Abstract
Information frictions in the labor market can limit workers’ ability to signal their skills and may disproportionately affect women, who face statistical discrimination and limited access to professional networks. Prior research suggests that verifiable reference letters can improve labor market outcomes, particularly for women. Hence, we study whether the opportunity to earn a reference letter, which makes past work performance visible to employers, affects job selection, effort, performance, and skill investment.
We run a multi-round field experiment embedded in a one time online data-entry job. In Round 1, jobseekers responding to an online advertisement are randomized into one of two arms before deciding whether to sign up: (i) an offer of a verifiable reference letter or (ii) a control condition offering no reference letter. This round measures impacts on selection into the job.
In Round 2, participants who enrolled from the initial (Round 0) control group only are invited to interview for the job, and are re-randomized into two arms : (i) an offer of a verifiable reference letter, or (ii) control condition offering no reference letter, to measure effects on job effort, job performance, and skill investment during the job. If funding allows, we may include (iii) an offer of performance-based bonuses, to benchmark the value of the reference letter to participants.
Outcomes will be analyzed overall and across subgroups, including by gender, to examine heterogeneous treatment effects.