surveyed political decision makers.

To study mechanisms, a subset of two scenarios is revisited after the main task. For these scenarios, respondents assess perceived administrative burden and risks associated with the grant process, including expected effort, perceived stress, and perceived risk of implementation or compliance problems.

These tasks are embedded in a questionnaire, structured in several blocks. On the first screen, we ask for their confirmation to participate. The survey itself begins with an introduction that emphasizes the relevance and policy impact of the study. Next follows the main conjoint experiment. We also ask about the applicability of scenarios to policy areas in a follow-up question. Subsequently, we use two scenarios shown before in the mechanism block asking about perceptions about grant features. The survey then includes follow-up questions on municipal characteristics, administrative capacity, and respondents’ background. It concludes with open-ended questions on motivation and feedback.

The survey is administered online. The target population consists of all mayors in Germany, who are invited via personalized contact information by mail and email.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization of attribute levels based on an R code, randomization of the order of attributes based on survey software Tivian
Randomization Unit
Randomization is at the individual choice scenario level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We field the survey to approximately 7000 mayors in Germany. Depending on response rate, we will reach out to another approximately 3000 mayors who are not invited in the first wave as we do not have a unique email address of the respective municipalities we could use.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We expect that 800–1,000 mayors (respondents) will participate, corresponding to 4,800–6,000 vignette-level observations (6 profiles per respondent).
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
We do not have discrete treatment arms. Instead, we implement a conjoint design with independent randomization of attribute levels. We plan to survey approximately 800–1,000 mayors, each evaluating 6 profiles, resulting in 4,800–6,000 vignette-level observations. Attribute levels are randomly assigned with equal probability; thus, each level is expected to be observed approximately 1,000 times.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Commission of the School of Business, Economics and Society of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg
IRB Approval Date
2025-12-15
IRB Approval Number
N/A