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Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?
Last registered on May 02, 2017

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0002166
Initial registration date
April 20, 2017
Last updated
May 02, 2017 4:10 PM EDT
Location(s)
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Stockholm School of Economics
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Stockholm School of Economics
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2017-04-20
End date
2017-04-28
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second. We hypothesize firstly, that a significant share of participants in the second treatment will choose to not disclose their name, thereby forego the opportunity to gather social esteem. Secondly, that this behavior by some subjects devalues the opportunity to gather social esteem and hence will lead to lower effort to donate in the second treatment as compared to the first.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Born, Andreas and Christian Jacobsson. 2017. "Self-Promoted Altruism: Looking Bad by Doing Good?." AEA RCT Registry. May 02. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2166/history/17163
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2017-04-20
Intervention End Date
2017-04-28
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Number of buttons clicked; Choice whether to reveal name; survey question about difference in donation-effort if choice/no choice; evaluation of social appropriateness of 3 different behaviors (from the post-survey)
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
In the experiment participants will be able to collect money to The Red Cross in a real effort task resembling the task used by Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009). We introduce two different treatments in which we vary the mechanism with which information about donations and the person donating is made public. In both treatments only the 10 participants with a highest donations are announced to everyone by name together with the amount of their donation. Whereas this disclosure of participants' names is automatic in the first treatment, this is subject to choice in the second.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Subjects draw a seat card from a stack of mixed cards. The card assigns them to a particular spot in one of two rooms (one for each treatment). So both, assignment to the room (=treatment) as well as assignment to a particular seat, is random.
Randomization Unit
individual participant
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
1
Sample size: planned number of observations
200-240 students participating in the experiment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100-120 participants in each of the two treatments.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports and Papers
Preliminary Reports
Relevant Papers