Abstract
Cashew is one of Mozambique's most important agricultural export crops and a significant source of income for rural households, supporting roughly 1.5 million smallholder farming families concentrated in the northern provinces. Farmgate prices vary widely across locations and marketing channels, and farmers often sell without timely knowledge of the IAM reference price announced ahead of each harvest season, which may limit their ability to assess and negotiate the offers they receive.
This study uses a village-level randomized controlled trial to measure whether providing smallholder cashew producers in Nampula Province with reference price information ahead of the selling season raises the farmgate prices they receive. Approximately 500 cashew-producing households across at least 60 villages complete an in-person baseline survey before the campaign, covering sales and prices received in the previous season, current price expectations, marketing channels and buyer relationships, and household characteristics. Villages are then randomly assigned to receive the IAM reference price via SMS, delivered shortly after it is announced for the season, or to a comparison group that receives no such information. A follow-up phone survey after the selling campaign records the prices households actually received, along with the quantities, timing, and channels through which they sold.
The main hypothesis is that limited access to timely price information constrains farmers' bargaining position at the point of sale, and that households receiving the reference price will therefore obtain higher farmgate prices than comparable households that do not. The analysis will estimate intention-to-treat effects on prices received, accounting for household and village characteristics. The study will generate evidence on whether access to price information raises the prices smallholder producers receive, with direct implications for the design of low-cost measures to improve price transmission in the cashew value chain.