Wage dispersion or wage compression?------follow-up experiment

Last registered on May 19, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Wage dispersion or wage compression?------follow-up experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018595
Initial registration date
May 18, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
May 19, 2026, 9:26 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Jierui Yang
Affiliation
Maastricht University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Sigrid Suetens
PI Affiliation
Tilburg University
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-05-18
End date
2028-05-08
Keywords
Behavior, Lab, Labor
Additional Keywords
Behavioral mechanism design
JEL code(s)
D90, M52
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
There is a debate in the literature as to whether dispersed or compressed wage structures enhances individual and organizational performance. We study how to design an incentive structure in an environment with two heterogeneous players using a lab experiment.








External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Suetens, Sigrid and Jierui Yang. 2026. "Wage dispersion or wage compression?------follow-up experiment." AEA RCT Registry. May 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18595-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Different wage structures (between subjects)
Intervention Start Date
2026-05-18
Intervention End Date
2028-05-08

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Mutual investment rate
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
If both players choose invest, the mutual investment is coded as "1", otherwise, the mutual investment is coded as "0". The mutual investment rate is the percentage of times that both players choose to invest.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Participants will play games with different wage structures.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Each computer in the lab is set up for one of the three treatments. Each treatment has at least 6 participants per session. Participants will randomly draw a number card to decide which computer in the lab they will use, so they are randomly allocated to a treatment. The stranger matching is done automatically by the computer program.
Randomization Unit
The matching group of 6 to 10 partcipants is the randomization unit. The participants will be rematched inside the matching group in each round.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
30 matching groups
Sample size: planned number of observations
Around 240 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
10 matching groups per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM) of Tilburg University
IRB Approval Date
2026-05-11
IRB Approval Number
EXE 2023-014 A1
Analysis Plan