Tax Preferences

Last registered on May 11, 2026
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Tax Preferences
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018572
Initial registration date
May 06, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 11, 2026, 9:08 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Justin Holz
Affiliation
University of Chicago
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2026-05-07
End date
2026-05-09
Keywords
Behavior, Finance & Microfinance, Governance
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study measures people's preferences over how property tax burdens are distributed across households. Using an incentivized survey experiment, we elicit willingness to pay to help or not help real homeowners with their property taxes. We vary characteristics of the homeowner to understand which factors people believe should matter for determining fair tax burdens.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Holz, Justin. 2026. "Tax Preferences." AEA RCT Registry. May 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18572-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Respondents view profiles of real homeowners and make incentivized decisions about whether to provide those homeowners with property tax appeal assistance. Respondents also complete a dictator game allocation task and answer survey questions about tax fairness.
Intervention (Hidden)
The study uses a 2×2 within-subject factorial design that independently varies the beneficiary household's income (low vs high) and home value (low vs high). Each respondent evaluates all four cells in randomized order. Willingness to pay is elicited using an iterative multiple price list (iMPL) with a bisection tree that converges in 4 steps to $5 intervals over a $0-$50 range. Estimates outside the range will be calculated using a triangular distribution. Respondents first choose whether to help or not, then the bisection elicits their reservation price. A dictator game presents the same four household profiles. One in 100 respondents is randomly selected to have one of their choices implemented. The survey also collects stated preferences about what factors should determine property taxes, open-ended reasoning, and demographics.
Intervention Start Date
2026-05-07
Intervention End Date
2026-05-09

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Willingness to pay to help or not help homeowners with property tax appeals, as measured by the iterative multiple price list. Dictator game allocations across household profiles. Stated preferences about factors that should determine property tax burdens.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The relative weight subjects place on different household characteristics.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Within-subject design in which each respondent evaluates multiple homeowner profiles and makes incentivized decisions about providing property tax appeal assistance. Respondent decisions have real consequences for real homeowners. The study also includes an unincentivized allocation task and survey questions about tax fairness.

Experimental Design Details
2×2 within-subject factorial crossing household income (low: $75,000 vs high: $150,000) and home value (low: $250,000 vs high: $500,000). Each respondent sees all four cells in randomized order. The primary elicitation is an iterative multiple price list (iMPL) that bisects over $0-$50 in four steps, separately for respondents who initially choose to help versus not. A constant-sum dictator game ($50 endowment, split among self and the four household profiles) is administered after the iMPL. Respondents are randomized into one of two attribute display orders (income-first vs home-value-first). One in 100 respondents is randomly selected to have one randomly chosen iMPL decision implemented. Post-iMPL survey questions elicit stated preferences about what factors should matter for property taxes and why.

We will examine heterogeneity in preferences and equity weights by respondent income, home value, political party. We will also examine the covariance across preferences and robustness checks that remove inattentive subjects.
Randomization Method
Randomization within qualtrics
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1300
Sample size: planned number of observations
1300
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The experiment is within person. Order is randomized between subjects.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Michigan
IRB Approval Date
2026-03-25
IRB Approval Number
HUM00290459
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials