Abstract
Marriage is among the largest financial decisions an Indian family makes. Dowry transfers at a daughter's wedding can consume more than a year of household income, and the quality of her match shapes her economic security, autonomy, and well-being for decades. How wisely families allocate financial resources across daughters therefore matters enormously. Parents typically arrange their children's marriages in birth order. If a good elder match functions as a positive signal to the marriage market, improving how prospective grooms' families view the household, then parents can capitalise on this spillover by strategically allocating more resources to the elder daughter's match. If no such spillover exists, or if parents misjudge it, the same allocation deprives the younger sister of resources to find a suitable match. This study asks whether parents believe that an elder daughter's marriage changes the younger sister's prospects in the marriage market, whether families on the groom's side actually update their assessments in the way parents of daughters expect, and whether parents act on these beliefs when dividing marriage budgets between daughters. We conduct a vignette-based survey experiment with approximately 520 parents of marriageable-age children in two districts of Uttar Pradesh, India. Respondents advise hypothetical families on marriage proposals and budget allocations under experimentally varied family circumstances. The design separates what parents believe about cross-sibling spillovers from their willingness to act on those beliefs, and measures both sides of the same market - the beliefs held by families of brides and the beliefs held by families of grooms.The findings will show how families allocate marriage resources among daughters, whether beliefs on the bride's side match behaviour on the groom's side or a wedge separates the two, and what any such wedge implies for the efficiency of matching in the marriage market and for the design of transfer programmes tied to marriage.