Strategic Communication and the Underuse of Incentive-Based Credibility: Experimental Evidence

Last registered on July 13, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Strategic Communication and the Underuse of Incentive-Based Credibility: Experimental Evidence
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019121
Initial registration date
July 08, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 13, 2026, 7:49 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Wellington
PI Affiliation
University of Graz

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-07-12
End date
2026-08-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
In many economically important environments, people receive information from sources whose interests are transparent. Such communication naturally invites skepticism because receivers understand that senders have incentives to influence their beliefs. However, skepticism should not be indiscriminate. When a sender communicates a message that contradicts the direction in which the sender benefits from influencing the receiver, the message becomes particularly credible because it is difficult to reconcile with purely opportunistic behavior.
In this paper, we ask whether receivers exploit this credibility of such incentive-incongruent messages or whether they continue to rely primarily on their own judgment, even when sender incentives imply that a message is unusually likely to be true?
Participants in our experiment act as receivers. They first answer factual questions comparing outcomes under the Obama and Trump administrations. They then observe a message from a sender in a previous study. Senders knew the correct answer, could send either possible message, and had a monetary incentive to induce either an "Obama" or a "Trump" answer. Receivers know the sender's incentive and earn a bonus for choosing the correct answer. This setup allows us to examine how receivers respond to messages, depending on the senders’ incentives and their own prior beliefs.
In additional treatments, we either elicit participants’ estimates of how frequently senders lie or provide them with explicit information on this frequency. In the CRED+ treatment, we additionally ask participants to explain their decision in an open-ended text field and through structured follow-up questions. This allows us to examine how underreaction to credible messages can be mitigated and whether any remaining underreaction to credible messages reflects limited comprehension, persistent reliance on prior beliefs, distrust, or other decision reasons.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Feess, Eberhard, Peter-J. Jost and Anna Ressi. 2026. "Strategic Communication and the Underuse of Incentive-Based Credibility: Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. July 13. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19121-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-07-12
Intervention End Date
2026-08-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The previously specified hypotheses for senders and receivers remain part of the broader project.
For the additional CRED+ treatment, we test the following additional hypothesis:
- H5: Receivers are more likely to follow the sender’s message in CRED+ than in the existing CRED treatment. Consequently, the difference between type-II errors and type-I errors is lower in CRED+ than in CRED.
As in the previous pre-registration, type-I and type-II errors are defined relative to the receiver’s subjectively optimal decision. This decision is derived from the receiver’s initial belief that their answer is correct and the empirical truth frequency of the relevant message type. A type-I error occurs when a receiver follows a message that should not be followed according to this benchmark. A type-II error occurs when a receiver does not follow a message that should be followed according to this benchmark.
We test H5 using both non-parametric comparisons and regression analysis. The main comparison is between CRED+ and the existing CRED treatment. As in the previous pre-registration, the analyses focus on observations for which the sender’s message is not aligned with the receiver’s initial answer.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
The previously specified secondary outcomes remain unchanged.
The only addition concerns the open-ended explanations and structured follow-up questions elicited in CRED+. These analyses are exploratory and are intended to support the interpretation of the behavioral mechanism. Specifically, we examine whether participants’ stated reasons for following or not following the sender’s message point to limited comprehension, persistent reliance on their initial answer, perceived credibility of the message, distrust of the sender, or other reasons.
For the open-ended responses, we will classify participants’ explanations into broad categories that capture the main stated reasons for their decisions. The structured follow-up questions will be analyzed descriptively and, where useful, related to observed follow/not-follow behavior. These analyses are not intended as confirmatory tests of additional hypotheses but as exploratory evidence on the mechanisms underlying receivers’ responses to credible messages.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
This pre-registration extends one of our existing studies by adding one treatment, CRED+. The general design remains unchanged. Participants in the role of receivers know that there are two main stages of which only one will be randomly chosen for determining their bonus.

In stage 1, participants answer factual questions comparing outcomes under the Obama and Trump administrations. Specifically, they are asked whether the unemployment rate in a particular U.S. state, and the crime rate in another U.S. state, was lower during the Obama or the Trump administration. The two questions are presented in random order. Participants know that, if stage 1 is selected for payment, one of the two questions will be randomly chosen and they will receive a bonus if and only if their answer to that question is correct. For each question, we also ask participants how certain they are that their belief is correct.

In stage 2, receivers can revise their previous answers based on a message from a sender in a previous study. In that study, senders knew the correct answer. For each question, they could send one of two possible messages, suggesting that the correct answer was either Obama or Trump. Senders in treatment TRUMP knew that they would receive a bonus if and only if the receiver answered Trump. Senders in treatment OBAMA knew that they would receive a bonus if and only if the receiver answered Obama.

Receivers are informed that senders knew the correct answers but did not need to report truthfully. Receivers are also informed about the senders' incentives. After receiving the sender's message, they again choose whether they believe that Obama or Trump is the correct answer. Receivers know that, if stage 2 is selected for payment, they will receive a bonus if and only if their answer is correct.

To elicit receivers' responses to the senders' messages, we use the strategy method. For each of the two questions, receivers choose between Obama and Trump for each of the two possible sender messages. Payoffs are calculated based on the message the sender actually sent.
The existing treatment manipulation varies the senders' incentives:
• In treatment OBAMA, receivers know that senders got a bonus if and only if the receiver they were matched with answered Obama.
• In treatment TRUMP, receivers know that senders got a bonus if and only if the receiver they were matched with answered Trump.

The additional treatment introduced in this extension is CRED+:
• CRED+ builds on the existing credibility-information treatment. Before making their final decisions, receivers receive information about the empirical truth frequency of the relevant message type.
• After this credibility information is presented, receivers answer an additional comprehension/attention check. The purpose is to ensure that the information has been made salient and to measure whether the participant processed the information.
• After their final decisions in cases where the receiver's initial answer differs from the sender's message, receivers are asked to explain their decision. We first elicit an open-ended explanation and then ask structured questions about possible reasons for their behavior.

In the post-experimental questionnaire, we elicit basic demographic information and personal attitudes, such as political affiliation.
The experiment will be conducted online using the survey software Qualtrics and participants will be recruited using Prolific. We will require participants to reside in the US and show an approval rate of at least 95%. Participants who answered the majority of our first three comprehension questions incorrectly will not be allowed to continue and will hence not be included our sample. Moreover, in the post-experimental questionnaire, participants are asked whether they looked up the answers to the estimation questions on the internet. Those who respond “Yes” will be excluded from the statistical analysis.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
All randomization procedures during the study are implemented by the survey software. This includes assignment to sender-incentive conditions, the order of questions, and the order of answer options.
Randomization Unit
Individual-level randomization
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
We cluster on the participant level and plan to obtain 300 participants/clusters.
Sample size: planned number of observations
This extension adds 300 participants in CRED+. Because we elicit each participant's decisions for both possible messages in two question domains, we obtain four observations per participant. Thus, CRED+ adds 1,200 observations in total. Since the main analyses focus on observations in which the receiver's initial answer differs from the sender's message, approximately half of these observations, i.e., 600 observations, are expected to be usable for the main statistical analysis.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
For CRED+, we plan to recruit 300 participants. Participants will be split evenly across the two sender-incentive conditions, with 150 participants in the condition in which senders were incentivized to induce Trump answers and 150 participants in the condition in which senders were incentivized to induce Obama answers.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethical Review Board (WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management)
IRB Approval Date
2026-07-08
IRB Approval Number
N/A