Trust in unequal societies: An experimental study

Last registered on June 15, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Trust in unequal societies: An experimental study
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0018892
Initial registration date
June 08, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
June 15, 2026, 4:23 PM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Name
Roberto Caputo
Affiliation
Norwegian School of Economics
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Ethan O'Leary
PI Affiliation
Norwegian School of Economics
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-06-09
End date
2026-06-24
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
Trust, Inequality, Fairness
JEL code(s)
C90; D01; D63; D83; D91
Secondary IDs
This study aims to investigate how the source of inequality affects trust beliefs and how this contrasts to observed behaviour. In an online experiment, we exogneously vary whether a fixed inequality within a society of participants is determined through luck or through a mer- itocratic process. We form dyads from a society to play a trust game and a dictator game and elicit beliefs about the other’s actions. This allows us to disentangle to what extent inequal- ity, and the source of such, affects trust and other regarding preferences for equal distribution
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study aims to investigate how the source of inequality affects trust beliefs and how this contrasts to observed behaviour. In an online experiment, we exogneously vary whether a fixed inequality within a society of participants is determined through luck or through a meritocratic process. We form dyads from a society to play a trust game and a dictator game and elicit beliefs about the other's actions. This allows us to disentangle to what extent inequality, and the source of such, affects trust and other regarding preferences for equal distribution.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Caputo, Roberto and Ethan O'Leary. 2026. "Trust in unequal societies: An experimental study." AEA RCT Registry. June 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.18892-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
All participants complete a real-effort task and are then assigned to a high- or low-endowment group. Participants are assigned either with equal chance (Random treatment arm) or on the basis of their score (Merit treatment arm). In the Merit treatment, the high endowment is given to participants who score at least as high as a threshold (the median score from a separate pilot study). The manipulation varies only the source of the inequality in participants' initial endowments.
Participants are then matched with either a high- or low-endowment participant (within the same treatment arm) and play two games, presented in random order:
- a binary trust game, in which they act as both first and second mover and, as first mover, guess the amount their match will return as second mover;
- a modified binary dictator game.
Intervention Start Date
2026-06-09
Intervention End Date
2026-06-24

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Trust beliefs: beliefs about the amount returned by the second mover in a binary trust game.
Trust behaviour: share of first movers sending the positive amount in a binary trust game.
Dictator (altruistic) behaviour: share of dictators sending the positive amount to their match in a modified binary dictator game.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Trust beliefs are measured by the guess an individual states about the amount that would be returned by the second mover (trustworthiness) in a binary trust game, conditional on the first mover having sent the positive amount to the second mover.

Trust behaviour is measured by the individual's choice, as first mover, whether to send the positive amount to their match in a binary trust game. The second mover receives the tripled amount and decides how much to return to the first mover. The first mover's choice is binary.

Altruistic behaviour is measured by the individual's choice, as dictator, whether to send the positive amount to their match. The amount is tripled and the match receives it. The dictator's choice is binary.

All measures are incentivized.

See document for more details.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
The experiment is conducted using English participants on Prolific.
See document for more details
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomisation performed by oTree programme.
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
N/A
Sample size: planned number of observations
800 individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
400 individuals per treatment arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
NHH IRB
IRB Approval Date
2026-06-01
IRB Approval Number
NHH-IRB-2026-181
Analysis Plan

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