Information, (Perceived) Admission Chances and Preference Reporting under Deferred Acceptance. An Experimental Study

Last registered on April 01, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Information, (Perceived) Admission Chances and Preference Reporting under Deferred Acceptance. An Experimental Study
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018245
Initial registration date
March 30, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 01, 2026, 10:50 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Research Center for Educational and Network Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Sciences; TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Budapest

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
ELTE KRTK
PI Affiliation
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-03-31
End date
2026-12-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study how different types of information about relative priority shape preference reporting under the student-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, focusing on whether information affects participants’ beliefs about their admission chances and, in turn, their reporting behavior. To address this question, we implement a laboratory school choice experiment in which four students compete for four schools, each with a capacity of one seat. Students have strict preferences over schools: they earn 15 EUR for their top choice, 11 EUR for their second choice, 8 EUR for their third choice, and 4 EUR for their least preferred choice. Schools rank students based on randomly assigned admission scores that determine priority.
In each round, participants first submit an initial rank-order list (ROL), then receive treatment-specific information, and finally submit a revised, payoff-relevant ROL. Each session is assigned to one of six treatment cells in a 3 × 2 design that crosses three information environments with two competition regimes. The information treatments are: (1) admission score disclosure, where participants observe all group members’ admission scores; (2) historical cutoff information, where participants observe the previous round’s minimum score required for admission to their highest-paying school; and (3) potential acceptance, where participants receive an individualized signal indicating whether they would be admitted to their highest-paying school if they ranked it first, holding others’ initial ROLs fixed. The competition regimes vary in the number of students competing for the same highest-paying school. In the full-competition regime, all four students share the same highest-paying school. In the medium-competition regime, two students compete for one of the highest-paying schools, and the other two compete for another.
Our main behavioral outcome is top-choice reporting, defined as ranking the highest-paying school first.
The experiment is conducted at the Laboratorio de Economía Experimental (LEE) at the University Jaume I in Castellón, Spain, in six sessions with 80 participants each. Each participant makes eight decisions, yielding 3,840 observations.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Keller, Tamas, Hubert János Kiss and Ágnes Pintér. 2026. "Information, (Perceived) Admission Chances and Preference Reporting under Deferred Acceptance. An Experimental Study." AEA RCT Registry. April 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18245-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Each session is assigned to one of six treatment cells in a 3 × 2 design that crosses three information environments with two competition regimes. The information treatments are: (1) admission score disclosure, where participants observe all group members’ admission scores; (2) historical cutoff information, where participants observe the previous round’s minimum score required for admission to their highest-paying school; and (3) potential acceptance, where participants receive an individualized signal indicating whether they would be admitted to their highest-paying school if they ranked it first, holding others’ initial ROLs fixed. The competition regimes vary in the number of students competing for the same highest-paying school. In the full-competition regime, all four students share the same highest-paying school. In the medium-competition regime, two students compete for one of the highest-paying schools, and the other two compete for another.
Intervention Start Date
2026-03-31
Intervention End Date
2026-04-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our main behavioral outcome is top-choice reporting, defined as ranking the highest-paying school first.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We implement a laboratory school choice experiment in which four students compete for four schools, each with a capacity of one seat. Students have strict preferences over schools: they earn 15 EUR for their top choice, 11 EUR for their second choice, 8 EUR for their third choice, and 4 EUR for their least preferred choice. Schools rank students based on randomly assigned admission scores that determine priority.
In each round, participants first submit an initial rank-order list (ROL), then receive treatment-specific information, and finally submit a revised, payoff-relevant ROL.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Interventions are assigned randomly based on the value of a randomly generated number.
Randomization Unit
Individual: Participants are randomly assigned at the session level. Each session corresponds to exactly one information treatment × one competition regime.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
480 students
Sample size: planned number of observations
Six sessions with 80 participants each. Each participant makes eight decisions, yielding a total of 3,840 observations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
80 students in each of the six combinations of information treatment (n = 3) × competition regime (n = 2)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
The minimum detectable effect size is 0.058, corresponding to approximately 6% of a standard deviation
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
ELTE CERS
IRB Approval Date
2026-03-17
IRB Approval Number
1Főig/11-1/2026