Abstract
This study examines how online dispute-resolution systems should be designed when a dispute can be reduced to a single compensation amount. Economic theory provides two natural benchmarks in this setting: direct bargaining and a structured one-shot ODR procedure based on the canonical sealed-bid mechanism. However, real platforms often add practical features such as bid revision after an impasse, algorithmic intervention when the parties’ requests are incompatible. These features are common in practice but are not well rationalized by standard bargaining theory, making their value an empirical question. In an online experiment, participants bargain over the division of 100 points while each has a private fallback amount if no agreement is reached. Participants are randomly assigned to Barg, ODR, SeqODR, or AlgODR. The main research questions are whether bid revision improves outcomes relative to one-shot ODR, whether algorithmic intervention improves outcomes when initial requests are incompatible. The study records agreement rates, final settlements, earnings, submitted requests, revised requests, and acceptance decisions.