Abstract
Fish-farming is growing worldwide, especially in developing countries, where it is becoming an alternative source of protein comparable to cattle rearing. Fish farming is also expanding in the Brazilian Amazon, where cattle rearing remains the main usage of already deforested land. Nevertheless, in such region, many barriers prevent fish-farming from becoming comparable to cattle in terms of farm profit and protein supply. The main barriers being the high market risk, due to a still incipient regional/national market, the lack of skilled labour, and the scale economy implied together with lacking credit access. Upon this background, we ask two research questions, having as our target subject the average Rondônia farmer with minimal fish-farming knowledge. First, what is the willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for up-taking a contract offered by a hypothetical new processing plant, as means to increase the share of farmland occupied with sustainable fish farming? Second, which are the marginal utilities for the five key attributes capturing the trade-off between (i) non-monetary costs of adopting good and sustainable fish-farming practices and (ii) better conditions for selling fish and purchasing inputs? These key attributes are: (i) required pond area to be built in the farm, (ii) good and sustainable fish-farming practices, (iii) practice non-compliance penalty, (iv) environmental sustainability label and (v) supplementary payment for fish delivered.
We test ten main hypotheses, namely: (1) the average WTA is statistically significant and larger than the maximum level of profit yielded by fish-farming in the study region, (2) the propensity for up-taking a contract is statistically equal among classes of fish-farmers, (3) marginal utility for required pond area is null, (4) marginal utility for good practices is null, (5) marginal utility for non-compliance-penalty is null, (6) marginal utility for the environmental sustainability label is null, (7) marginal utility for the supplementary payment is null, (8) marginal utility for a contract-based alternative (i.e., the reverse of the status-quo) is null, (9) smallholders not having fish-selling experience are not more likely to opt-out of contracts, and (10) cattle ranching and fish-farming are substitutes when taking all farmers as a whole, but become complements at large farm sizes. A sample of farms with satellite-detected ponds is randomly selected for interviews. All respondents are interviewed in-person and on-field by the research team and hired enumerators. By the time of this registration, only the pretest (pilot) survey was conducted (the full-fledged survey was planned to take place after this registration).