Who Do People Cooperate For? Experimental Measures of Cooperation Behavior and Organizational Performance

Last registered on June 15, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Who Do People Cooperate For? Experimental Measures of Cooperation Behavior and Organizational Performance
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018882
Initial registration date
June 07, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 15, 2026, 1:54 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Policy Studies Institute (PSI)

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
IFPRI
PI Affiliation
University College Dublin (UCD)
PI Affiliation
IFPRI

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-06-08
End date
2026-09-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Group-based organizations such as youth agribusiness associations, savings and credit groups, cooperatives, and forest user groups are central instruments of development policy. Their success depends on whether members and leaders are willing to forgo private resources for collective goals, but this form of cooperation is difficult to enforce or observe directly in real organizations. This study uses an incentivized public goods game (PGG) with Youth Agricultural Innovation Groups (YAIGs) in Ethiopia to elicit and compare different measures of cooperation among members and link these measures to real organizational outcomes. To assess relative importance of cooperative leaders and members, we elicit levels of cooperation among leaders and members. To evaluate and compare cooperation for various causes and motives, we randomly assign 183 youth groups to one of three experimental arms for the member experiment. Members are anonymously paired with three other members within their youth organization and decide how much of an endowment to contribute. In the first arm (Standard PGG arm), the total contribution of the four members is doubled and shared equally between them. In the second arm (YAIG contribution), the total contribution is doubled and transferred to the participant’s own youth organization. In the third arm (Forest contribution arm), the total contribution is doubled and transferred to a broader environmental public good, the Yayu Forest Coffee Biosphere Reserve. We first compare these experimentally elicited cooperations across these three arms, and then examine which measures predict pre-specified organizational outcomes, including economic performance, financial capacity, governance quality, organizational stability, and internal conflict. By varying the beneficiaries of cooperation and eliciting cooperation from both leaders and ordinary members, we provide a large-scale test of the external validity of experimental cooperation measures and identify which forms of cooperation best predict the success of real world organizations.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Abate, Gashaw T et al. 2026. "Who Do People Cooperate For? Experimental Measures of Cooperation Behavior and Organizational Performance." AEA RCT Registry. June 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18882-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-06-08
Intervention End Date
2026-09-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Individual contribution to the common account (ETB) by leaders
2. Individual contribution to the common account (ETB) by members
3. Contribution rate by youth group leaders
4. Contribution rate by youth group members
5. Group-based performance of YAIGs (savings, income, revenue, assets, perceived performance, participation of members, frequency of meetings)
6. Group-level cohesion and trust among members and leaders
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
1. Individual contribution to the common account (ETB) among members: the amount each youth group member contributes out of the 200 ETB endowment. This is the main outcome of the public goods game and ranges from 0 to 200 ETB in increments of 20 Birr.

2. Contribution rate by members of youth groups: the individual contribution by youth members expressed as a share of the 200 ETB endowment (ranging from 0% to 100%).

3. Individual contribution to the common account (ETB) by leaders: the amount each youth leader contributes out of the 200 ETB endowment. This is the main outcome of the public goods game and ranges from 0 to 200 ETB in increments of 20 Birr.

4. Contribution rate by leaders: the individual contribution by youth leaders expressed as a share of the 200 ETB endowment (ranging from 0% to 100%).

5. Group-based performance of YAIGs (savings, income, revenue, assets, perceived performance, participation of members, frequency of meetings). The YAIGs have been operating as a group for the last 4–5 years, but they exhibit substantial performance in terms of
economic performance (e.g., asset accumulation, savings, revenue) and overall functioning (e.g., whether the YAIG can be perceived as fully operational or not).

6. Group-level cohesion and trust among members and leaders: This is measured using reported conflicts and disagreements between members as well as broader trust among YAIG members and leaders.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This section describes the experimental design of the three variants of the incentivized public goods game (PGG). In this study, YAIG members, including leaders, participate in the experiment. Each participant receives an initial endowment of 200 Birr and is randomly matched with three other anonymous participants from the same YAIG. At the time of the study, $1 approximately 155 Ethiopian Birr. Participants privately decide how much of the 200 Birr to keep for themselves and how much to contribute to a group account. Contributions can range from 0 to 200 Birr in increments of 20 Birr (0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, 180, and 200 Birr). The amount kept directly benefits the participant. The amount contributed to the group account is doubled, but the beneficiary of the doubled contribution differs across the three treatment arms.

The experiment follows YAIG level clustered randomization. The 183 YAIGs are randomly assigned to one of three experimental arms, stratified by kebele, as there are multiple YAIGs in each kebele. All participating members and leaders within a YAIG are assigned to the same experimental arm. With each YAIG, participants are anonymously matched into four-person groups for the contribution decision.

Arm 1: Standard PGG arm
In this arm, participants are randomly paired with three other anonymous participants from the same YAIG. Each participant decides how much of the 200 Birr endowment to keep and how much to contribute to the group account. The experimenter doubles the total amount
contributed by the four matched participants and shares the doubled amount equally among them. A participant’s payoff in this arm equals the amount kept for oneself plus one-fourth of the doubled group account.

This arm is a standard, context-free PGG with a social dilemma: contributing is socially beneficial but privately costly. With four participants and a multiplier of two, each Birr contributed returns 0.5 Birr to the contributor but increases total group earnings by 2 Birr. Of the 183 YAIGs, 62 are randomly assigned to this arm.

Arm 2: YAIG contribution arm
In this arm, the contribution is framed as a contribution to the participant’s YAIG account. Participants are anonymously matched with three other participants from the same YAIG and decide how much of the 200 Birr endowment to keep and how much to contribute. The total contribution of the four matched participants is doubled and transferred to the participant’s own YAIG account. Participants directly receive only the amount they keep for themselves, while the contribution benefits the YAIG as an organization. This arm captures cooperation
directed toward an identifiable in-group institution, where benefits accrue to members of the participant’s own youth organization. Of the 183 YAIGs, 61 are randomly assigned to this arm.

In Arm 3: Forest contribution arm
In this arm, the contribution is framed as support for a local forest reserve, the Yayu Forest Coffee Biosphere Reserve. Participants are anonymously matched with three other participants from the same YAIG and decide how much of the 200 Birr endowment to keep and how much to contribute. The total contribution of the four matched participants is doubled and transferred to support conservation activities in the reserve. Participants directly receive only the amount they keep for themselves, while the contribution supports a broader environmental and social public good. This arm captures cooperation directed toward a public good that extends beyond the participant’s immediate youth organization. Of the 183 YAIGs, 60 are randomly assigned to this arm.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization is conducted at the YAIG level. Each YAIG is assigned to one of the treatment arms. A total of 183 YAIGs are randomly assigned into three groups, with stratification at kebele level. Within each YAIG, participants are randomly paired with three other YAIG members for the game. Pairing is done using a pre-generated random list, and participants are not informed of their partner's identity before and after making their decision.
Randomization Unit
Youth groups (YAIGs) in Ethiopia
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
183 YAIGs, 732 YAIG leaders, 2500-2600 YAIG members
Sample size: planned number of observations
183 YAIGs, 732 YAIG leaders, 2500-2600 YAIG members
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
C (Control: Standard PGG): 62 YAIGs, T1 (YAIG contribution): 61 YAIGs, and T2 (Forest contribution): 60 YAIGs
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
The sample consists of YAIG members in Bedele and Gechi districts in the Oromia region in Ethiopia. The target sample is approximately 2500-2600 YAIG members across 183 YAIGs and 16 kebeles. The study is powered to detect a minimum detectable effect of 10 ETB (about 10 percent) in mean contribution (across the three arms) at 80% power and a 5% significance level, assuming an intra-cluster correlation coefficient (ICC) of 0.1. This assumes a YAIG size of 15 youth members (and an attrition rate of 10%) and is based on mean contributions and standard deviations from previous studies in a similar context
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IFPRI IRB
IRB Approval Date
2025-09-29
IRB Approval Number
IRB #00007490
Analysis Plan

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