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Field
Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
on_going
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Abstract
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Before
This project studies how leadership turnover affects cooperation in teams. Participants take part in a laboratory experiment in groups of four. Three participants make repeated costly effort choices in a team production setting. One participant has a leadership role and can assign sanctions after observing information about individual team members’ behavior. The experiment compares teams in which the leader remains in place with teams in which the leader is replaced after an initial phase of interaction. The study tests whether cooperation changes when the person holding enforcement authority is replaced while the formal production and sanctioning environment remains fixed.
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After
This project studies how leadership turnover affects cooperation in teams. Participants take part in a laboratory experiment in groups of four. Three participants make repeated costly effort choices in a team production setting. One participant has a leadership role and observes noisy bracket signals about individual contributor effort as well as the team average effort. The leader can assign rewards or sanctions subject to per person and total consequence limits. The experiment compares teams in which the leader remains in place with teams in which the leader is replaced after an initial phase of interaction. The study tests whether cooperation changes when the person holding consequence authority is replaced while the formal production environment, information structure, and consequence technology remain fixed.
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Field
Last Published
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Before
May 18, 2026 08:17 AM
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After
June 12, 2026 10:22 AM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
Participants take part in a repeated group decision task. Groups consist of three contributors and one leader. Contributors repeatedly choose costly effort in a team production setting. The leader observes information about contributors’ behavior and can assign sanctions subject to limits. The study varies whether the same leader remains assigned to the group in the second part of the task or whether a different leader is assigned.
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After
Participants take part in a repeated group decision task. Groups consist of three contributors and one leader. Contributors repeatedly choose costly effort in a team production setting. The leader observes noisy information about contributors’ behavior and can assign rewards or sanctions subject to limits. The study varies whether the same leader remains assigned to the group in the second part of the task or whether a different leader is assigned.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The project is a laboratory experiment with a pilot stage followed by a planned main study. Participants interact in groups of four. Three participants repeatedly choose costly effort in a team production task, while one participant acts as leader. The interaction has two phases. The study varies whether the same leader remains assigned in the second phase or whether the group receives a different leader. The leader can assign sanctions after observing information about group performance. Pilot data will be used only for feasibility checks and will not be included in the confirmatory main analysis.
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After
The project is a laboratory experiment with a pilot stage followed by a planned main study. Participants interact in groups of four. Three participants repeatedly choose costly effort in a team production task, while one participant acts as leader. The interaction lasts 20 rounds. The study varies whether the same leader remains assigned after round 10 or whether the group receives a different leader. The leader observes noisy bracket signals about individual effort and the team average effort, and can assign rewards or sanctions subject to per person and total consequence limits. Pilot data collected before the main experiment were used only for implementation updates and feasibility checks, including timing checks, interface checks, payoff and consequence calibration, and data export checks, and will not be included in the confirmatory main analysis.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
Currently planned main study: 40 contributor groups, with 20 groups assigned to control and 20 groups assigned to turnover. The final main study sample size may be revised after the pilot and before main study data collection, based on feasibility, session timing, dropout, payment range, implementation constraints, and power calibration. Pilot groups are used for feasibility checks only and are excluded from the confirmatory main analysis.
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After
Planned main study: at least 80 contributor groups, with at least 40 groups assigned to control and at least 40 groups assigned to turnover. If additional chair funding and laboratory capacity are available before confirmatory outcome analysis begins, the sample may be increased up to a prespecified maximum of 160 contributor groups, with equal allocation across treatment arms. The final sample size within this range will be determined by budget and laboratory capacity, not by estimated treatment effects from the main study. This range is based on pilot informed implementation, budget, and power calibration, including sensitivity analyses over lower, pilot based, higher, and high variance scenarios. Pilot groups are used for feasibility and calibration checks only, are excluded from the confirmatory main sample, and will not be used in the confirmatory main analysis.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
Currently planned main study: 160 participants, with four participants per contributor group. The final number of participants may be revised after the pilot and before main study data collection if feasibility or power calibration requires a change. Pilot participants are excluded from the confirmatory main analysis.
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After
Planned main study: at least 320 participants, with four participants per contributor group and at least 80 contributor groups in total. If additional chair funding and laboratory capacity are available before confirmatory outcome analysis begins, the sample may be increased up to a prespecified maximum of 640 participants, corresponding to 160 contributor groups. The final sample size within this range will be determined by budget and laboratory capacity, not by estimated treatment effects from the main study. Pilot participants are excluded from the confirmatory main sample and will not be used in the confirmatory main analysis.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
Currently planned main study: 20 contributor groups assigned to control and 20 contributor groups assigned to turnover. The final allocation may be revised after the pilot and before confirmatory main data collection. Any revision will be documented before the main study starts and will not be based on estimated treatment effects from the pilot.
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After
Planned main study: at least 40 contributor groups assigned to control and at least 40 contributor groups assigned to turnover, corresponding to at least 160 participants per treatment arm under complete groups of four. If additional chair funding and laboratory capacity are available before confirmatory outcome analysis begins, the sample may be increased up to a prespecified maximum of 80 contributor groups per treatment arm, corresponding to 320 participants per treatment arm under complete groups of four. The final sample size within this range will be determined by budget and laboratory capacity, not by estimated treatment effects from the main study. Pilot groups are excluded from the confirmatory main sample and will not be used in the confirmatory main analysis.
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Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
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After
Power calculations are based on the group level primary outcome, defined as the change in average contributor effort from rounds 8 to 10 to rounds 11 to 13. The unit is effort points on the 0 to 100 effort scale. Effects of 4, 6, and 8 effort points correspond to 4, 6, and 8 percentage points of the feasible effort range and are interpreted as absolute effects in either direction. The pilot based standard deviation of the group level pre to post change is 5.92 effort points, based on 4 complete pilot groups. Because this pilot based estimate is imprecise and the final design differs from the pilot implementation, power is evaluated by simulation for 40 to 80 groups per condition and with sensitivity to lower, pilot based, higher, and high variance scenarios. At the planned minimum of 40 groups per condition, the design is mainly powered for moderate to large effects under the pilot based variance scenario. Increasing the sample within the prespecified range improves power for smaller effects and for higher variance scenarios. Pilot data are used only to calibrate implementation and variance inputs and are excluded from the confirmatory main analysis.
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Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
The experiment studies leadership turnover in a repeated team production task. Groups consist of three contributors and one leader and interact for 20 rounds, divided into two phases of 10 rounds. Contributor groups remain fixed throughout the task.
In each round, contributors choose costly effort. Effort increases team output but entails convex private costs. The leader does not choose effort. After contributors make their decisions, the leader observes summary information about contributors’ behavior and can assign costly sanctions subject to individual and group level limits.
The treatment variation occurs after round 10. In the control condition, the same leader remains assigned to the contributor group in the second phase. In the turnover condition, the contributor group is assigned a different leader in the second phase. Any pilot data collected before the main experiment will be used only for implementation checks and excluded from the confirmatory main analysis.
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After
The experiment studies leadership turnover in a repeated team production task. Groups consist of three contributors and one leader and interact for 20 rounds, divided into two phases of 10 rounds. Contributor groups remain fixed throughout the task.
In each round, contributors choose costly effort from 0 to 100. Effort increases team output but entails convex private costs. The leader does not choose effort. After contributors make their decisions, the leader observes the team average effort and a noisy bracket signal for each contributor. The signal is based on four true effort brackets: 0 to 30, 31 to 60, 61 to 80, and 81 to 100. The signal is correct with probability 70 percent. For interior brackets, the remaining probability is split equally across the two adjacent brackets; for boundary brackets, it is assigned to the only adjacent bracket.
The leader can assign costly reward or sanction points subject to individual and group level limits. For a given contributor in a given round, the leader can assign either reward points or sanction points, but not both. The per person cap is 10 consequence points and the total consequence budget is 20 points per round. One reward point increases the contributor’s payoff by one point, while one sanction point reduces the contributor’s payoff by three points. Leader costs depend on total consequence points assigned: the first 10 points cost one point each, and points 11 to 20 cost two points each.
The treatment variation occurs after round 10. In the control condition, the same leader remains assigned to the contributor group in the second phase. In the turnover condition, the contributor group is assigned a different leader in the second phase. The successor leader faces the same formal payoff rules, information structure, and consequence technology, but does not observe the predecessor’s earlier individual signal and consequence history. Pilot data collected before the main experiment were used to inform implementation updates, including payoff and consequence calibration, interface checks, timing checks, and data export checks, and will be excluded from the confirmatory main analysis.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
• Full phase two change in average contributor effort
• Immediate round 11 change in average contributor effort
• Within group dispersion of contributor effort
• Sanctioning intensity
• Sanction targeting by performance signal
• Contributor payoffs
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After
• Full post turnover change in average contributor effort
• Immediate round 11 change in average contributor effort
• Within group dispersion of contributor effort
• Reward and sanctioning intensity
• Reward and sanction targeting by performance signal
• Contributor payoffs
• Post game survey measures on perceived effort standards, perceived reward and sanction thresholds, predictability, fairness, strictness, and clarity of consequence rules
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Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
• Full phase two change: average contributor effort in rounds 11 to 20 minus average contributor effort in rounds 6 to 10
• Immediate round 11 change: average contributor effort in round 11 minus average contributor effort in rounds 8 to 10
• Within group dispersion: standard deviation of contributor effort within a group and round, averaged over the relevant window
• Sanctioning intensity: total sanction points assigned by the leader per group and round
• Sanction targeting: mean sanction points assigned to contributors by observed performance signal category
• Contributor payoffs: average contributor payoff at the group round level, reported before and after sanctions where applicable
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After
• Full post turnover change: average contributor effort in rounds 11 to 20 minus average contributor effort in rounds 6 to 10
• Immediate round 11 change: average contributor effort in round 11 minus average contributor effort in rounds 8 to 10
• Within group dispersion: standard deviation of contributor effort within a group and round, averaged over the relevant window
• Reward and sanction intensity: total reward points and total sanction points assigned by the leader per group and round
• Reward and sanction targeting: mean reward and sanction points assigned to contributors by observed signal bracket
• Contributor payoffs: average contributor payoff at the group round level, reported before and after rewards and sanctions where applicable
• Survey measures: post game self reports used for descriptive mechanism checks and heterogeneity analyses, not as causal mediators
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