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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
The survey has three experimental modules administered, any 2 of which are administered to a respondent in one face-to-face sitting, along with a demographic questionnaire and a closing questionnaire on marriage norms.
Respondents are screened into one of two belief modules: those with at least two daughters are eligible for the bride-side module, and those with at least one son are eligible for the groom-side module; where a household satisfies both screens, assignment follows the pre-printed respondent identifier.
In the bride-side module, respondents advise the parents of two unmarried daughters who receive a proposal for the elder daughter requiring a gift transfer exceeding half of the family's lifetime marriage savings. Respondents are presented with eight scenarios in which we vary: the proposed groom's quality (Medium vs High), the presence of a brother (brother vs no brother), and the age gap between the daughters (2 vs 5 years), creating a 2 x 2 x 2 full factorial. In each scenario, respondents report: whether to accept the proposal; the expected distribution of the younger daughter's future match opportunities across three groom types had the elder daughter accepted; the effect of the elder's match on how groom-side families view the family; and the gift value the younger would require to marry a high-quality groom had the elder married the proposed groom.
In the groom-side module, respondents advise the parents of a son receiving marriage proposals (we vary the qualifications of the son in line with Medium vs High descriptors from the bride module, between respondents). They evaluate a proposal for the younger daughter of a family where the elder daughter has married, but her match is initially unknown. Phase 1 comprises two baseline scenarios, one with and one without a brother, presented in counterbalanced order. The initial offer is half of the family's lifetime marriage savings (0.5W). Respondents state their likelihood to accept and their reservation gift value to accept this match. In Phase 2, the elder daughter's realised match is revealed (High, Medium, or Low) with the offer adjusted (0.3W, 0.4W, 0.7W respectively), in six scenarios (3 match types x 2 brother categories) whose order follows a 6 x 6 Williams design. Respondents restate acceptance likelihood (0-10), their reservation gift value, and also report how they view the family as a result of the elder's realised match.
The allocation module is administered to all respondents. Respondents choose between an unequal split of the family's marriage savings favouring the elder daughter or an equal split, with both daughters' resulting match qualities fully specified on a 7-point ladder. Cells vary whether the unequal split generates a cross-sibling gain, the age gap, and brother status (none, non-contributing, contributing). Each respondent answers six of twelve potential budget-allocation cells (2 x 2 x 3), drawn from 24 pre-generated configurations balanced so that each cell is seen by an equal number of respondents. Because outcomes are supplied, choices reveal allocation preferences uncontaminated by beliefs about the mapping from budgets to matches.
Finally, we vary family lifetime marriage wealth/savings 'W' (Rs. 2,50,000 or 5,00,000), the unequal split level required to facilitate a match (60%-40% or 70%-30%), and the quality of son being advised (High vs Medium) at the block level between respondents - assigned from pre-generated lists balanced within sampling units.
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After
The survey has three experimental modules, any two of which are administered to a respondent in one face-to-face sitting, together with a demographic questionnaire and a closing module on marriage norms. A verbal-consent question precedes all content; respondents may decline any individual question thereafter.
Respondents are screened into one of two belief modules: those with at least two daughters are eligible for the bride-side module, and those with at least one son are eligible for the groom-side module; where a household satisfies both screens, assignment follows the pre-printed respondent identifier.
In the bride-side module, respondents advise the parents of two unmarried daughters who receive a proposal for the elder daughter requiring a gift transfer exceeding half of the family's lifetime marriage savings. Respondents are presented with eight scenarios in which we vary: the proposed groom's quality (Low vs High), the presence of a brother (brother vs no brother), and the age gap between the daughters (2 vs 5 years), creating a 2 x 2 x 2 full factorial. In each scenario, respondents report: whether to accept the proposal; the expected distribution of the younger daughter's future match opportunities across three groom types had the elder daughter accepted; the effect of the elder's match on how groom-side families view the family; and the gift value the younger would require to marry a high-quality groom had the elder married the proposed groom. An enumerator-recorded protocol captures respondents who decline to name a gift value, distinguishing "no realistic amount", "she could not marry such a groom", comprehension difficulty, and refusal.
In the groom-side module, respondents advise the parents of a son (Medium or High type, varied between respondents) evaluating a proposal for the younger daughter of a family whose elder daughter has married, initially to an unknown groom. The module is blocked by family: for each of two hypothetical families (with vs without a son, order counterbalanced), respondents first answer baseline questions (acceptance likelihood on a 0-10 scale and a reservation gift value, at an offered gift of half the family's savings), then receive three sequential revelations of the elder daughter's realised match (High, Medium, or Low: Class 8 pass, factory labourer) with the offer adjusted to 0.3, 0.4, or 0.7 of savings respectively, restating both outcomes and additionally rating their view of the family (5-point scale) after each revelation. The respondent's own baseline answers for the current family are displayed for reference at each update. The three revelation orders within the first family follow a balanced set of all six permutations; the second family's revelations reverse the first family's order. The reservation-gift hesitation protocol distinguishes "no gift value would suffice", "gifts are irrelevant", comprehension difficulty, and refusal.
The allocation module is administered to all respondents. Respondents choose between an unequal split of the family's marriage savings favouring the elder daughter and an equal split, with both daughters' resulting match qualities fully specified on a 5-point labelled ladder with colour-coded scores. Cells vary whether the unequal split generates a cross-sibling gain, the age gap, and whether the family has a son (framed as easing the budget). Each respondent answers four of eight cells (2 x 2 x 2), drawn from sixteen pre-generated configurations balanced so that each cell is seen by an equal number of respondents; which side of the screen carries the equal split is randomised within respondent. Because outcomes are supplied, choices reveal allocation preferences uncontaminated by beliefs about the mapping from budgets to matches.
Between-respondent block factors: household lifetime marriage wealth W (Rs. 5,00,000 or 10,00,000); the unequal split (60-40 or 70-30), assigned jointly with W on the bride side and orthogonally to W on the groom side; and the advised son's quality (Medium vs High, groom side only). All assignments come from pre-generated lists balanced within sampling unit.
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