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Field
Last Published
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Before
April 27, 2017 12:33 PM
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After
June 28, 2017 09:54 AM
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
(good) advice followed or not; subject envy; demographics
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After
(good) advice followed or not; subject envy; stubbornness (in general and relating to the sunk-cost fallacy); whether the nature of the task matters (luck or ability-based) in determining if advice is followed; demographics
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Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Whether good advice is followed is determined in the experiment: advice is good if following it increases expected payoff. Remuneration is determined by treatment (low or high, can be affected by the subject or cannot). Subject envy is a measure of envy drawn from the psychology literature.
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After
Whether good advice is followed is determined in the experiment: advice is good if following it increases expected payoff. Remuneration is determined by treatment (low or high, can be affected by the subject or cannot). We can also measure the role of the task itself (whether luck or ability-based) by looking at behaviour by the same individuals across tasks. Subject envy is a measure of envy drawn from the psychology literature. Stubbornness associated with the sunk-cost fallacy is measured using scenarios derived from the relevant social science literature converted to a Likert scale. Stubbornness is measured using a series of questions taken from the existing literature and again converted to a Likert scale.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Subjects receive information on the quality of the advice and their own quality which allows them to make a simple rational choice. They also receive information on the remuneration of the advisor but they know that this remuneration was allocated after the advice was made and has no link to the quality of the advice.
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After
Subjects receive information on the quality of the advice and their own quality which allows them to make a simple rational choice. They also receive information on the ex-post remuneration of the advisor. It is common knowledge that all participants receive the same instructions before the tasks where it is made clear that remuneration was revealed and allocated after the advice was made. This means that there is no link between remuneration and the quality of the advice. The two tasks differ in a meaningful way (one is luck-based, one is ability-based) and allow us to perform a within-subject analysis of the difference in behaviour across tasks to allow us to check whether the type of task matters.
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