Striking to be Productive: An Experimental Study of Collective Exit Threats and Centralized Redistribution

Last registered on July 27, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Striking to be Productive: An Experimental Study of Collective Exit Threats and Centralized Redistribution
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019251
Initial registration date
July 26, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
July 27, 2026, 7:11 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Hamburg

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-07-27
End date
2026-08-07
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We study whether a collective exit option (the right to strike) affects productivity in an experimental labor market with centralized redistribution. In a repeated game with groups of four (one employer, three workers), workers generate income through a real-effort slider task, subject to a minimum performance requirement backed by a financial penalty. All income from each round is pooled with the employer, who redistributes it freely among all members of the group after observing individual performance. In the treatment condition, workers can vote by majority to strike, suspending the next round's working phase. The strike option gives workers a collective threat that may protect them against expropriation and thereby sustain effort. We test whether the option raises worker effort per working phase, how it affects total group output net of production lost to realized strikes, whether it disciplines employer redistribution, and whether the resulting output gains leave employers themselves better off.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Schimmer, Malte. 2026. "Striking to be Productive: An Experimental Study of Collective Exit Threats and Centralized Redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. July 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19251-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-07-27
Intervention End Date
2026-08-07

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. Worker productivity per conducted working phase: number of correctly completed sliders per worker per working phase in which work took place (excluding strike rounds).
2. Total group output per round: sum of worker-generated ECU per group per round, averaged over all rounds including strike rounds (in which output is zero), before the employer multiplier.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Outcome 1 captures the effect of the strike threat on effort provision; Outcome 2 captures the net productivity effect including the output loss from realized strikes. Because the number of rounds is stochastic, both outcomes are normalized per round/phase.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Total group surplus per round including the employer multiplier (welfare measure; the redistributed pool); worker share of redistributed income per round and the employer's self-allocated share; cumulative payoffs by role; within-group payoff inequality (employer-to-mean-worker payoff ratio; Gini coefficient of cumulative payoffs across all 4 members); employer redistribution style measured by three continuous indices (within-round Spearman correlation between worker effort and allocation; coefficient of variation of worker allocations; average self-allocated share); strike rate, passed strike votes, individual voting, strike duration and timing (treatment only); share of worker-rounds below the 20-slider minimum; share of rounds in which the employer's clicker threshold is met; worker effort in round t as a function of the share received in round t−1; time trends and first-round effects. Post-experimental questionnaire (age, gender, field of study, general risk attitude 0–10) is used for covariates and balance checks.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Between-subject laboratory experiment with two conditions (Baseline, Collective Exit), one session per condition (12:00 and 16:00 on the same day), 60 participants (15 groups of 4) each. Within sessions, participants are randomly assigned to groups and to roles (1 employer, 3 workers), fixed for the entire session. Groups are the independent unit of observation; because each condition is run in a single session, treatment effects cannot be statistically separated from session-level effects, and inference relies on the 15 independent groups per condition. The experiment is computerized in oTree. The number of rounds is stochastic (minimum 10, then 20% ending probability per round). After the game ends, participants complete a short questionnaire (age, gender, field of study, general risk attitude).
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Treatment is assigned at the session level in a fixed order: one Baseline session and one Collective Exit session, conducted sequentially on the same day at the WISO Research Laboratory of the University of Hamburg. Participants register via the laboratory's standard recruitment system without knowledge of the experimental condition. Within sessions, the oTree software randomly assigns participants to groups and roles.
Randomization Unit
Session (condition); individual (group and role assignment within session).
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
30 groups (15 per condition)
Sample size: planned number of observations
120 participants (90 workers, 30 employers); approximately 1,260 worker-round and 420 group-round observations at an expected game length of aprox. 14 rounds.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
60 participants (15 groups) Baseline; 60 participants (15 groups) Collective Exit.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Unit of analysis: group-level means, 15 independent groups per arm (two-sided t-test, alpha = 0.05, power = 0.80), yielding a minimum detectable effect of approximately d = 1.06 standard deviations for both primary outcomes. Using standard deviations estimated from the pilot (4 groups; imprecise — one pilot group was a strong outlier in productivity, so these SDs are likely overestimates and the stated MDEs conservative): Outcome 1 (worker effort per conducted working phase), SD ≈ 24 sliders around a mean of ≈ 52, MDE ≈ 25 sliders (≈ 48% of the pilot mean); Outcome 2 (group output per round including strike rounds), SD ≈ 65 ECU around a mean of ≈ 136, MDE ≈ 69 ECU (≈ 51% of the pilot mean). Panel regressions at the worker-round level (≈ 1,260 observations, group-clustered standard errors) provide additional power for the effort and mechanism hypotheses.
Supporting Documents and Materials

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences (EK WISO), Universität Hamburg
IRB Approval Date
2026-07-23
IRB Approval Number
2026-083
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information