How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment

Last registered on August 20, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019368
Initial registration date
August 13, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 20, 2026, 9:02 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

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Primary Investigator

Name
Yaqiong Luo
Affiliation
Concordia University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Huan Xie
PI Affiliation
Concordia University
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-09-21
End date
2027-05-30
Keywords
Behavior, Lab, Labor, Welfare
Additional Keywords
unemployment benefits, relational contracts, gift exchange, repeated games
JEL code(s)
C92, J41, J65
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We conduct a lab experiment based on a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game with unemployment-benefit policies. Using a three-arm between-subjects design, we examine the effects of introducing unemployment benefits and varying benefit eligibility based on current unemployment versus recent employment history. Our experiment sheds light on how social insurance rules shape relational incentives and cooperation in labor-market interactions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Luo, Yaqiong and Huan Xie. 2026. "How Do Government Unemployment Benefit Programs Affect Worker-Firm Relational Contracts? An Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. August 20. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19368-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2026-09-21
Intervention End Date
2027-05-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Relational cooperation, labor-market performance, and relationship stability.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In the experiment, we implement a repeated worker-firm gift-exchange game in a laboratory labor-market setting. Participants are assigned to fixed roles as firms or workers and interact repeatedly within the same market. Firms make wage offers with desired effort levels, workers decide whether to accept employment or remain unemployed, and employed workers choose actual effort. We use a three-arm between-subjects design. The treatment variation concerns the unemployment-benefit environment: a baseline labor-market environment is compared with two unemployment-benefit regimes that differ in their eligibility requirements. The design allows us to study how unemployment-benefit rules affect relational incentives and repeated worker-firm interactions.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization done by computer.
Randomization Unit
Treatments are randomized at the session level. Within each session, participants are randomly assigned to fixed roles as firms or workers at the beginning of the experiment.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
15 sessions.
Sample size: planned number of observations
180 participants.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
60 participants per treatment arm.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan