Collaborative Contact in Tourism: A Randomized Field Experiment in Beach Volleyball

Last registered on August 10, 2026

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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Collaborative Contact in Tourism: A Randomized Field Experiment in Beach Volleyball

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0018354

Initial registration date

August 04, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

August 10, 2026, 9:09 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name

Jorge Araña

Affiliation

Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2026-02-01

End date

2027-06-30

Keywords

Other

Additional Keywords

Development Economics; Field Experiments; Discrimination, Prejudice, Tourism, Contact Hypothesis.

JEL code(s)

C93, J15, Z32

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Can structured collaborative contact between tourists and local residents reduce intergroup prejudice? We conduct a randomized field experiment in Gran Canaria, Spain, where growing tourismphobia has intensified resident-tourist tensions. 800 participants (tourists and Canarian residents) are randomly assigned to 2v2 beach volleyball teams that are either mixed (one tourist, one resident) or homogeneous (same group), cross-randomized with team pay versus individual pay.
Tournaments are organized under a formal agreement with the Federación Canaria de Voleibol across four beach locations. Each tournament runs approximately 3.5 weeks with eight matches per team. The primary outcome is an omnibus cross-group behavior index comprising six incentivized behavioral tasks and one attitudinal measure: social interaction choices, team formation decisions, cross-group trading, and trust game behavior. The design replicates Lowe (2021, American Economic Review), who found that collaborative contact through cricket leagues reduced caste prejudice in India by 0.23 standard deviations. We test three hypotheses: (H1) mixed-team assignment increases cross-group prosocial behavior; (H2) effects generalize beyond direct teammates to the outgroup as a whole; and (H3) adversarial contact through competition against outgroup opponents produces null or negative effects. This is the first randomized field experiment testing the contact hypothesis in a tourism setting.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Araña, Jorge. 2026. "Collaborative Contact in Tourism: A Randomized Field Experiment in Beach Volleyball." AEA RCT Registry. August 10. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18354-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Participants are randomly assigned to 2v2 beach volleyball teams for a recreational tournament lasting approximately 3.5 weeks
(~8 matches). The primary treatment is team composition: mixed teams (one tourist paired with one local resident) versus homogeneous teams (two tourists or two residents). A secondary treatment cross-randomizes the incentive structure: team pay (prize money shared equally between teammates) versus individual pay (prize money awarded individually based on performance).
Tournaments are organized under a formal agreement (Convenio de Investigación) with the Federación Canaria de Voleibol, with professional referees, official equipment, and club infrastructure at four beach locations across Gran Canaria.

Intervention Start Date

2026-06-01

Intervention End Date

2026-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Primary: Omnibus cross-group behavior index (mean of seven standardized components: six incentivized behavioral tasks and one attitudinal measure). Components: (1) number of outgroup want-to-interact nominations, (2) number of outgroup friendships, (3) outgroup chosen for team with stakes, (4) outgroup chosen for team without stakes, (5) cross-group trade (binary), (6) trust game amount sent to outgroup partner,
(7) stated generalized trust toward outgroup.

Secondary: Each component analyzed individually. Voting measure (allocating votes to outgroup candidates in a hypothetical
committee election).

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Each component is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the zero-match backup group (low-priority backup participants who were never called as substitutes and therefore had minimal contact exposure).
The omnibus index is the unweighted average of the seven standardized components. This approach follows Kling, Liebman,
and Katz (2007) and Lowe (2021). As a sensitivity check, standardization is repeated using all low-priority backups by
original assignment status (ITT), including those who substituted into one or two matches.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Each of the seven omnibus index components analyzed individually. Additionally: votes allocated to outgroup candidates in a
hypothetical committee election task (measure of revealed preference for outgroup representation).

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Individual component analyses use the same standardization procedure as the omnibus index. Multiple testing across the seven individual components is controlled using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure at q = 0.10. The voting measure is analyzed separately as an additional behavioral outcome.

Experimental Design

2×2 factorial randomized field experiment. 800 participants (tourists and local residents in Gran Canaria, Spain) are randomly assigned to 2v2 beach volleyball teams that are either mixed (one tourist + one resident) or homogeneous (same group). Cross-randomized with team pay (shared prizes) vs. individual pay. Tournaments organized under a Convenio de Investigación with the Federación Canaria de Voleibol.
Eight tournaments across four beach locations, two waves. Each tournament runs 3-3.5 weeks (~8 matches per team). All outcomes measured post-tournament using incentivized behavioral tasks with real monetary stakes.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Computer-generated randomization stratified at the individual level by gender and volleyball ability (above/below median within each group). Randomization performed in office using statistical software (Stata/R) after baseline assessment.
Match schedule randomized using the Bollobás random pairing algorithm (see Lowe, 2021, for implementation details).

Randomization Unit

Individual (for team assignment). Team (for incentive structure — team pay vs. individual pay). Match schedule randomized at the tournament level.

Was the treatment clustered?

Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

Approximately 200 teams (2 players per team) across 8 tournaments

Sample size: planned number of observations

800 participants (approximately 400 tourists and 400 local residents). Scaling option: 1,200 participants across 12 tournaments if funding permits.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

Approximately 182 teams mixed composition (364 players), 98 teams homogeneous composition (196 players), 240 low-priority backup players. Within each composition type, approximately half assigned to team pay and half to individual pay.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Equation 1 (active players, N≈560): MDE = 0.148 SD for the omnibus index at 80% power, alpha = 0.05, two-sided, with team-level clustering (ICC = 0.15). For individual outcomes: MDE = 0.234 SD. Equation 2 (full sample including backups, N≈800): MDE = 0.124 SD for the omnibus index. For individual outcomes: MDE = 0.196 SD. At 15% attrition: Equation 1 MDE = 0.161 SD (omnibus), Equation 2 MDE = 0.135 SD (omnibus). Based on Lowe (2021), who found effects of 0.23 SD on a comparable omnibus index, the design is powered to detect effects of approximately two-thirds of Lowe's estimate.

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB