Leasing the sun: asset-based and performance-contingent finance for the solar-adoption gap among small manufacturers in Pakistan

Last registered on August 20, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Leasing the sun: asset-based and performance-contingent finance for the solar-adoption gap among small manufacturers in Pakistan
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019423
Initial registration date
August 16, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 20, 2026, 9:09 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Lahore School of Economics

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Lahore School of Economics
PI Affiliation
ILO

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2027-01-01
End date
2029-05-01
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial is based on or builds upon one or more prior RCTs.
Abstract
Small manufacturers in Punjab spend roughly 28% of operating costs on energy, and falling panel prices have cut solar payback to 1.5–2 years, yet few have adopted. Our completed randomized experiment among 657 firms (IGC PAK-22225; AEARCTR-0010691) shows the barrier is not information: short informational videos raised firms' knowledge of the correct savings range by 19–22 percentage points but left attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and adoption essentially unmoved. The evidence points instead to a financing constraint, as 95% of these firms have never held a bank loan, and toward a specific instrument: 64.7% would consider a rent-to-own arrangement versus 26% a bank loan, and rent-to-own willingness is the financing attitude most strongly tied to intended adoption. We aim to test whether asset-based, performance-contingent solar finance can close the gap for credit-excluded small firms. Because a solar system is discrete, resaleable, and directly metered, repayments can flex with realized generation at near-zero verification cost, making it an especially good fit for performance-contingent contracts. The current work comprises three linked components to support the development of a pre-registered design and power analysis for a full RCT: qualitative supply-side scoping of Pakistan's emerging asset-finance market, including value-chain anchor models; an incentivized discrete-choice experiment on 250 firms eliciting demand over contract terms and structures; and a small randomized real-offer pilot with a provider partner.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Chaudhry, Azam, Theresa Chaudhry and Nikita Grabher-Meyer. 2026. "Leasing the sun: asset-based and performance-contingent finance for the solar-adoption gap among small manufacturers in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. August 20. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19423-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The current project It builds on an existing panel of 657 small manufacturers whose baseline beliefs, financing preferences, and firm attributes are already measured, and on a separately funded follow-up telephone survey that records actual adoption and the financing method used. In order to develop the full RCT, we are currently engaged in the following background research and piloting initiatives:
(a) Supply-side market scoping. We will map the emerging market for asset-based solar finance through 20–30 structured interviews with installers/EPC firms, asset-finance and leasing companies, microfinance institutions, and DFI-backed investors, characterising the contract taxonomy (BOT, BOOT, PPA) and documenting the ~1 MW threshold below which fixed costs make these unviable, defining the sub-1 MW “missing middle” our MSMEs occupy (documented so far in a preliminary consultation with a local supplier; the interviews will establish them systematically). We will approach lease-to-own providers (Royal Solar Energy, Multan), providers that have declined the SME segment (e.g. Alpha Solar), and DFIs including BII and its investee platforms (e.g. Atlas Energy). Collecting contract templates and unit-economics, we will characterise pricing and the binding supply constraints (fixed costs, default/repossession risk, the documentation barrier), then assess the delivery-model design space that could serve the missing middle.
(a-ii) Value-chain / anchor-financing scoping. A dedicated strand assesses whether solar finance can be delivered through supply-chain anchors (lead exporters, estate authorities, sector associations), which resolve both problems at once: aggregating many small suppliers into one program (spreading fixed origination cost) while deducting repayments at source from trade payments (the design proven by Cordaro et al., 2025) and pre-selecting creditworthy suppliers from the commercial relationship. In our existing panel, 24.8% of firms are value-chain-linked, concentrated in Sialkot (≈80%) and Gujranwala (36%). We will interview candidate anchors and their financiers on willingness to anchor, the legal feasibility of payment-linked repayment, exposure to buyer/brand decarbonisation mandates, and supplier single-buyer-dependence.
(b) Demand-side contract-terms experiment. Among 250 firms (drawn primarily from the existing panel plus a targeted fresh sample including an oversample of women-owned firms) we will field an incentivised discrete-choice/conjoint experiment varying the salient features of an offer: up-front deposit, contract length, monthly instalment, early-buyout option, bundled maintenance/insurance, system size (partial vs. fuller coverage, directly targeting the “all-or-nothing” belief that was the strongest barrier in the completed study), and the contract’s performance-contingency: fixed lease-to-own vs. savings-linked vs. a hybrid that flexes with realised savings up to a capped total (Cordaro et al., 2025). For each offer, the firm makes a simple accept-or-reject choice; exactly one choice is made real using the Prince method (Johnson et al., 2021), more transparent for a low-numeracy population than BDM.
(c) Small real-offer pilot and RCT design. With the partner provider, we will deliver 15–20 randomised real offers to firms from the demand-experiment sample to test operational feasibility and measure real take-up, verified against the provider’s origination/contracting records and, for installations, by site visit and metered generation. Contingency: if no provider commits by month 4, the module falls back to refundable-deposit bookings for independent site visits/quotes brokered by the team (still yielding a revealed take-up measure) and the pilot budget shifts to deepening the supply-side and anchor scoping. Candidate partners beyond Royal Solar Energy are identified in the month 1–4 interviews, which double as recruitment meetings. The deliverable is a pre-registered design and power analysis for a full randomised evaluation: the offer, unit of randomisation, outcomes, and the partnership and data architecture needed to implement it.
Intervention Start Date
2028-01-01
Intervention End Date
2028-12-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
take-up of solar panel financing offer; firm performance indicators
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Treatment 1: fixed lease-to-own payments on solar panels
Treatment 2: performance-based/contingent lease-to-own payments on solar panels
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
by computer (Stata)
Randomization Unit
Firm
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
4-5 districts in Punjab
Sample size: planned number of observations
375 firms
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Control: 125 firms; Treatment 1: 125 firms; Treatment 2: 125 firms
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number