Price transparency and remittance provider choice in the GCC-to-Pakistan corridor

Last registered on October 07, 2026

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Price transparency and remittance provider choice in the GCC-to-Pakistan corridor
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0019897
Initial registration date
October 07, 2026

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
October 07, 2026, 11:20 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
London School of Economics

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of New Mexico

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2026-08-23
End date
2026-10-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This study examines how remittance price transparency and provider characteristics shape remittance provider choice in GCC-to-Pakistan corridors. Approximately 1,000 GCC-based senders, linked to recipient households surveyed in Pakistan, complete a discrete choice experiment. Each remittance sender receives four choice tasks (Part 1) between two hypothetical formal providers plus four choice tasks (Part 2) between a varying formal provider and a fixed, low-transparency option representing an informal provider commonly known as hawala. Transfer fee, exchange-rate margin, arrival time, payout method, and send channel vary within a blocked D-efficient design. Price transparency is a provider-level display condition applied separately and balanced across the underlying attributes, making it orthogonal to them in the selected design.

Each part 1 choice task contains one standard-transparency and one high-transparency formal provider. In part 2, the formal option uses each display condition in two of the four choices. The study estimates cost sensitivity, willingness to pay for service features, and whether transparency changes sensitivity to exchange-rate margins. A ninth displayed task repeats one of the respondent's own prior choice task with left/right positions flipped. It is used only to measure response consistency and is excluded from preference estimation.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Adams, Paul and Alexander Fertig. 2026. "Price transparency and remittance provider choice in the GCC-to-Pakistan corridor." AEA RCT Registry. October 07. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.19897-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The main intervention is the introduction of a high transparency provider into the respondents choice set, making a choice between two hypothetical remittance providers. A standard-transparency formal-provider display shows the provider’s fee, offered exchange rate, and service attributes (arrival time, how the receiver collects the money; how the sender initiates the transaction. A high-transparency formal-provider display also shows the official market-rate benchmark and the calculated final amount received in PKR.
Intervention Start Date
2026-08-23
Intervention End Date
2026-10-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
The main outcome of interest is the choice of provider.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
The two pre-specified primary estimands are:
- In Part 1, the transparency-by-exchange-rate-margin interaction in formal-provider utility; and
- In Part 2, the interaction between formal-option transparency and the formal-minus-informal exchange-rate-margin difference.

Hypothesis 1: Transparency makes choice more responsive to the exchange-rate margin when comparing formal providers.
Hypothesis 2: Transparency makes formal-versus-informal choice more responsive to the formal option's relative exchange-rate margin.

Both are tested two-sided. Holm-adjusted and unadjusted p-values and 95% confidence intervals will be reported across the two primary tests.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary outcomes and estimands include fee and margin sensitivity; preferences and willingness to pay for arrival time, payout method, and send channel; the transparency main effect; transparency-by-fee; average marginal effects; formal-choice probabilities; and indifference thresholds. Pre-specified exploratory heterogeneity analyses cover age, monthly income, actual remittance amount, education, employment, and remittance frequency. Gender and GCC-country or corridor differences are descriptive or exploratory subject to estimability. Other respondent characteristics are post-registration exploratory analyses.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Within-respondent blocked discrete choice experiment using a fixed Bayesian D-efficient design. Six design blocks distribute 48 selected task templates across the sample while each respondent completes eight estimation choice sets. The main intervention is the introduction of high transparency providers within the choice set.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Within each assigned block, the order of the eight estimation tasks, the eligible repeat-task source position and content, and the A/B placement of alternatives are assigned using reproducible pseudorandom draws, and the realized assignments are stored. In Part 2, the formal option uses the high-transparency display in two of four tasks and the standard display in two. The same respondent-specific task order and A/B placement are used in the web-link and image-card versions.

Randomization Unit
The respondent is the unit for pseudorandom task sequencing and repeat-task selection; the respondent-task choice set is the unit for the joint pseudorandom A/B permutation of the two transparency conditions
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Approximately 1,000 completed remittance sender respondents, contributing up to 8,000 real estimation choice sets (each respondent completes 8 real choice tasks). Approximately 1,000 additional repeated choices are collected only for quality control.
Sample size: planned number of observations
9,000 estimation choice sets completed, including 8,000 real choice sets and 1,000 additional repeated choices collected for quality control
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
All respondents get 50% control (standard transparency providers) and 50% treatment (high transparency providers) in both Part 1 and Part 2.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Power is based on 1,000 joint Monte Carlo replications of the current selected six-block templates. The same 1,000 respondents complete four part 1 and four part 2 real choice tasks in each replication; the ninth displayed repeat is excluded. Choices are generated at the design-prior means. The assumed transparency-by-margin coefficient, TM = -0.2, is used for design search and simulation. It represents an additional utility change of -0.2 when the exchange-rate margin worsens by one percentage point under high transparency and does not constrain estimation. Part 1 is estimated by the fixed conditional-logit equivalent. Part 2 is estimated as a formal choice with the hawala-like alternative-specific constant and block fixed effects. Both use respondent-clustered sandwich standard errors. The registered Holm correction is applied to the two primary transparency-by-margin p-values within each replication. At the prior mean of -0.200, Holm-adjusted empirical power is 0.142 in part 1 and 0.065 in part 2 (Monte Carlo standard errors 0.011 and 0.008); unadjusted power is 0.218 and 0.117. The MDEs were calculated from 1,000 joint simulations over a grid of effect magnitudes, setting both primary interactions to the same negative value at each point. Interpolation at 80% power gives unadjusted MDEs of 0.487 and 0.763 and Holm-adjusted MDEs of 0.522 and 0.764 for parts 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, the current sample is not conventionally powered for either interaction at the design-prior mean. The estimands remain pre-specified and will be reported with confidence intervals and an explicit statement of limited precision. The repeat contributes no power.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Innovations for Poverty Action IRB
IRB Approval Date
2026-07-08
IRB Approval Number
17768
Analysis Plan

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information