Misperceptions, Protest Norms, and Democratic Stability: How Cross-Partisan Beliefs Shape Political Violence in Post-Authoritarian

Last registered on May 11, 2026

Pre-Trial

General Information

Title

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0018515

Initial registration date

May 04, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

May 11, 2026, 8:02 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name

Ryo Takahashi

Affiliation

Waseda University

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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

PI Affiliation

PI Name

PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2026-05-04

End date

2026-08-31

Keywords

Behavior, Crime, Violence, & Conflict

Additional Keywords

JEL code(s)

D72, D83, P0, O12

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

In many developing countries, elections are often accompanied by political violence. A recurring pattern is the escalation of protest beyond its initial target—from resistance against the government to attacks on civilians, media organizations, and private property. We term this grievance-exceeding protest, distinguishing it from grievance-directed protest targeting government actors. Using the case of Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, we hypothesize that the perceived success of such escalation may have embedded grievance-exceeding protest into citizens’ democratic norms.
We argue that misperceptions about political opponents sustain this norm: citizens overestimate opponents’ tolerance for grievance-exceeding protest, generating a security-dilemma dynamic in which both sides retain violent means. We test this using a two-wave online survey experiment with 3,000 respondents following Bangladesh’s February 2026 election. Respondents receive randomized information about opponents’ actual intolerance for grievance-exceeding protest, including a common-knowledge treatment. Outcomes include list experiments on protest norms, a public declaration measure, an NPO donation coordination game, and a cross-partisan public goods game.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Higashida, Keisaku, Yuki Higuchi and Ryo Takahashi. 2026. "Misperceptions, Protest Norms, and Democratic Stability: How Cross-Partisan Beliefs Shape Political Violence in Post-Authoritarian ." AEA RCT Registry. May 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18515-1.0

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2026-06-04

Intervention End Date

2026-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

List experiment (Exceeding). We measure support for grievance-exceeding protest using a list experiment. The outcome is the difference in mean item counts between a treatment list that includes a sensitive item—whether exceeding protest can be a legitimate part of democracy—and a control list that excludes it.
Declaration Tier 1. We measure respondents’ willingness to publicly reject grievance-exceeding protest using a declaration exercise. The outcome is the share of respondents selecting Support, Oppose, or Abstain on a statement calling for resolving political grievances exclusively through democratic institutions and rejecting exceeding protest.
Declaration Tier 2. Among respondents who select Support or Abstain in Tier 1, we measure willingness to make a public commitment. The outcome is the share consenting to have their first name displayed as a supporter of the declaration.
1st-order tolerance (post). We measure individual-level normative beliefs about grievance-exceeding protest. The outcome is agreement with the statement that exceeding protest cannot be justified as a form of political action. This direct measure asks essentially the same question as the list experiment’s sensitive item. Comparing the prevalence of disagreement from the list experiment with the share disagreeing on the direct question provides a test of whether respondents answer the direct question honestly (i.e., without social desirability bias). If the two estimates are statistically indistinguishable, the direct question can serve as a primary outcome with full statistical power, complementing the list experiment.
NPO donation coordination game. We measure cross-partisan coordination on pro-democracy behavior using a binary donation game. Respondents decide whether to approve or disapprove a 100 BDT donation to an election-monitoring NGO (EWG), paired with a partner from an opposing political group. The outcome is the approval decision. The coordination game is preceded by an individual (unpaired) donation decision, allowing us to isolate the coordination component as the difference between individual and paired donation rates.
Cross-partisan public goods game. We measure cooperative behavior with political opponents using a standard public goods game. Respondents are paired with an opposing-party participant and decide how much of a 100 BDT endowment to contribute to a shared account. Total contributions are increased by 50% and split equally. The outcome is the contribution amount.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We conduct a two-wave online survey experiment with 3,000 respondents in Bangladesh following the February 2026 election. In Wave 1, we measure baseline beliefs and attitudes. In Wave 2, respondents are randomly assigned to receive information about political groups’ attitudes toward protest, including (i) out-group information, (ii) in-group information, (iii) both, (iv) both with a common knowledge statement, (v) placebo information on a non-political topic, or (vi) no information.

Experimental Design Details

Not available

Randomization Method

Randomization done in the field by a computer

Randomization Unit

Individual

Was the treatment clustered?