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Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
completed
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Abstract
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Before
We will recruit survey participants on MTurk to conduct an online survey. With this survey, we plan to study whether the legitimacy (in the sense of conformity to the law) of a certain political view also affects its social desirability.
First, all subjects will answer a few demographic questions. Second, they will be asked about their opinion on prohibiting the building of minarets. Third, they will be asked to participate in a dictator game where they will have to split $3 between them and another subject. They will be randomized into four groups. Subjects in the control group will only be told that the other subject is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland. Subjects in the "anti-minarets" treatment group will be also told that the other subject is against the building of minarets. Subjects in the "anti-minarets public support" will additionally be told that the 57.5% of Swiss voters is against minarets. Finally, subjects in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" will be additionally told that following the result of a referendum in 2009, building minarets is illegal in Switzerland.
Our main hypotheses are:
1) The donation rates will be reduced in the "anti-minarets" when compared to the donation rates in the control group.
2) The donation rates will be increased in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" when compared to the donation rates in the "anti-minarets public support" group.
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After
We will recruit survey participants on MTurk to conduct an online survey. With this survey, we plan to study whether the legitimacy (in the sense of conformity to the law) of a certain political view also affects its social desirability.
First, all subjects will answer a few demographic questions. Second, they will be asked about their opinion on prohibiting the building of minarets. Third, they will be asked to participate in a dictator game where they will have to split $3 between them and another subject. They will be randomized into four groups. Subjects in the control group will only be told that the other subject is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland. Subjects in the "anti-minarets" treatment group will be also told that the other subject is against the building of minarets. Subjects in the "anti-minarets public support" will additionally be told that the 57.5% of Swiss voters is against minarets. Finally, subjects in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" will be additionally told that following the result of a referendum in 2009, building minarets is illegal in Switzerland.
Our main hypotheses are:
1) The donation rates will be reduced in the "anti-minarets" when compared to the donation rates in the control group.
2) The donation rates will be increased in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" when compared to the donation rates in the "anti-minarets public support" group.
In a follow-up experiment, we recruit participants through an online panel survey firm who previously self-identified to the firm as Democrats. We study how the 2016 US presidential election changed people’s interpretation of observed xenophobic expression. First, all participants answer a few demographic questions. Second, the participants (player 1) are asked to play a dictator game with a random participant to a previous study (player 2) that they are matched with. Players 1 are informed that in the other study player 2 authorized a donation to an anti-immigration organization. We cross-randomize whether we tell player 1 that: i) Trump or Clinton won the election in player 2’s area (respectively "Trump won" and "Clinton won" treatment); and ii) player 2’s donation was in private or publicly observable on a website shared with other participants from his/her area (respectively "private" treatment and 'public" treatment). Our hypothesis is that player 1 donation rates to player 2 will be higher in the "Trump won public" treatment than in the other three treatment conditions.
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Last Published
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Before
March 02, 2017 06:47 PM
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After
May 18, 2019 01:07 PM
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
Dictator game decisions are the answer to the following question:
"In this exercise, we matched you with a participant from another survey. You will not know who you are paired with; only the researchers will know this. However, we will provide you with some additional background information about the other participant.
The participant you are matched with is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland.
You and the other participant will split a total bonus of $3. You alone will make the decision of how much of the $3 you will receive and how much of the $3 the other participant will receive. Whatever decision you make will be implemented. You can choose to divide the $3 however you like. Whatever you do not give to the other person you get to keep. The amount you keep will be credited to your MTurk account in the form of a bonus payment.For example, if you decide to give $1.70, then you will receive a bonus payment of $1.30.
How much would you like to give to the other person?"
We will examine two outcomes:
a) the average and median amount donated;
b) whether the participant donated a positive amount.
In a second phase of the experiment we slightly modified the text of our survey to the following:
"In this exercise, we matched you with a participant from another anonymous survey. You will not know who you are paired with. However, we will provide you with some additional background information about the other participant."
The purpose is to make clear that the person who expresses the anti-minaret sentiment did so in private, and not because of public pressure.
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After
Dictator game decisions are the answer to the following question:
"In this exercise, we matched you with a participant from another survey. You will not know who you are paired with; only the researchers will know this. However, we will provide you with some additional background information about the other participant.
The participant you are matched with is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland.
You and the other participant will split a total bonus of $3. You alone will make the decision of how much of the $3 you will receive and how much of the $3 the other participant will receive. Whatever decision you make will be implemented. You can choose to divide the $3 however you like. Whatever you do not give to the other person you get to keep. The amount you keep will be credited to your MTurk account in the form of a bonus payment.For example, if you decide to give $1.70, then you will receive a bonus payment of $1.30.
How much would you like to give to the other person?"
We will examine two outcomes:
a) the average and median amount donated;
b) whether the participant donated a positive amount.
In a second phase of the experiment we slightly modified the text of our survey to the following:
"In this exercise, we matched you with a participant from another anonymous survey. You will not know who you are paired with. However, we will provide you with some additional background information about the other participant."
The purpose is to make clear that the person who expresses the anti-minaret sentiment did so in private, and not because of public pressure.
In the second experiment, the dictator game decisions are the answer to the following question:
"You and the other participant will split a total bonus of $2. You alone will make the decision of how much of the $2 you will receive and how much of the $2 the other participant will receive. You can choose to divide the $2 however you like, and you get to keep whatever you do not give to the other participant. For example, if you decide to give $1.30, then you will receive $0.70. Your survey provider will credit this bonus to your account.
How much would you like to give to the other participant? Keep in mind that when making his donation decision, the other participant did not know that he would be playing this follow-up game. Your decision about how much to give the other participant will be completely anonymous."
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We will recruit survey participants on MTurk to conduct an online survey. With this survey, we plan to study whether the legitimacy (in the sense of conformity to the law) of a certain political view also affects its social desirability.
First, all subjects will answer a few demographic questions. Second, they will be asked what is their opinion on prohibiting the building of minarets. We will focus our analysis on participants who are against prohibiting the building of minarets. Third, they will be asked to participate in a dictator game where they will have to split $3 between them and another subject. They will be randomized into four groups. Subjects in the control group will only be told that the other subject is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland. Subjects in the "anti-minarets" treatment group will be also told that the other subject is against minarets. Subjects in the "anti-minarets public support" will additionally be told that 57.5% of Swiss voters is against minarets. Finally, subjects in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" will be also told that following the result of a referendum, building minarets is illegal in Switzerland.
Participants in the control group will be asked whether they think minarets are illegal in Switzerland, and what percentage of Swiss people they think are against minarets.
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After
We will recruit survey participants on MTurk to conduct an online survey. With this survey, we plan to study whether the legitimacy (in the sense of conformity to the law) of a certain political view also affects its social desirability.
First, all subjects will answer a few demographic questions. Second, they will be asked what is their opinion on prohibiting the building of minarets. We will focus our analysis on participants who are against prohibiting the building of minarets. Third, they will be asked to participate in a dictator game where they will have to split $3 between them and another subject. They will be randomized into four groups. Subjects in the control group will only be told that the other subject is a 24-year-old male from Switzerland. Subjects in the "anti-minarets" treatment group will be also told that the other subject is against minarets. Subjects in the "anti-minarets public support" will additionally be told that 57.5% of Swiss voters is against minarets. Finally, subjects in the "anti-minarets legitimacy" will be also told that following the result of a referendum, building minarets is illegal in Switzerland.
Participants in the control group will be asked whether they think minarets are illegal in Switzerland, and what percentage of Swiss people they think are against minarets.
In a follow-up experiment, we recruit participants through an online panel survey firm who previously self-identified to the firm as Democrats. First, all participants answer a few demographic questions. Second, we randomize the participants in one of two groups. In the "Trump won" group we tell participants that a respondent from another survey comes from an area where Trump won the election. In the "Clinton won" group we tell participants that a respondent from another survey comes from an area where Clinton won the election. Then all subjects are presented with two anti-immigrant quotes and are asked to predict the share of voters in the other participant’s area that
they believed would agree with the quotes. Third, the participants (player 1) are asked to play a dictator game with a random participant to a previous study (player 2) that they are matched with. Players 1 are informed that in the other study player 2 authorized a donation to an anti-immigration organization. We cross-randomize with the Trump/Clinton won treatments whether we tell player 1 that player 2’s donation was in private or publicly observable on a website shared with other participants from his/her area (respectively "private" treatment and 'public" treatment).
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
400
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After
400
In the second experiment, 1,800
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
100 control group, 100 anti-minarets, 100 anti-minarets public support, 100 anti-minarets referendum
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After
100 control group, 100 anti-minarets, 100 anti-minarets public support, 100 anti-minarets referendum
In the second experiment: 450 Trump won public, 450 Trump won private, 450 Clinton won public, 450 Clinton won private
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