Gender and the Price of Prejudice

Last registered on June 15, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Gender and the Price of Prejudice
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018884
Initial registration date
June 08, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 15, 2026, 4:29 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Institute of Social and Economic Research - Osaka University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-06-21
End date
2026-07-26
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We conduct an online experiment on Prolific to measure the willingness-to-pay to discriminate against female coworkers, using the price-of-prejudice paradigm of Hedegaard and Tyran (2018). We add a treatment of hidden productivity to highlight the differences between taste-based and statistical discrimination. This document pre-registers the hypotheses, estimation strategy, and power analysis.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Clochard, Gwen-Jiro. 2026. "Gender and the Price of Prejudice." AEA RCT Registry. June 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18884-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We measure the willingness to pay to discriminate against female co-workers in a multi-stage experiment. The main treatment variable will be an information treatment about partner productivity. Comparing No Info and Info groups will enable not only to measure productivity, but also to establish its origin - taste-base vs statistical.
Intervention Start Date
2026-06-21
Intervention End Date
2026-07-26

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
gender discrimination; price-elasticity of discrimination
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Discrimination will be measured through the share of choices where subjects chose a female partner. The price elasticity will measure the evolution of this probability of choosing a female partner, but with the information about partner producitivity.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Race-specific gender discrimination
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Two dimensions of randomness will be introduced in the experiment.
First, we will introduce randomness in the productivity orders for the partner choices, enabling to get a causal measure of gender discrimination.
Second, we will introduce randomness by allocating subjects into four groups for intervention. The main treatment group will be No Info-Info, where subjects will first have no information about partners, and then have productivity information. We will also have three other treatment groups, Info-No Info, No Info-No Info, and Info-Info, that will enable us to measure treatment effects.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done by computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
600 individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
400 No Info-Info
100 Info-No Info
50 Info-Info
50 No Info-No Info
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Simulations give an MDE of 0.7 tau units.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Tulane University Human Research Protection Office
IRB Approval Date
2026-02-24
IRB Approval Number
2025-1631
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Gender_Price_Prejudice_PAP.pdf

MD5: 133c6aa2c205c212738cff7d054cbe49

SHA1: c753904267c35902e6998698e2beaf514680d60d

Uploaded At: June 07, 2026