Promotion of Peers and Retention Concerns over Future Targets

Last registered on August 31, 2026
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Promotion of Peers and Retention Concerns over Future Targets
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019524
Initial registration date
August 27, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 31, 2026, 8:35 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

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Primary Investigator

Name
Jeremy Douthit
Affiliation
University of Arizona
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Michael Majerczyk
PI Affiliation
Georgia State University
PI Name
Reed Dickson
PI Affiliation
University of Arizona
PI Name
Kaitlin Hudspeth
PI Affiliation
University of Southern Mississippi

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2026-09-01
End date
2027-06-01
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
accounting, promotions, targets
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment with student participants, we examine how non-promoted employees' response to the promotion of their peer. Specifically, we examine what non-promoted employees expect their promoted peer to set performance targets at for the non-promoted employees and how a peer's promotion affects non-promoted employees’ intention to leave the firm. We further examine whether these effects differ when non-promoted employees were could, versus could not, compete for the promotion their new manager received and whether the types of tasks previously performed with a promoted peer. Prior research suggests that non-promoted employees are more likely to leave the firm due to a perceived lack of upward mobility opportunities, but we examine other rationales for why employees may leave the firm following a peers’ promotion. Notably, our theory suggests that non-promoted employees anticipate the promoted peer to set more aggressive targets for them going forward. We expect this to be especially true for those non-promoted employees who competed for the promotion with the promoted peer, but lessened when the non-promoted employee had previously performed cooperative tasks with the promoted peer.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Dickson, Reed et al. 2026. "Promotion of Peers and Retention Concerns over Future Targets." AEA RCT Registry. August 31. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19524-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Experimental groups of 5 employees will complete the experiment. They will complete a general trivia task and then seven production periods. Before period five, it is announced that one employee from each group will be promoted to a role of manager, who will set performance targets for the group they oversee in periods six and seven. After period five, the promotion occurs and all non-promoted employees state what they expect the new manager to set their new targets at and whether they wish to work for another, lower-paying, firm in periods six and seven.

We manipulate, between-subjects, whether a given employee is eligible for promotion (3 of 5 group members are always eligible). We manipulate, between-subjects, whether the promoted employee oversees the group they were previously in or another group within the same session. We manipulate, between-subjects, whether two of the first five periods involve a task where cooperation is necessary or whether all of the first five periods involve tasks that are independently completed. All manipulations occur at the session-level and apply to all participants in the session.
Intervention Start Date
2026-09-01
Intervention End Date
2027-06-01

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The primary outcome variables are generated by the non-promoted employees immediately after the promotion is announced at the end of period 5. They are: 1) expectations of the difficulty of the targets that the promoted employee will set and 2) whether they choose to leave the firm for the lower-paying alternative.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary outcomes are based on exit questionnaire items. They examine aspects of our theory, including 1) expectations of hard targets by managers to differ based on whether an employee had been eligible for promotion, 2) the fairness of harder targets to be set by managers, 3) whether managers would base their targets on the manager's or employee's prior performance, and 4) their overall treatment by the division. We also collect covariates related to risk, demographics, and social trust to ensure these do not affect results in unintended ways.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Experimental groups of 5 employees will complete the experiment. They will complete a general trivia task and then seven production periods. Before period five, it is announced that one employee from each group will be promoted to a role of manager, who will set performance targets for the group they oversee in periods six and seven. After period five, the promotion occurs and all non-promoted employees state what they expect the new manager to set their new targets at and whether they wish to work for another, lower-paying, firm in periods six and seven.

We manipulate, between-subjects, whether a given employee is eligible for promotion (3 of 5 group members are always eligible). We manipulate, between-subjects, whether the promoted employee oversees the group they were previously in or another group within the same session. We manipulate, between-subjects, whether two of the first five periods involve a task where cooperation is necessary or whether all of the first five periods involve tasks that are independently completed. All manipulations occur at the session-level and apply to all participants in the session.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by the computer in the office prior to data collection. It determines order of what treatment occurs in each of the first four sessions. Subsequent sessions will follow this procedure subject to the caveat that each treatment needs to end with a similar number of subjects.
Randomization Unit
Each session is randomized to a different treatment. Within session, the employees in each group are randomly assigned to be eligible/ineligible for promotion.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Between 200-300 students, depending on funding availability and subject pool depth.
Sample size: planned number of observations
200-300 students, depending on funding availability and subject pool depth
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Between 40-60 non-promoted employees (half of which were eligible for promotion and half of which were not eligible) and 10-12 promoted managers for each of our four experimental conditions.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Because the primary outcome is novel to our study and no prior data are available to estimate its standard deviation, MDEs are expressed in standardized units rather than the outcome's raw units. We assume 25 observations of each type of employee in each of our four conditions, with alpha of 0.05 and 80% power. Using one-tailed tests, MDE for simple treatment effects is between 0.35-1 SD.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
University of Arizona Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2026-04-13
IRB Approval Number
7865
Analysis Plan

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