Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion

Last registered on July 06, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019071
Initial registration date
June 30, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 06, 2026, 7:27 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Margaret Levenstein
Affiliation
University of Michigan
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Valerie Suslow
PI Affiliation
Johns Hopkins University
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Brian Gunia
PI Affiliation
John Hopkins University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-07-01
End date
2026-08-31
Keywords
Behavior, Firms & Productivity
Additional Keywords
cartels, cooperation, information, communication, collusion, negotiation, trust
JEL code(s)
L41, C91, D22
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines the role of trust in maintaining cooperation. Its primary intervention is differing third party information (received by randomly selected study participants). It includes a protocol designed to manipulate the extent to which the recipient of the information trusts the information.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Gunia, Brian, Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow. 2026. "Undermining Trust: Can Third Party Information Destabilize Collusion." AEA RCT Registry. July 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19071-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Participants are solicited to join an online game. They complete a Qualtrics survey that explains the design of the game and confirms their understanding and attention to the game structure. Participants then play the online game in which they are asked to set a high or low price for the sale of an item. They set the price over an ambiguous number of rounds of play and then answer questions in a follow up survey. Their payoff depends on the number of rounds during which they were able to sustain a "collusive" high price.
Intervention Start Date
2026-07-01
Intervention End Date
2026-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Was collusion (high price) sustained?
2. Do participants report trusting the other party in the game?
3. Do participants report wanting to play the game with the same party in the future?
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Outcomes are measured as follows:
Do participants play "high price?"
Do participants report trust and report wanting to play with the other seller in a post-experiment
survey?

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
1. How does the source of new information affect participants' trust in the quality of that
information?
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
We hypothesize that participants are more likely to trust reports that are consistent with the
self-interests of the reporter.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will solicit participants on Prolific to participate in an online game. In the game, they play
three rounds in which they choose to sell an object at a high or low price. They are offered the opportunity to communicate with the other seller and the buyer.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization is done at the level of individual players.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
None
Sample size: planned number of observations
400
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 in each arm
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

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IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
John Hopkins University HIRG
IRB Approval Date
2023-09-09
IRB Approval Number
HIRB00000756
Analysis Plan