Mixed Repeated and One Time Player Games: Criminal Plea Negotiations Simulation

Last registered on July 22, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Mixed Repeated and One Time Player Games: Criminal Plea Negotiations Simulation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018751
Initial registration date
July 14, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 22, 2026, 8:02 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Nathaniel Neligh
Affiliation
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Nathaniel Neligh
PI Affiliation
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Benjamin Barton
PI Affiliation
University of Tennessee - Knoxville
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-08-17
End date
2027-05-31
Keywords
Behavior, Crime, Violence, & Conflict, Lab
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
K14, C70
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract

Many experiments have compared the behavior of players in finitely repeated games and indefinitely repeated games, but to our knowledge no experiments have examined the impact of mixed-continuation games where some some players repeat the game indefinitely while others cycle through for a single round. In this experiment, we study a mixed-continuation game based on plea bargaining in the United States criminal justice system. In this system prosecuting district attorneys (DAs) and public defenders (PDs) will generally interact frequently across many cases. On the other hand, defendants typically only interact with these attorneys for a single case. This incentivized experiment tests whether the long term relationships between DAs and PDs harm clients or reduce the fairness of the court system. We also examine whether these long term relationships impact the probability of going to trial, which has a large impact on the efficiency of the proceedings.


External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Barton, Benjamin, Nathaniel Neligh and Nathaniel Neligh. 2026. "Mixed Repeated and One Time Player Games: Criminal Plea Negotiations Simulation." AEA RCT Registry. July 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18751-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-08-17
Intervention End Date
2027-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Average number of "years in prison" the defendant receives.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The experiment is set up such that individual defendants are as likely to be considered guilty as they are innocent under fair conditions. This means that outcomes which vary from (in expectation) half of the penalty associated with conviction would be considered biased.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
How often negotiations go to trial.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Trials waste resources, so the frequency with which negotiations go to trial is a measure of inefficiency.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Students participate in an incentivized experiment where they take the roles of DAs, PDs, and defendants making decisions in a mock criminal plea negotiation setting.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The experiment lengths will be pre-randomized by a computer.
The trial outcomes will be randomized by computer during the trial.
Randomization Unit
We cluster by experimental session.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
10 sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
200
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
5 sessions for the control, 5 sessions for the treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Tennessee, Knoxville IRB
IRB Approval Date
2026-06-08
IRB Approval Number
N/A
Analysis Plan