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Abstract
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Before
Many critical real-world choices—ranging from corporate board investments to financial regulatory policies—are made by groups rather than isolated individuals. Crucially, these collective decisions are rarely simple; they routinely involve multi-dimensional settings where outcomes are both uncertain (risky) and delayed in time (intertemporal). While standard economic theories often assume a frictionless aggregation of preferences, real-world committees operate under specific formal protocols: institutional voting thresholds and asymmetric distributions of voting power.This study conducts a controlled laboratory experiment to systematically investigate how formal institutional designs shape collective choice in these complex environments. We implement a randomized 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design, manipulating two core institutional dimensions: (1) Voting Rules, comparing a two-thirds majority rule against a strict unanimity rule; and (2) Voting Weights, comparing an unweighted system (equal power) against a weighted system (where a designated leader possesses asymmetric voting power). Group members are presented with canonical choice lists trading off immediate, certain payoffs against delayed, probabilistic rewards.By tracking the complete trajectory of the collective bargaining process—from initial individual proposals, through group deliberation, to the final voting outcomes—this study aims to uncover how voting rules and power structures jointly condition a group's propensity for risk-taking and its sensitivity to time discounting. Given the large and saturated sample size of 160 independent interaction groups (640 participants in total), this project provides high-powered, clean empirical evidence for the micro-foundations of institutional design, offering actionable insights for optimizing decision-making protocols in corporate governance and financial institutions.
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After
Many critical real-world choices—ranging from corporate board investments to financial regulatory policies—are made by groups rather than isolated individuals. Crucially, these collective decisions are rarely simple; they routinely involve multi-dimensional settings where outcomes are both uncertain (risky) and delayed in time (intertemporal). While standard economic theories often assume a frictionless aggregation of preferences, real-world committees operate under specific formal protocols: institutional voting thresholds and asymmetric distributions of voting power.This study conducts a controlled laboratory experiment to systematically investigate how formal institutional designs shape collective choice in these complex environments. We implement a randomized 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design, manipulating two core institutional dimensions: (1) Voting Rules, comparing a two-thirds majority rule against a strict unanimity rule; and (2) Voting Weights, comparing an unweighted system (equal power) against a weighted system (where a designated leader possesses asymmetric voting power). Group members are presented with canonical choice lists trading off immediate, certain payoffs against delayed, probabilistic rewards.By tracking the complete trajectory of the collective bargaining process—from initial individual proposals, through group deliberation, to the final voting outcomes—this study aims to uncover how voting rules and power structures jointly condition a group's propensity for risk-taking and its sensitivity to time discounting. Given the large and saturated sample size of 200 independent interaction groups (600 participants in total), this project provides high-powered, clean empirical evidence for the micro-foundations of institutional design, offering actionable insights for optimizing decision-making protocols in corporate governance and financial institutions.
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Last Published
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June 03, 2026 08:37 AM
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July 04, 2026 07:38 AM
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
This study employs a mixed between-within subject factorial design to rigorously evaluate the causal impacts of formal voting rules and voting weights on collective intertemporal choices under uncertainty. The unit of randomization and independent statistical inference is fixed strictly at the group level (3-person interaction sessions) to fully control for intra-group correlation.
1. Between-Subject Factors (2 × 2 Factorial Treatment Cells)
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four distinct, mutually exclusive institutional treatment cells upon arrival at the laboratory:
Treatment 1 (U-Uw) Unanimity & Unweighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members (consensus threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 2 (U-W) Unanimity & Weighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members. Voting power is distributed asymmetrically: one randomly designated leader holds 2 votes, while the remaining two members hold 1 vote each.
Treatment 3 (M-Uw) Majority & Unweighted: Decisions require agreement from at least two out of three members (2/3 majority threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 4 (M-W) Majority & Weighted: Voting power is distributed asymmetrically (Leader has 2 votes; each ordinary member has 1 vote; total = 4 votes). The institutional passage threshold is set to a strict minimum of 3 votes.
2. Within-Subject Factors (Multi-Dimensional Risk Tasks)
Every independent group completes two sequential conditions across four formal parts (Parts A to D) to elicit baseline individual preferences and final collective outcomes:
Condition 1: Risky Choice (RC) Task: Elicits pure risk preferences using a multiple price list (MPL) framework, trading off a certain, immediate payoff (Option A) against a probabilistic, immediate reward (Option B).
Condition 2: Risky-Intertemporal Choice (RIC) Task: Imposes a 4-week temporal delay on all potential payoffs of the risky option (Option B) while keeping the certain option (Option A) immediate, thereby capturing the direct behavioral interaction of risk taking and time discounting.
3. Coordination Protocol and Deadlock Rule
Within each group task (Parts B and D), a structured, dynamic coordination protocol is executed for a maximum of 5 formal rounds. Each round sequentially consists of: (i) Simultaneous Proposal Submission, (ii) Anonymous Free-Form Group Chat Deliberation, and (iii) Simultaneous Voting. If a group fails to reach a binding collective decision matching their treatment's threshold by the end of Round 5, a complete contract deadlock is declared, and all members earn zero payoff for that task.
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After
This study employs a mixed between-within subject factorial design to rigorously evaluate the causal impacts of formal voting rules and voting weights on collective intertemporal choices under uncertainty. The unit of randomization and independent statistical inference is fixed strictly at the group level (3-person interaction sessions) to fully control for intra-group correlation.
1. Between-Subject Factors (2 × 2 Factorial Treatment Cells)
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of four distinct, mutually exclusive institutional treatment cells upon arrival at the laboratory:
Treatment 1 (U-Uw) Unanimity & Unweighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members (consensus threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 2 (U-W) Unanimity & Weighted: Decisions strictly require unanimous support from all 3 members. Voting power is distributed asymmetrically: one randomly designated leader holds 2 votes, while the remaining two members hold 1 vote each.
Treatment 3 (M-Uw) Majority & Unweighted: Decisions require agreement from at least two out of three members (2/3 majority threshold). All members possess equal voting power (1 vote each).
Treatment 4 (M-W) Majority & Weighted: Voting power is distributed asymmetrically (Leader has 2 votes; each ordinary member has 1 vote; total = 4 votes). The institutional passage threshold is set to a strict minimum of 3 votes.
2. Within-Subject Factors (Multi-Dimensional Risk Tasks)
Every independent group completes two sequential conditions across four formal parts (Parts A to D) to elicit baseline individual preferences and final collective outcomes:
Condition 1: Risky Choice (RC) Task: Elicits pure risk preferences using a multiple price list (MPL) framework, trading off a certain, immediate payoff (Option A) against a probabilistic, immediate reward (Option B).
Condition 2: Risky-Intertemporal Choice (RIC) Task: Imposes a 4-week temporal delay on all potential payoffs of the risky option (Option B) while keeping the certain option (Option A) immediate, thereby capturing the direct behavioral interaction of risk taking and time discounting.
To control for order effects, my experimental design also counterbalanced the order of the Risky Choice task and the Risky-Intertemporal Choice task.
3. Coordination Protocol and Deadlock Rule
Within each group task (Parts B and D), a structured, dynamic coordination protocol is executed for a maximum of 5 formal rounds. Each round sequentially consists of: (i) Simultaneous Proposal Submission, (ii) Anonymous Free-Form Group Chat Deliberation, and (iii) Simultaneous Voting. If a group fails to reach a binding collective decision matching their treatment's threshold by the end of Round 5, a complete contract deadlock is declared, and all members earn zero payoff for that task.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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160 Groups
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200 Groups
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Planned Number of Observations
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480 participants (organized into 160 independent virtual groups).
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600 participants (organized into 200 independent virtual groups).
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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40 groups per treatment arm.
40 groups in Unanimity & Unweighted, 40 groups in Unanimity & Weighted, 40 groups in Majority & Unweighted, and 40 groups in Majority & Weighted.
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50 groups per treatment arm.
50 groups in Unanimity & Unweighted, 50 groups in Unanimity & Weighted, 50 groups in Majority & Unweighted, and 50 groups in Majority & Weighted.
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